The Al Qaeda Empire In Pakistan

Pakistan-based pan-Islamic terrorist organisations, which are allied with Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda in hisInternational Islamic Front(IIF), have been consistent in the pursuit of their long-term strategy directed against India.  They look upon Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) as the gateway to India andrepeatedly underline that the "liberation" of  J&K would be only the first stage of theirjihad against India. 

According to them, the second stage would be the "liberation" of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh andJunagadh in Gujarat, which they look upon as rightly belonging to Pakistan and the third and final stage wouldbe the "liberation" of the Muslims in the rest of India as a prelude to the formation of an IslamicCaliphate in South Asia.

All these organisations project their jihad as directed not only against the Indian State, but also againstthe Hindu religion and against what they describe as the corrupting influence of Hinduism on Islam not only inIndia, but also in the Sindh and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan and in Bali in Indonesia.  

It is as part of their jihad against Hinduism that they have been attacking Hindu places of worship andHindu pilgrims not only in J&K as one saw again in Jammu on November 24, 2002, in Hyderabad a few daysbefore that and in Gandhinagar in Gujarat in the last week of September, 2002.

The most virulent and the most active of these organisations is the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), whoseheadquarters previously used to be based at Muridke, near Lahore, in Pakistan.  It has been responsiblefor most of the suicide attacks in India since it joined bin Laden's IIF shortly after its formation in 1998. Before it joined the IIF, it did not believe in suicide terrorism.

After the attack on the Indian Parliament House on December 13, 2001, the USA, which had designated the LeTand the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), another pan-Islamic terrorist organisation allied with Al Qaeda in the IIF, asForeign Terrorist Organisations under a 1996 Law, exercised pressure on the military regime in Pakistan to actagainst the Pakistani pan-Islamic organisations allied with Al Qaeda in the IIF.

In response to this pressure, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, ostensibly banned onJanuary 15, 2002, the LeT, the JeM and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), arrested many of their leaders andadministrative cadres and imposed restrictions on their open fund collection drive in Pakistani territory.  

However, he did not ban the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), which was declared by the US as a Foreign TerroristOrganisation as early as October,1997, and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), both of which have a largenumber of trained cadres operating not only in J&K, but also in Bangladesh, in the Arakan area of Myanmar,southern Philippines, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and Chechnya in Russia.

The Pakistani authorities, while briefing the media at that time, had said that another order banning the HuMand the HUJI would follow.  This has not happened so far.  This reluctance to ban theseorganisations is attributable to the large following they have in the lower and middle ranks of the PakistaniArmy.

Among those ordered to be arrested by Musharraf under US pressure were Prof. Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed of theMarkaz Dawa Al Irshad (MDI), the political wing of the LeT, and Maulana Masooid Azhar, the head of the JeM. But, he did not order the arrest of Maulana Fazlur Rahman Khalil, the head of the HuM, who was one of thesignatories of bin Laden's first fatwa of 1998 against the US and Israel, and Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the headof the HUJI.

Many of the arrested cadres of the LeT and the JeM were subsequently released on the ground that there wasno evidence of their involvement in terrorism.  Maulana Azhar was released from jail, but placed underhouse arrest.  Prof. Sayeed was released, re-arrested and has recently been released again, ostensibly onthe orders of a court.

The MDI changed its name as Markaz Ud Dawa (MUD) and proclaimed itself as delinked from the LeT.  TheLeT, the JeM, the HuM and the HUJI transferred their training infrastructure and cadres to camps inPakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the Northern Areas ( NA-- Gilgit and Baltistan), which were not covered bythe ban order of January 15, 2002.

Pakistani Government spokesmen had indicated in January, 2002, that a separate order banning theiractivities not only in the POK and the NA, but also in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)bordering Afghanistan would follow. This too has not happened so far.

Taking advantage of the exclusion of these areas from the purview of the ban order, Al Qaeda, the Talibanand the Chechen and Uzbeck components of the IIF moved their training infrastructure and surviving cadres tothe FATA and the Pakistani pan-Islamic organisations, except the LeJ, to the POK and the NA.  

The LeJ defied the ban order and moved its cadres to Karachi, where it paved the way for the creation ofshelters in the Binori madrasa and other places for the survivors of Al Qaeda, including bin Laden. The HuMfloated a new organisation called the HuM (Al Almi, meaning Universal) to evade the provisions of the banorder of January 15, 2002, and set up its headquarters in the Binori madrasa.

By March, 2002, the LeT resumed its activities in other parts of Pakistan too in violation of the banorder.  This became evident after the arrest of Abu Zubaidah, a top functionary of Al Qaeda, at Faislabadin Punjab towards the end of March.  He had been given shelter by the local LeT office-bearers.  

At that time, there was considerable speculation in Pakistan that bin Laden had also been shifted from theFATA to Faislabad, but he managed to evade capture and escape to Karachi. Despite this proved nexus betweenthe LeT and Al Qaeda, the military-intelligence establishment has not acted against the resumption of the LeTactivities in Punjab in violation of the ban.

Drawing attention to the spread of Al Qaeda cadres to different parts of Pakistan, with the complicity ofthe Pakistani pan-Islamic organisations without the State acting against it, Khaled Ahmed, the highlyrespected Pakistani analyst, wrote in the Daily Times (July19, 2002), the prestigious daily of Lahore,as follows: 

"While our religious leaders deny that there is such a thing as Al Qaeda existing on the face of theearth and say that the Americans had created it to be able to attack Muslim sovereign States, the empire of AlQaeda keeps unfolding in Pakistan.  The Government troops are fighting Al Qaeda foreigners and the localwarriors aligned with them in the tribal areas and the major cities of the country.  What is coming tolight is the astounding depth of Al Qaeda's penetration of Pakistan.  One is compelled to realise thatthe State itself was co-operating  with the elements that planned to take over Pakistan on behalf of AlQaeda and Osama bin Laden."

Alluding to the linkages of the LeT with Al Qaeda and the emergence of Karachi as the new clandestine hubof Al Qaeda, he further wrote: 

"The State of Pakistan allowed the centralisation of jihad in Karachi at the Banuri [My comment: Sameas Binori] mosque complex, whose founder Maulana Yusuf Banuri was empowered through induction into the Councilof Islamic Ideology in 1977 by Gen. Zia. It was in Banuri mosque that Osama bin Laden and Mulla Umer [Mycomment: The Amir of the Taliban] reportedly met for the first time during the Afghan war.  The abovereport from Karachi makes clear the connection of Al Qaeda with Pakistan's jihad movement.  The AhleHadith connection [My comment: the reference is to the LeT] with Osama was revealed when Osama bin Ladenhimself possibly and his lieutenant Abu Zubaida took shelter in Faislabad.  That in all the big cases ofterrorism an official of the State agencies was also caught along with the jihadi terrorists points to thelingering connection of the State with Al Qaeda."

During the Afghan war of the 1980s, bin Laden had financed the construction of a mosque and a guest housefor his use in the headquarter complex of the LeT at Muridke.  During his visits to Pakistan, he used tostay in this guest house.  After 1996, this guest house was used as transit accommodation for Al Qaedarecruits from Saudi Arabia and Yemen on their way to and from the Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. It is said in Pakistan that some of the 19 terrorists involved in the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US hadalso stayed in this guest house when they had transited through Pakistan on their way to Kandahar to meet binLaden.

The MDI and its successor the MUD did not join the six-party religious coalition during the recentelections in Pakistan as Prof. Sayeed is strongly opposed to Western-style democracy which he views asanti-Islam.  However, the MUD extended its propaganda support and made financial contributions to thecoalition partners.  It was at its insistence that the coalition included in its manifesto a promise ofincreased assistance to the jihadis in Palestine, J&K, Arakan, southern Philippines and Chechnya.

Al Qaeda and the other components of the IIF generally step up their acts of terrorism and pro-jihadpropaganda during the holy fasting period of Ramadan and in the days preceding it.  Many of theirterrorist acts such as the Mumbai (Bombay) blasts of March,1993, the New York World Trade Centre explosion ofFebruary,1993 etc took place during the fasting period.

The last but one and the last Fridays of the fasting period are particularly important occasions for themto draw the attention of the world to their continuing jihad.  The recently -stepped up propagandaoffensive, either by bin Laden himself or someone on his behalf, has also coincided with the fasting period. November 29 is the last Friday of the fasting period and there would be need for extra vigilance on and aroundthat day.

After the elections in Pakistan, what was described as a jihad conference was held at the initiativeof the MUD.  The exact dates of the conference are not known, but the Pakistani media carried reports onthe conference in the first week of November, 2002.  The conference was held at a place called Yarmook,which has been projected as the new headquarters of the MUD, the parent organisation of the LeT.  I donot as yet know where this place is located.

Among those who addressed the conference were Sajid Mir of the Jamiat Ahle Hadis, Amir Hamza of the MUD,Ghulam Mohammad Safi, the POK-based representative of the Hurriyat of J&K, Amir Abdullah ofJamiat-ul-Mujahideen and Sheikh Jamitur Rehman of the Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen.

The speakers strongly criticised the USA and India and called for the intensification of the jihad againstboth the countries.  They said that jihad was the only way to compel India to come to terms.  ThePakistani military regime did not take any action to stop this conference and to prevent the participation init of persons belonging to organisations ostensibly under a ban since January 15, 2002.

The intensification of terrorist attacks in J&K and elsewhere has come in the wake of this conference. The overtures made by the new Government of J&K to the indigenous Kashmiri organisations will not have anyimpact on these Pakistani pan-Islamic organisations whose agenda is totally different from that of theindigenous organisations.  Their agenda is an Islamic Caliphate in South Asia and not better governance,more autonomy and a new political dispensation in J&K.

Most of them are the Pakistani jihadi warriors of bin Laden's IIF and not sons of the Kashmiri soil. They have to be ruthlessly eliminated, if necessary, by taking our counter-terrorism operations into Pakistaniterritory through appropriate covert actions. Unless and until we do so, our innocent civilians will continueto bleed.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai)