The American Hug, The Chinese Frown

You don't have to go far to find an example.Look at the US' relationswith Pakistan. So long as the US was engaged in a cold war with theUSSR, Pakistan was Washington's privileged ally. When the USSRcollapsed and the cold war ended, Pakistan was downgraded in itsimportance. After 9/11, Pakistan and General Pervez Musharraf weretoasted once again as front-line allies.If Pakistan fails to deliveron the terrorism front or in the unlikely event of the so-called waragainst terrorism losing its present importance, we will have anothersteep turn in the US policy towards Pakistan.

To maintain a balance, it is important to keep this in view in thecurrent debate on the pros and cons of the recently-concludedagreement on Indo-US Civil Nuclear Co-operation, which is oftenreferred to as the 123 agreement--a reference to the relevant sectionof the US law relating to nuclear co-operation.

Even if our agreement with the US is satisfactory in every respectfrom our point of view, it is no guarantee that there will not beanother Tarapore trauma. After our first nuclear test of 1974, the USdid not hesitate to break its solemn contractual obligations andstarve the USaided power station of fuel to punish us for the test.

The US will observe the provisions of the 123 Agreement so long as itsuits it and it looks upon India as of importance to it in its pursuitof its global designs and ambitions. If a day comes when the USdecides that India is no longer of such importance to its nationalinterests or when it fears that India's indigenous nuclear projectsare detrimental to its nuclear agenda, it will not hesitate to throwthe 123 agreement into the waste paper basket and try to enforce itswill on India.

What is called for is not an unwarranted euphoria generated by spinsand wishful-thinking or counter-productive criticism, but a carefulidentification of the various scenarios in which the implementation ofthe agreement can turn sour and we are confronted with anotherTarapore-like situation. The purpose of such an exercise should be tohave a clear idea of the various fall-back options that would beavailable to us and to keep ourselves in readiness for being able touse them. One does not see evidence of such an exercise.

There is a need for a three-track approach. First, to keep pressingahead in our quest for nuclear self-sufficiency so that we canproduce one day all the nuclear power we need through our ownresources and efforts. Second, to force open the doors tointernational nuclear commerce so that we can buy our requirements ofpower stations and related technologies till such time as we reach thegoal of self-sufficiency. The recently-concluded agreement with the USis one of the initial steps in our attempt to break open the doors,which are till now shut against us. And third, to keep ourselvesmentally and in other ways prepared to meet a situation in which thedoors might again be closed against us before we reach the goal ofself-sufficiency. A comprehensive exercise to cater to these threetracks is the need of the hour.

Unfortunately, the national debate on this subject has got stuck in a"for or against" syndrome. If one is for it, one can think of dozensof reasons for supporting it. If one is against it, one can equallyfind dozens of reasons for opposing it. The question now is not justone of "for or against", but how to protect ourselves from thevagaries of US perceptions and policy-making and any bad faith in itsimplementation by the US.

More than the agreement itself, the circumstances surrounding thenegotiations which preceded its finalisation and the changing attitudeto the US amongst the present political leaders in power in New Delhiand the small group of officials and non-official intellectualsadvising them should be a matter of concern to public opinion. Thenegotiations and the background against which these were conductedbrought out certain defining characteristics of the leaders and theiradvisers. Firstly, the lack of transparency. All governments in Indiahave tended to be less transparent than they ought to have been, butnone has been more opaque in policy-making than the present one.Second, the noticeable contempt for those expressing reservationsabout the present policy of the government towards the US in generaland this agreement in particular. One could sense an orchestratedattempt to ridicule and discredit them. Even Indira Gandhi, during theemergency, had not indulged in such tactics to discredit heropponents. Third, an uncritical fascination for the US and adisquieting belief that India's ultimate salvation and its emergenceand recognition as a major power lie in close relations with the USand a readiness to be subservient to its policy goals. Fourth, agreater willingness to be sensitive to the views and concerns ofAmerican legislators and moulders of public opinion than to those ofIndia.

The US is an important country. It is in India's interest to maintainthe closest of relations with it without damaging our sense ofnational dignity and the needs of our national interests. It is at thesame time important to ensure that our pursuit of close relations withthe US and the manner in which we are doing so do not create wrongperceptions of India in the minds of other countries such as China, inthe Islamic world and in our own Muslim community, which has made usproud by keeping away from pan-Islamism and the global jihad of AlQaeda brand.

Rightly or wrongly, there is a perception among large sections ofthinking people in our own country that the pursuit of close relationswith the US has been at the cost of the independence of ourdecision-making in matters concerning foreign policy today. It couldbe in matters concerning economic policy tomorrow. We have seenexamples of this in our vote against Iran in the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, our maintaining a studied distancefrom the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, our discreet silence onthe deaths of hundreds of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq due toAmerican air strikes, the welcome accorded to US naval ships which areengaged in the military operations in Iraq, and our letting ourselvesbe inveigled into a closer working relationship with the US,Japan andAustralia.

There has been no proper examination of the likely impact of ourUS-induced policy changes on our relations with China and on theattitude of our Muslim community. There are already indicators ofBeijing's concern over the direction which our foreign policy has beentaking at the nudge of Washington DC. The Chinese opposition to ourbecoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the lack ofAmerican enthusiasm for the idea frustrated our ambitions. We nolonger talk of our quest for this.

A consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) on removing therestrictions on civilian nuclear trade with India would dependultimately on the Chinese willingness to go along with it. WouldChina, which is concerned over the new directions of the US-inducedforeign policy of India, support us without reservations in the NSG?Would China be unresponsive to Pakistani concerns on the implicationsof the Indo-US Agreement for it?

Pakistan uses the continuing Chinese willingness to help it in thenuclear and missile fields as the most important yardstick for judgingthe priority attached by China to its relations with Pakistan.Beijing, therefore, loses no opportunity to underline its willingnessto continue to assist Pakistan in this field. Not many in Indianoticed that the statement, which emanated from the Chinese Embassy inIslamabad on the Lal Masjid raid by the Pakistani commandoes, includeda reference to China's assistance to Pakistan in the civilian nuclearfield. It referred to the completed Chashma I nuclear power stationand to the under construction Chashma II and then highlighted theon-going talks on possible Chinese assistance to Chashma III andChashma IV.

What was the need for referring out of context to this in a statementon the Lal Masjid? It was obviously meant to reassure Pakistan thatBeijing's unhappiness over the attacks on its nationals by the jihadiswould not have any impact on the priority accorded by it to itsrelations with Pakistan and to its continuing interest in assistingPakistan in the nuclear field.

The US has ruled out any civil nuclear co-operation agreement withPakistan on the ground that India is a special case. Will Beijing,piqued by perceptions of India letting itself be used by the USagainst China, treat India as a special case in the NSG and agree tolifting the restrictions on India without simultaneously lifting thoseon Pakistan? These are questions which have not been adequatelyaddressed in the debate on the US-induced new directions in ourforeign policy.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is alaso associated with the Chennai Centre ForChina Studies.