The Hyphenated Half

Till the forthcoming US presidential elections are over in November and the present Bush Administrationgets re-elected or is replaced by a new Democratic Administration headed by Senator John Kerry, India islikely to figure much less than Pakistan in the political calculations of the Bush Administration or even itsopponents.

President Bush is already under electoral compulsions to show that his so-called war against internationalterrorism, which, in the eyes of the man in the street in the US, is the war against Al Qaeda and Osama binLaden, is showing results by placing the US Government in a better position to protect American lives andproperty in US territory and that his government is capable of bringing its intervention in Iraq to asuccessful culmination in a manner which would serve US national interests. These compulsions would continueto increase as the US approaches the elections.

There is widespread, though often  not publicly-admitted, recognition in policy-influencing circles inthe US that Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran  cannot escape a major share of responsibility for the growthof the cancer of international terrorism and that the successful outcome of the present war would depend uponthe effectiveness of the Pervez Musharraf Government in Pakistan in removing the lingering roots of thiscancer in Pakistani territory.

There is a convergence of perceptions between India and the US that Musharraf has not done or is not tryingto do all that needs to be done to eradicate the dregs of Al Qaeda and the Taliban still operating fromPakistani territory. The divergence relates to their respective perceptions of the sincerity of hisoft-proclaimed determination to root out this cancer.

While many of us in India feel strongly that his commitment to the war against terrorism is half-heartedand that  he is playing a tactical game to retain the increasing support of the US Administration for hiscontinued rule without impairing Pakistan's ability to make strategic use of the various terrorist groups toserve its  national interests vis-a-vis India and Afghanistan, many in the US policy-influencing circlesare convinced that he is trying to do all that he could in the prevailing circumstances without endangeringhis own administration.

There is recognition that Musharraf's democracy in olive green (OG) is not the best option the US has forprevailing over the new brand of international jihadi terrorism spreading from this region, but, at the sametime, there is a conviction that this is the only option it has, however imperfect, and that it would beill-advised to discard it unless and until a better option is available.

In the ongoing examination at various levels  as to why the US failed to foresee and prevent 9/11, ithas been admitted by many that the ambivalence which had marked the policies of different US Administrationstowards the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its supporters in Pakistan's military and intelligenceestablishments was an important factor in the failure.

Dr. Condoleeza Rice, the National Security Adviser, herself admitted this ambivalence in her testimonybefore the National Commission enquiring into the 9/11 terrorist strikes on April 8, 2004. To quote from herprepared testimony:

"More importantly, we recognized that no counter-terrorism  strategy could succeed in isolation.As you know from the  Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made  available to theCommission, our counter- terrorism strategy  was part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.

"Integrating our counter-terrorism and regional strategies was  the most difficult and themost important aspect of the new  strategy to get right. Al-Qaida was both client of and patron  tothe Taliban, which in turn was supported by Pakistan.  Those relationships provided al-Qaida with apowerful  umbrella of protection, and we had to sever them. This was  not easy.

 "Not that we hadn't tried. Within a month of taking office,  President Bush sent a strong,private message to President  Musharraf urging him to use his influence with the Taliban  to bringBin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida  training camps. Secretary Powell actively urged the Pakistanis, including Musharraf himself, to abandon  support for the Taliban. I met with Pakistan'sForeign  Minister in my office in June of 2001. I delivered a very  tough message, which was metwith a rote, expressionless  response.

 "America's al-Qaida policy wasn't working because our  Afghanistan policy wasn't working.And our Afghanistan  policy wasn't working because our Pakistan policy wasn't  working. Werecognized that America's counter-terrorism  policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and toour overall foreign policy.

 "To address these problems, I made sure to involve key  regional experts. I brought inZalmay Khalilzad, an expert on  Afghanistan who, as a senior diplomat in the 1980s, had  workedclosely with the Afghan Mujahedeen, helping them  to turn back the Soviet invasion. I also ensured the participation of the NSC experts on South Asia, as well as  the Secretary of State and his regionalspecialists. Together,  we developed a new strategic approach to Afghanistan.  Instead of theintense focus on the Northern Alliance, we  emphasized the importance of the south - - the social and political heartland of the country. Our new approach to  Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticksto persuade  Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And we began  to change our approach toIndia, to preserve stability on the subcontinent." 

(Citation ends)

This ambivalence and the consequent reluctance to act tough against Pakistan were due to the followingfactors: 

• Pakistan's long history of collaboration with the US against the USSR during the Cold War. Gratitude forthe past and current assistance of Pakistan in promoting US national interests in the region has been animportant component of the US policies in the region.

• The initial US backing to Pakistan's creation and use of the Taliban between 1994 and 1996 to restore lawand order in Afghanistan and thereby pave the way for the implementation of US plans for the exit of the oiland gas resources of Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan instead of through Iran or Russia. Eventhough the de jure Burhanuddin Rabbani Government was in power in Kabul till September 1996, the creation ofan alternate de facto power capable of restoring law and order to serve the interests of the US oil lobbyenjoyed the tacit backing of the Clinton Administration.
  
  
• The nod of approval given by the Clinton Administration to the Benazir Bhutto Government's decision in1996 to let  bin Laden and his bodyguards in the so-called 055 Brigade of Al Qaeda  shift fromKhartoum in the Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan. It is often forgotten that it was not the Taliban, but theRabbani Government backed by the late Ahmed Shah Masood which admitted bin Laden into Afghanistan andprotected him at Jalalabad. It did so with the concurrence of the Benazir Government, which, in turn, obtainedthe approval of the Clinton Administration to his shift.It was only after its capture of Jalalabad and Kabulin September,1996, that the Taliban shifted bin Laden to Kandahar and took him under its protection. The USagreed to his shifting to Afghanistan because John Deutch, the then Director of the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA), felt that the CIA would be better able to keep on eye on him in Afghanistan than in the Sudan.
  
  
• Between 1996 and February 1998, the US was content to keep an eye on bin Laden and his followers insteadof pressuring Pakistan and the Taliban to hand them over to the US for investigation and trial. The ClintonAdministration started taking the Al Qaeda threat seriously only after the formation of the InternationalIslamic Front (IIF) for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People by Al Qaeda in February,1998, andthe subsequent explosions in August, 1998, outside the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzaniya, which wereattributed by the US to Al Qaeda.
  
  
• US efforts towards a strategy for the elimination of Al Qaeda and bin Laden thus became discernible onlyafter the failure of the Cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan in August,1998, failed tokill bin Laden and destroy his infrastructure.

• Through a commando operation mounted by the US Special Forces from Pakistani territory with theconcurrence of the Nawaz Sharif Government then in power. Or
  
  
• By exercising pressure on the Pakistan Government to bring about the end of the Taliban; Or
  
  
• By backing the Northern Alliance led by Massod to defeat the Taliban and re-capture power in the whole ofAfghanistan.
  

The second option enjoyed the support of the US State Department and figured in the discussions held byStrobe Talbott, the then Deputy Secretary of State, and Karl Inderfurth, the then Assistant Secretary ofState, during their visits to Pakistan in 1999 and during the visit of Nawaz to Washington DC  after theKargil conflict, when Inderfurth held a very long discussion with him on the subject.

The third option, which was favoured by some of the counter-terrorism experts such as Richard Clarke, whowas the counter-terrorism co-ordinator in the National Security Council Secretariat, did not have many takersin the State Department.

This debate on a strategy to eliminate Al Qaeda was not confined to the Administration. It also figured ina number of reports and studies on the subject between 1999 and 2001. To quote from some of them: 

The first was the continued hope of the US oil industry that a moderated and softened Taliban would betterserve the strategic interests of the US oil industry than a Government dominated by the Northern Alliance,with its linkages to Iran and Russia or any other Government, which might not be able to enforce its authorityin the Pashtun belt.

The second was the continued reluctance of the State Department and the Pentagon to take any punitiveaction against Pakistan for its repeatedly proved role in fomenting jihadi terrorism due to a fear that suchaction could aggravate the problem instead of solving it and lead to an al Qaedisation  of nuclearPakistan.

9/11 brought about a realisation of the need for immediate action against the Al Qaeda terroristinfrastructure in Afghan territory and for the overthrow of the Taliban regime, with the co-operation ofPakistan, if possible, and even without it, if necessary. Musharraf's decision to jettison the Pakistan Army'ssupport for the Taliban, at least tactically, and to co-operate with the US in its action to eradicate the AlQaeda infrastructure from the Afghan territory saved him from any punitive action by the US directed againstPakistan.

Musharraf has been following a two-pronged policy since then. Firstly, to co-operate actively with the USin its operations against Al Qaeda. Secondly, while going along with the US determination to overthrow theTaliban administration, to save it from destruction and allow it to prepare itself from Pakistani territoryfor another go at a capture of power in Afghanistan at a suitable opportunity.

The double game being played by Musharraf is realised in Washington DC, but one notices a widespreadconviction that so long as he is co-operating without reservation against Al Qaeda, which poses a directthreat to American lives and interests in US territory, his continued dalliance with the dregs of the Talibanshould be tolerated if  such dalliance does not endanger the Hamid Karzai Government in Kabul.