Talk delivered today at the 21st Asia-Pacific Round Table at Kuala Lumpur
There can be copybooks on physical security to prevent successful acts of terrorism and on crisis management after an act of terrorism. Such copybooks are of universal application and can be used against different kinds of terrorism. But, there can be no copybook on counter-terrorism, which is of universal application. Each kind of terrorism calls for a different counter-terrorism approach.
A counter-terrorist policy has to be distinguished from a counter-terrorism policy. A counter-terrorist policy deals with terrorism as a threat to national security. It seeks to prevent acts of terrorism through timely intelligence and effective physical security and reduce the consequences if prevention fails. It seeks to damage and destroy the capability of the terrorists to carry out acts of terrorism and, ultimately, make them realise that they cannot achieve their aims through terrorism. The formulation and execution of a counter-terrorist policy is largely the responsibility of the intelligence and security agencies, under the guidance of the political leadership.
A counter-terrorism policy treats terrorism as a phenomenon with variousdimensions--political, economic, social, ethnic, separatist, religious, sectarian etc. It seeks to address the various dimensions of the phenomenon at the levels of the State, the Government and the civil society, while giving the intelligence and security agencies the required resources and capabilities to deal with the threat posed by the phenomenon to national security. The formulation and execution of a counter-terrorism policy is largely the responsibility of the political leadership.
To be effective, a campaign against terrorism has to have a blend of the counter-terrorist and the counter-terrorism approaches. An over-focus on the counter-terrorist approach without adequate attention to addressing terrorism as a phenomenon would be as counter-productive as an over-focus on the counter-terrorism approach without enabling the intelligence and security agencies to neutralize the threat on the ground. Administrative and operational firmness in action on the ground and political flexibility in thinking and on the table are the essential ingredients of a successful campaign against terrorism.
The kind of policy mix required would depend on whether the campaign is against indigenous terrorism with no trans-border or trans-national ramifications or whether it is against international terrorism with such ramifications. It is easier to deal with indigenous terrorism than with international terrorism. The perpetrators are one’s own nationals, their area of operation and capabilities are limited and they are often amenable to a hearts and minds psychological approach. Moreover, the success of the campaign against them depends on the affected State’s own capabilities and resources. It does not generally depend on the co-operation received from other States. However, even indigenous terrorism becomes difficult to handle when it is sponsored and supported by another State for achieving its national objectives.
Dealing with international terrorism is more difficult. The perpetrators belong to different nationalities. Their areas of operation are much larger spreading across many nations. Their capabilities and resources are superior to those of indigenous terrorists. They are not amenable to a psychological approach. Moreover, the success of the campaign against them depends on the capabilities of many nations and the effectiveness of the action taken by them and their co-operation with one another.
Of the different kinds of terrorism, which pose a threat to peace and security, those motivated by the religiousfactor--with the perpetrators united by a religious or a sectarian bond--have been more difficult to tackle than those arising from economic, social, ideological or ethnic factors. We have seen this in the case of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the UK, the Khalistani terrorism in India’s Punjab, indigenous jihadi terrorism in countries such as Thailand and India, sectarian terrorism in Pakistan and pan-Islamic jihadi terrorism prevalent in different countries of the world.
Terrorists motivated by religious anger show a greater inclination to indulge in mass casualty terrorism and a less sensitivity to the impact of their actions on public opinion. Violence in the name of religion finds greater acceptability among the adherents of that religion than violence in the name of an ideology or an ethnic group.
A question that has been posed by the organizers of this Round Table is: "Six years after 9/11, have we understood the real causes of terrorism any the better?" Thereis terrorism and there is terrorism. Each phenomenon of terrorism has a different cause, a different context and a different motivating factor.
However, all phenomena of terrorism--whether ethnic or ideological or religious orsectarian-- have a common underlying cause, namely, anger. The anger could be against the State or the civil society or a community or an external power. The anger could be due to variousreasons--economic deprivation, social injustice, religious discrimination etc. In the case of many terrorist groups,it is possible to identify and analyse the reasons for the anger and address those, which are perceived to be legitimate.
