The Jihadi Iceberg

The series of explosions since December last in Mumbai, culminating in the twin blasts of August 25, 2003,which killed over 50 innocent civilians, should be a matter of great concern to our policy-makers and publicopinion for three reasons.

• First, there seems to be a deterioration in the preventive and investigative capability of our securityagencies in matters relating to terrorism outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
  
  
• Second, despite the reports of the task forces on the revamping of the intelligence apparatus and internalsecurity management set up by the Government of India in 2000 and those of the three National SecurityAdvisory Boards, there seems to be no significant improvement in our counter-terrorism capability.
  
  
• Third, despite the periodic claims by Government spokesmen about the successes of our security agencies indetecting and neutralising  dozens of jihadi terrorist and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) modules ,dozens more  of them continue to operate undetected and with their motivation and capability for actionundiminished.

Lacking TECHNIT

Effective counter-terrorism depends on the ability to collect preventive intelligence, effective physicalsecurity to deny success to the terrorists even if intelligence fails and a thorough investigation of the actsof terrorism committed in order to identify those responsible, their supporters and their networks and takeaction against them.

Penetration of terrorist organisations for the collection of preventive human intelligence (HUMINT) abouttheir plans is very difficult. No intelligence agency in the world has effectively  done so -- not evenin Israel, despite some occasional successes.  A HUMINT gap  is, therefore, inevitable. This has tobe made good by effective technical intelligence (TECHINT) coverage and competent investigation of the acts ofterrorism committed. Evidence collected during the investigation through the interrogation of capturedsuspects and following up the clues provided by them could result in  a fund of actionable intelligence.

The successes scored so far by the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) in arresting or killing some of the senior leaders of Al Qaeda would not have been possible butfor the excellent TECHINT coverage provided by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the clues collectedduring the interrogation of those arrested.

One has the impression that the Mumbai Police has not had the benefit of similar TECHINT back-up eitherfrom the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is responsible for internal security, including counter-terrorism, orthe Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), which deals with the external ramifications of jihadi terrorism.

The excellent TECHINT support provided by the IB and the R&AW was one of the factors, which facilitatedthe success of our counter-terrorism operations in Punjab. One has not seen evidence of similar support inMumbai. It is not clear what is this due to. Temporary weakening of  our TECHINT capability due to thereported decision to set up a new TECHINT agency , which is still in the process of finding its feet? Thenon-use of modern means of communications such as telephones, the internet etc by the terrorists in ourterritory for communicating with each other? Inhibitions arising from two different political formations beingin power in New Delhi and Mumbai? One does not have the answers.

Mumbai Police - Falling Standards?

Even in the absence of adequate TECHINT back-up, the Mumbai police should have been able to get clues of apreventive nature during the investigation of the previous blasts. The importance of thorough investigation in identifying and neutralising perpetrators of terrorism was vividly demonstrated after the assassination ofRajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in 1991, after the Mumbai blasts of March 1993  by the Dawood Ibrahim gang andits terrorist associates  and after the Coimbatore blasts of February,1998, in Tamil Nadu by  AlUmmah.

The absence of similar results after the explosions in Mumbai since December last is  an indicator ofa possible deterioration in the investigative capability of the Mumbai Police since March,1993. The samePolice, which did so brilliantly in investigating the blasts of March,1993, seems to be groping in the darksince December. What is it due to? Political interference in its functioning? Its hands being tied in theinvestigation of acts of jihadi terrorism due to a misplaced anxiety on the part of the ruling establishmentin Mumbai not to antagonise the members of the Muslim community by too vigorous an action against theterrorists, many of whom have come from their ranks? Lack of adequate co-ordination between  the centraland state agencies due to their political masters being from opposite sides of the political spectrum?

The same political party was in power in New Delhi as well as in Punjab and Maharashtra during the heightof our counter-terrorism operations in those areas in the early 1990s. This strengthened the hands of thePolice and other security agencies in dealing with terrorism and the mafia gangs. How to ensure equallyeffective co-ordination when different political formations are in power and bring about a convergence ofapproach in dealing with jihadi terrorism? Again these are questions difficult to answer satisfactorily, butthey are none the less valid and relevant.

Effective physical security is an important component of counter-terrorism, especially when the terroriststarget guarded establishments and personalities. Weak physical security has been responsible for many of thesuccesses of the jihadi terrorists in J&K, such as their recent attack on an army establishment at Akhnoor,during which they killed a Brigadier and others. But, when terrorists attack soft unguarded targets throughmeans such as the use of explosives in public places, as they have been doing in Mumbai, physical security,however effective, cannot deny them success. Hence, better intelligence collection and investigativecapabilities are all the more important.

The Jihadi Iceberg

It is not as if the Mumbai Police and the central intelligence agencies helping them have not made break-throughsin the investigation of the earlier blasts. They have. Arrests of suspects have been made and clues obtained.But the fact that despite them, terrorist strikes continue to take place show that what they have detected sofar is only the tip of the jihadi iceberg.

This jihadi iceberg has been forming for years since the Babri Masjid demolition of December,1992 -- notonly in Mumbai, but also in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, New Delhi and other parts of India. While wefocussed on jihadi terrorism in J&K, we did not pay the same attention to this iceberg threatening therest of India.

Even though India has been the worst victim of jihadi terrorism in the world today, neither the politicalleadership nor the moulders of public opinion nor even many of the professional experts have an adequateunderstanding of the nature and magnitude of the problem and of the international linkages of the jihaditerrorists operating in India since 1993.

Our comparative successes of the past  in dealing with insurgency or terrorism in the North-East,Punjab, Mumbai (in the 1990s), Tamil Nadu and Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh were due to the fact that while theinsurgents and terrorists were in receipt of financial, training and arms assistance from Pakistan's ISI,there was no involvement of Pakistani jihadis.

International Islamic Front

The difficulties faced by us in J&K since 1993 are due to the large-scale induction by the ISI ofPakistani and other foreign jihadis belonging to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami(HUJI), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). The HUM is a founding member of Osama binLaden's International Islamic Front (IIF) since 1998 and the other three joined it subsequently.

Since the Kargil conflict in 1999, these four Pakistani components  of the IIF, operating under theguise of Kashmiris, have taken over the leadership of the terrorist infrastructure in J&K and have beenextending it from there to the rest of India. These are pan-Islamic organisations whose objectives were notrestricted to J&K. They look upon J&K as the gateway of India and believe in bin Laden's objective ofthe creation of regional Islamic caliphates to bring the Muslim majority areas of Asia under a single rulingdispensation devoted to the implementation of the sharia.

Outside J&K, their initial focus was on creating a jihadi network in Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh andJunagadh in Gujrat because they feel these areas should have gone to Pakistan when India was partitioned in1947. From there, they have extended their networks, under the instructions of the ISI, to Maharashtra, TamilNadu and Kerala because of their strategic significance in the eyes of Pakistan's military-intelligenceestablishment. In their perception, this strategic significance arises from Mumbai being the economic andfinancial capital of India and all the three states being the nerve-centres of India's nuclear and spaceestablishments.

Of the four Pakistani components of the IIF, only the LET would seem to have succeeded in good measure sofar in extending its jihadi tentacles to Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. There is so far noevidence of similar successes by the other three components outside J&K and New Delhi.

While the LET and the other pro-bin Laden Pakistani organisations now exercise the leadership of theterrorist infrastructure in J&K, the LET's networks in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu andpossibly  Kerala are still in the process of formation and they have to rely largely on localorganisations such as the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) in Maharashtra, Al Ummah and the MuslimDefence Force  of Tamil Nadu etc  for their sustenance and success. Their role has been more fromthe background as mentors and motivators than as jihadi foot-soldiers. This should explain the fact that whilethe Pakistanis constitute the largest number of terrorist suspects killed or captured in J&K, this is notso in the rest of India.

In India, there is not yet adequate appreciation of the implications for our internal security arising fromthe membership of these organisations in bin Laden's IIF. The implications are particularly ominous in respectof the LET. It is the most well-motivated, well-funded and well-organised jihadi organisation in the Indiansub-continent today, with its tentacles spreading as far east as Indonesia, to the whole of the Gulf and evento the US as the recent arrests of an LET cell there showed.

Abu Zubaidah, reportedly the then No. 3 in Al Qaeda, who is now in US custody, was arrested from the houseof an LET office-bearer in Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March last year. The Pakistani media had reportedat that time that before coming to Pakistan, he had done a course in computer technology in Pune in India. Wasthis information developed further by the Indian intelligence agencies with the help of their US counterparts?Were they able to detect any network of sleeper-agents that he might have set up in Pune and Mumbai during hisstay in Pune? Again more questions without satisfactory answers.

Unabating Flow

The social profile of the breed of jihadi terrorists, which has been playing havoc in India and the rest ofthe world, disturbingly brings to mind that of the breed of Marxist ideological terrorists of the 1970s andthe 1980s such as Carlos, the jackal, and his followers, the Baader-Meinhof of Germany, the Red Army factionof Germany and Japan,the Red Brigade of Italy, the Action Dirercte of France etc.

It would be unwise to dismiss them as marginals of their society or as misled youth or as irrationals. Manyof them have an affluent and educated background and are capable of independent thinking and action. What weview as irrational actions, they view  as the only rational response available to them to deal with theperceived acts of injustices against their community. We cannot tolerate their giving vent to their angerthrough terrorism, but this is no excuse for closing our eyes and ears to their anger. Even if we cannotreduce their anger for the present, we should at least not aggravate it by unwise words and actions.

The Marxist ideological terrorist movements of the West collapsed post-1991 due to two reasons. First, thedrying-up of the flow of adherents due to the increasing economic prosperity of their societies. Second, thecollapse of the USSR, Yugoslavia and other communist states which were supporting and using them.

The flow of adherents to the jihadi terrorists from the Muslim communities in different countries shows nosigns of abating. And the states, which have been helping and using them such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iranand Syria for achieving their own objectives have not suffered the consequences of their actions.  Solong as this state of affairs continues, there is going to be no respite to the security agencies of the worldfrom the ravages of jihadi terrorism.

International co-operation is important in our efforts to control them, but that alone will not help us inthe absence of an effective national counter-terrorism capability.  India has a capability, which isbetter than that of many other affected countries of the world, but the fact that despite this we have notbeen able to prevent the spread of their clandestine networks and activities would show that there are seriousdeficiences in our capability and internal security management.

Instead of continuing to rationalise our failures, we must honestly admit them and try to improve ourcapability. This has to be done not only at the professional level of the Police and the security agencies,but also at the political level.

Poor internal security management at the political level has been India's Achilles heel. After 9/11 in theUS, the US Congress, at the joint initiative of the USA's  two political parties, has devoted aboutone-fourth of its sittings, if not more, to an examination of the counter-terrorism capability of the US andto reach bipartisan consensus on how to strengthen it. India has been the worst victim of jihadi terrorism inthe world today, as stated above. How many hours have  our Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies ofthe States devoted to this task? Zilch.

Will it be fair then to blame the Police and the security agencies alone? Every country gets thecounter-terrorism capability its political leadership deserves.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and, Convenor, Advisory Committee, Observer Research Foundation (ORF),Chennai Chapter.