The Grassroots Terror

In Jharkhand, for example, a 'comprehensive plan' has been chalked out,including aerial surveillance, to deal with the Maoists. In response, thelatter, in order to evade the pre-poll crackdown, are believed to have shiftedsome of their camps into the neighbouring states of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengaland Chhattisgarh, where there is a strong Maoist presence in border districts.The inter-state movement of Maoists is not a new thing and in the last fewyears, the poor coordination between security forces of various affected stateshas facilitated the easy movement of Maoist cadres from one state to another.

The behaviour of Naxalite groups during previous elections suggests that their statedobjectives have little role to play as far as grassroots mobilization ofelectoral support is concerned. In a state like Bihar, caste remains one of themost important factors in political mobilisation and its impact has been visiblein the organizational structure, mobilization strategy and activities ofNaxalite groups. 

In Bihar, for instance, though the CPI-Maoist has officially declared thatthe continuance in power of the ruling Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) is against theinterest of the party, it has, at the same time, admitted that the Naxalites andthe RJD 'share the same social base'. Some prominent leaders of the RJD havealso expressed the same view. The RJD state vice-president, Samsher Alam, saidon December 12, 2004, "Both extremists and RJD are struggling for socialjustice. While, extremists use violence as a weapon to fight social injustice,RJD believes in non-violent method for the purpose. In this situation, we do notsee any possibility of extremist attack on our programme." 

The CPI-Maoist has reportedly alleged that Laloo Prasad Yadav has been tryingto bribe its cadre and activists through Government contracts and projects. Incombination, these factors have ensured that, unlike Andhra Pradesh, where thePWG had issued a call to defeat Chandrababu Naidu in the run-up to the April2004 elections, the Maoists in Bihar are not expected to issue any statementasking people to defeat the RJD.

Muscle power plays a critical role in elections in these states and the enormousclout wielded by Naxalite groups at the grassroots level has been one of thecrucial instruments of influence in the electoral process. In Jharkhand,according to one estimate, the Naxalites are capable of influencing the electionprocess in some 54 of the 81 Assembly constituencies. Unsurprisingly, Naxalitegroups often use their influence to support candidates or political formationswhich provide them a favourable context for operation in the post electionphase. 

The resulting ambivalence has meant that the impact of their boycott call isnot significant on voter turnout. Thus, for instance, during the April 2004Parliamentary Election in Jharkhand, where the pre-poll campaign was marred by aseries of attacks on security force personnel, the voter turnout was recorded at55.71 per cent. Even in some of the worst-affected districts, including Palamu,Hazaribagh, Singhbhum and Lohardaga, the voter turnout ranged between 49 and 60per cent. Similarly, many Naxalite dominated areas in Bihar registered animpressive voter turn out.

There are reports, moreover, that these groups have themselves contested theelections through proxies. For example, during the Panchayat (VillageCouncil) elections in 2001, activists of both the PWG and MCCI contested inJehanabad district. In the Parliamentary Elections of April 2004, a former'sub-zonal commander' of the MCCI, Ramlal Oraon alias Veer Bhagat, contested asan independent candidate from one of the worst Naxalite-affected constituencies,Chatra in Jharkhand, and the voter turnout in some of the worst-affectedAssembly segments recorded their highest turnout in the last 20 years.

Clearly, despite the announcement of the election boycott, the factors that havehistorically influenced the behaviour of Naxalite groups still remain operative,and will continue to have considerable influence during the election process.Some of these factors include the general breakdown of the rule of law, thecriminalization of politics, sharp polarization on the basis of caste, and anexus between elements of mainstream political parties, various stateinstitutions and extremist formations.

The problem is enormously compounded by the absence of proper administrative andenforcement responses. After every major incident of Naxalite violence, the centraland state governments announce a succession of ad hoc and emergencymeasures, but these have only had a negative impact in the long run. Noattention has been paid to basic issues, such as the proper functioning of civiladministration in rural and tribal areas and the development of an effective policeforce. 

Bihar, for instance, has no police training college after its separation fromJharkhand. The state police lacks the most basic counter-terrorism capabilities,such as bullet-proof vehicles, high-frequency wireless sets, night visiondevices and anti-landmine vehicles, even in the Districts worst afflicted byLeft Wing extremism. It is evident that the crisis created by the complexdynamics of the Left Wing insurgency requires skill, capacities and efficiencyfar beyond the current capabilities of the state and its various agencies.

Sanjay K. Jha is Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies &Analyses, New Delhi. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal