The Clash Of The Tamil Warlords

Summary

Ever since the ceasefire accord between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE was signed two years ago, there were persistent reports of unhappiness amongst the Tamils of the East overwhat was seen by them as unjustified overtures to the Muslims by the northern leadership of the LTTE, over thelack of recognition of the Easterners, who had fought and won most of the battles of the LTTE against the SriLanka Army and over the perceived discriminatory treatment meted out to them in the North. 

Did thisunhappiness force Karuna, the Eastern warlord, to act against Prabhakaran against his will or did he takeadvantage of it to defy Prabhakaran and assert his independence? Will he succeed in his defiance? Will thefighters of the East carry out his orders or disobey him? If they obeyed his orders, will there be a militaryconflict between the North and the East, leading to a resumption of the violence and damaging the peaceprocess? Even if Prabhakaran succeeds in having Karuna eliminated, will he be able to re-assert his controlover the East? Will his authority remain as strong as before?

These are very relevant questions, but it would be difficult to answer them at present. Allone could say is that Karuna's position is not as strong as he seems to think it is and not as weak asPrabhakaran seems to wish it is. Even presuming that the overwhelming majority of Karuna's followers remainloyal to him, which is doubtful since they may not wish to contribute to a weakening of the struggle for TamilEelam, the two forces would be evenly matched and the outcome uncertain.

The Text

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) disseminated the following statement on themorning of March 6, 2004:

"Today the 6th March 2004, at 10.20 a. m. a Press Conference was held at the LTTE PeaceSecretariat in Kilinochchi,in which Mr. S. P. Tamilselvan, Head of the Political Wing of the LTTE, along withMr. Ramesh, Special Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai District, Mr. Ram, Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai District,Mr. Piraba, Deputy Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai District, Mr. Gihaththan, Commander, Batticaloa-AmparaiDistrict, Mr. Ramanan, Head of the Military Intelligence Wing, and Mr. Kausalyan, Political Head of theBatticaloa-Amparai District, were present.

"Mr. Karuna who was Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai, instigated by some malicious elementsopposed to the Tamil Eelam liberation struggle, acting traitorously to the Tamil people and the Tamil EelamNational Leadership, has planned to secede himself from the liberation organization.

"The Commanders, Divisional Heads and cadres under him, unable to acquiesce with thistraitorous act, have refused to comply with his orders and met with the National Leadership, explaining theground reality prevailing there. In accordance with this, Karuna has been discharged from the LiberationTigers organization and relieved of his responsibilities.

"The Tamil Eelam National Leadership has appointed Mr. Ramesh as Special Commander, Mr.Ram as Commander, Mr. Piraba as Deputy Commander and Mr. Kausalyan as Political Head of the Batticaloa-AmparaiDistrict.

"It is hereby informed that these officials will assume their positions and functions asthe official representatives of our organization."

It has been reported that simultaneously with this announcement Prabhakaran has orderedthat about 500 cadres from the Eastern Province working in Kilinochi, whose loyalty to him was suspect, shouldbe disarmed and placed under house-arrest. Karuna has retaliated by appealing to the fighters from the Eastdeployed in the North to get those under house-arrest released and to help them to return to the East.

An LTTE spokesman said before the orders sacking Karuna were issued: "How canKaruna be a part of the LTTE when he has violated our founding principles? This is a problem with anindividual. All eastern commanders have expressed their allegiance to the movement except Karuna. We have noproblem with the control of cadres in Batticaloa and Amparai."

The announcement came in the wake of over three days of speculation about seriousdifferences between Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, and Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Col. Karuna,who, as Special Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai, was in over-all charge of the LTTE's military operations in theEastern Province. 

The speculation was initially denied by Tamilselvan, but subsequently admitted after reportscame in that Karuna had replaced some key officials of the LTTE in the Eastern Province, who enjoyed theconfidence of Prabhakaran, with his own nominees and approached the Sri Lankan authorities and the Norwegianmonitoring mission for a recognition of the separate role of his set-up in the now-stalled peace process, forphysical protection and for ensuring safe passage for the Eastern cadres bottled up in the North who want toreturn to their homes in the East.

The changes reportedly made by  Karuna in the LTTE set-up in the Eastern Province,without apparently consulting Prabhakaran, which preceded his sack by Prabhakaran were: The appointment ofKarikalan as the Batticaloa-Amparai  Political Wing Leader in the place of  Kausalyan;. thereplacement of  Ramesh, Karuna's deputy military commander, by Rabat; and of  Pirabha, in charge ofadministration, by Thurai. 

He also sacked about 60 policemen from the North posted in the Eastern Province andordered them to leave the area and banned the entry of any officials of the LTTE's intelligence wing into theEastern Province. He has also reportedly ordered the detention of recruits from the North, who had come to theEast for undergoing military training, and the closure of all offices of the LTTE in the Eastern Province. Itis not clear whether his orders are being carried out by his subordinates. Latest reports, however, indicatethat Karikalan has also gone  to Kilinochi on March 7 and supported Prabhakaran and criticised Karuna..

The 53-year-old Karikalan, a native of the Eastern Province and a close confidante ofPrabhakaran for two decades, who was then designated as the Special Political Commissar for Batticaloa andAmparai, had been  removed from that post along with two of his close associates, Visu and Thurai, bothalso natives of the East, by Prabhakaran, on July 31, 2002. They were attached to the military wing andtransferred to Kilinochi.

While no reasons were given for their unceremonious dismissal and transfer out of theEast, well-informed observers said that the dismissal followed the submission of a report by the intelligencewing of the LTTE blaming them for provoking riots by Muslims of the province the previous month through theirunwise and irresponsible statements, which were perceived by the Muslim community as anti-Muslim. Karikalanhad justified the action of LTTE volunteers in collecting taxes from the Muslims on the ground that since theMuslims were in occupation of lands, which originally belonged to the Tamils, they had to pay taxes  tothe original owners.

Prabhakaran had also reportedly taken umbrage at another statement made by Karikalan rebuking Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC), indirectly without, however naminghim,  for taking up the problems of the Muslims of the Eastern Province directly with Prabhakaran insteadof first discussing them with the LTTE's leadership in the Eastern Province. 

Karikalan  had told the Colombo Tamil daily Virakesari: 

"Solutions to real problems can be achieved by holdingdiscussions with the regional commanders in areas where such problems really exist. Instead of doing so,making attempts to resolve problems by talking to our hierarchy will not help because solutions about theexact field situation, the ongoing problems and how to resolve them won't be available there. Matters shouldbe resolved through discussing issues in places where they exist. Unity cannot be reached through commandmentsor insistence."

After dismissing Karikalan and his two associates, Prabhakaran had named  Kausalyan,the LTTE's financial controller for the province, as political chief of Batticaloa-Amparai and Reginald, thethen head of administration, as the  deputy political chief  in addition to his charge as the headof administration. These changes were welcomed by the Muslim community who viewed Karikalan and Karuna asanti-Muslim. However, this action of Prabhakaran caused ripples of discontent amongst the local Tamils, manyof whom approved their hardline towards the Muslims.

After the action taken by Karuna, Kausalyan, Ramesh and Pirabha fled to Kilinochi and they have now been reinstated by Prabhakaran in the LTTE's set-up in the Eastern Province -- Ramesh asSpecial Commander,   Piraba as Deputy Commander and  Kausalyan as Political Head of theBatticaloa-Amparai District.

Over 100 cadres of the LTTE loyal to Prabhakaran are also reported to have fled to Vannibefore the LTTE issued the order sacking Karuna. It is not known how many of them are from the North and howmany from the East. At the same time, Karuna was reported to have sought the help of the Sri Lankan Army andthe Norwegian monitoring mission officials to ensure the protection of nearly  2,000 cadres from the Eastemployed in the North and for their safe return to the East. Among those loyal to Prabhakaran, who escaped toKilinochi were Keerthi and  Senadi Kuilanban.

Long-simmering differences between Prabhakaran and Karuna came into the open on March 3when Karuna refused to send an additional 1000 troops to the North as requested by Prabhakaran. Though Karunahas not said so, it is believed that Prabhakaran had ordered the transfer to the North of the 1,200-strongJayanthan Padaippirivu (Jayanthan Battalion), consisting exclusively of Easterners, which had returned to itsbases in the East after distinguishing itself in the Elephanta Pass battles of 1999 under the leadership ofKaruna.

Since there was really no operational requirement for this transfer unless Prabhakaranwas planing to resume hostilities against the Sri Lankan Army about which he had not consulted him, Karunawould appear to have suspected that this was possibly a prelude to have him removed from the leadership of theEast and decided to pre-empt Prabhakaran by refusing to send the additional troops and removing those loyal toPrabhakaran posted  in the East.

Another reason for Karuna's revolt was his anger over the operations of Pottu Amman, thechief of the LTTE's intelligence wing,  in the East without keeping him in the picture. Ever sinceelections to the Sri Lankan Parliament were called on April 2,Karuna  had been assuring the people of theEast that the LTTE would ensure that there was no interference with the electoral process in the East. He feltthat the actions of the intelligence wing in carrying out the assassinations of a candidate of the UNF and anelection worker of the EPDP, who did not enjoy the blessings of the LTTE, discredited him (Karuna) in the eyesof the people and the international community and called into question his ability to keep up his promise.

After deciding to defy the directions of Prabhakaran,Karuna simultaneously informed the Norway- managed Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission that hereafter he and his Eastern troops would actindependently. Immediately thereafter,  the Monitoring Mission's chief, Major General (retd) TrondFuruhovde flew to Kilinochchi in a Sri Lanka Air force helicopter and had urgent discussions with Tamilselvan.

The diiferences between Prabhakaran and Karuna burst into the open a day beforeKausalyan was to get married  at a holiday resort. On hearing of Karuna's revolt, Kausalyan postponed thewedding and fled to Kilinochi  with his fiancee and their parents.The Sri Lankan Army came to know of therevolt when Varathan, Secretary to Karuna, contacted Army officers and requested them to prevent Kausalyan,Ramesh and Pirabha from escaping to Kilinochi and hand them over to Karuna. The Army reportedly turned downhis request and did not attempt to prevent them and other Prabhakaran loyalists from fleeing to Kilinochi.

In an interview to the Daily Mirror of Colombo, Varathan stated as follows: 

• A separate  ceasefire agreement by the Government with Karuna  could ensure security in the Eastern Province. In the backdrop of continued killing of political activists in the East bythe intelligence wing of the LTTE headed by Pottu Amman, there was little choice left to ensuresecurity." We have banned any of their men from entering the East, but some men can remain. We can notrule out their involvement in these killings."
  
  
• Prabhakaran's  decision to dismiss   Karuna would have no"impact" practically. "There will be no impact on our interests. It is out of theircontrol."
  
  
• When asked about a  possible threat to the life of Karuna similar  to what hadhappened to Mahattaya in 1994,he stressed that there was "no similarity between the two situations.""These are totally different issues. In Mahattaya's case, there was foreign involvement, there's nothinglike that here."
  
  
• The  continued alienation  of the Eastern Commanders of the LTTE by the Northernhierarchy, the continued attempts to fortify the North by using Eastern cadres and the Eastern members havingto face the brunt of the consequences of the actions  of the Intelligence Wing of the North had allcontributed towards the decision of Karuna  to split from the LTTE. "How do we answer the parents ofthese boys when the North asks us for additional cadres during a period of peace? Over 30 of the hierarchy inthe organisation are of the North. They hold the posts of Finance, Police, Intelligence and the PoliticalWing, leaving nothing for us despite our sacrifices to the cause."
  
  
• Karuna  would remain committed to peace and was ready to sit in any negotiating tablewith the Government to discuss  peace.

The letter said: 

"It is very painful that when all the heads of Tamil Eelamdivisions and administrative heads tour Kilinochchi town in luxury vehicles, members of the Jeyanthan regimentfrom Batticaloa and Amparai remain on full time duty at the checkpoint in Palai. How can this be reasonable?

"At this time of peace, all fighters like to be with their relatives in their homeareas. It is my feeling that up to now they have rendered an invaluable service to the people of 'North TamilEelam', sacrificing their lives. At this time I like to serve the people of 'South Tamil Eelam' ; not onlythat, it is my final wish to fight for these people here itself and die at their feet. I do not like any otherperson interfering in these matters".

It further said: 

"We do not want to desert you. We look to you as our god. Sometimesthis decision of ours can anger you. The reason is that I do not like to commit the historical mistake of notdisclosing to you the hopes of the people and the fighters here and not respecting their feelings. If youbelieve in the people here and the fighters here allow us to work independently under your leadership".

In an  interview to  Shimalee Senanayaka, a  journalist of the Associated Press, who was the first to break the news of the revolt on March 3, which was disseminated by AP, Karuna wasquoted as saying as follows:
 

• *He had sounded  the Government about negotiating a separate cease-fire in the EasternProvince." We think it's very important to have a separate defense pact with the security forces. Thereis no question of reconciliation, everything is beyond reconciliation. In future we will have a fullself-administration (in the east). We'll receive no more command from the Wanni administration or Prabhakaran."
  
  
• His men would  not begin fighting and would  respect the current cease-fireuntil a new agreement was signed. Explaining the reasons for the split, he said that he disagreed withPrabhakaran's request to recruit more fighters and deploy them in the north. "In the past it did not seema big issue. Now it's peace time, people and parents are trying to analyze why they have to give soldiersduring peace time."
  
  
• He also said that the northern cadres were favoured for positions in the group'sadministrative wing." We have already paid a heavy price to protect Wanni, its people, particularly theleadership. I sincerely hope that unlike the Wanni leadership, those people (in the north) will be gratefulfor our sacrifices."

• Col. Karuna said  that he and his troops were ready to retaliate against Prabhakaran and his loyalists if he (Karuna ) or his troops were ever harmed in any way.
  
  
• Karuna accused  Prabhakaran of using the troops from the East for his own personalends. He said that he refused to send 1,000 more troops to Wanni as requested by Prabhakaran  because theEastern troops had always been  used at the front lines while the others led a luxurious life enjoyingall comforts in the North. He  alleged that the lives of 2,300 eastern  troops had already beensacrificed for the protection of Prabhakaran.