Unfortunately, in the case of jihadi terrorism as practised by Al Qaeda and the jihadi terrorist organizations allied with it in the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, the identification and analysis of the reasons for their perceived anger become difficult and even a meaningless exercise. This is because the reasons for their anger arise not from contemporaneous factors, which may be within the realm of rectification, but historic factors, which are beyond rectification.
They call for acts of reprisal to avenge what they project as historic wrongs committed to the Muslims. They call for the restoration to the Ummah of Muslim-majority areas in non-Islamic countries on the ground that these areas historically belonged to the Ummah. They advocate acts of reprisal not only against non-Muslims but even against Muslims, who co-operate with non-Muslim Governments and the Western world. They describe as anti-Islam not only leaders of non-Islamic countries, but even of Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Algeria. They proclaim their ultimate objective as an Islamic Caliphate. In their perception, these causes may not have contemporary relevance and meaning, but have a historic legitimacy. A contemporary world, which seeks to attain peace,stability and harmony, cannot accept the legitimacy of such causes.
Conventional wisdom of terrorism analysts attributes their anger to some other causes of a contemporary importance such as the unresolved Palestine issue, the failure of the international community to act against the policies of the Israel Government, the acceptance by the international community of the Jewish atomic bomb while opposing the Islamic atomic bomb and the perception of a general humiliation of the Muslims in the Western world.
These causes are relevant for understanding the spreading and persisting anger among the Muslims as a whole, but not for justifying the wave of terrorism unleashed by Al Qaeda and the IIF since 1998. If the unresolved Palestine issue is responsible for their acts, why are they not supporting the Palestine Liberation Organisation ( PLO) and the Hamas, which have been fighting for the liberation of Palestine? Why do they denounce them as apostate? If Israeli policies are responsible for their anger, why did they not support the Hezbollah, when it resisted the Israeli attacks in the Lebanon in July last year? Why did they not condemn the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon as vigorously as they condemned the US invasion of Iraq? If the Israeli military nuclear capability is a reason for their anger, why are they not condemning the reported plans of the US and Israel to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability? While they are asserting their right to acquire a nuclear weapon to protect their religion, why are they not defending the right of Iran and the Shias to have their own military nuclear capability? If the perceived humiliation of the Muslims in the Western world is a reason for their anger, why are they quiet on the humiliation and massacre of the Shias in areas controlled by the Wahabi jihaditerrorists--whether in Iraq or Afghanistan or Pakistan or elsewhere?
If one objectively examines these questions, one will come to the conclusion that Al Qaeda and the IIF represent not a coherent ideology, but a ruthless attempt by a group of Wahabi Sunnis belonging to different nationalities to capture political power in the Islamic world and impose their will on the Ummah. They have no legitimate causes, but only exploitable pretexts which they use to achieve their objectives. To talk of addressing the root causes of Al Qaeda and the IIF would be as counter-productive as it would have been, during the second World War, to talk of addressing the root causes of Nazism, Fascism and Japanese militarism. The campaign against Al Qaeda and the IIF, therefore, calls for the vigorous execution of a well thought-out counter-terrorist policy.
This does not mean that a counter-terrorism policy has no importance in the campaign against international terrorism of Al Qaeda and the IIF variety. Its importance is not for neutralizing their operations, but for preventing them from misleading the angryMuslims--particularly the youth-- and making them take to suicide and other kinds of terrorism. It is a fact that despite the losses in manpower, sanctuaries and capabilities suffered by Al Qaeda and the member-organisations of the IIF since 9/11, they have been able to keep up their campaign of jihadi terrorism. Continuing flow of angry Muslim youth to these organizations is mainly responsible for the undamaged resilience of Al Qaeda and the IIF. Many of the young Muslims, who are supporting the operations of Al Qaeda, do not necessarily support its cause and objectives. And yet, they volunteer themselves for joining its operations, firstly, because of their anger over the way the so-called war against international terrorism is being waged and, secondly, because of their belief that in the absence of the willingness of any Islamic State to stand up to the US, only non-State actors such as Al Qaeda and the IIF are able to do so. They ,therefore, deserve the support of the community even if the community does not agree with their objectives and logic. So the Muslim youth think.
The anger of sizable sections of the Muslim youth in different countries of the world over the manner in which the so-called war or the campaign against international terrorism is being carried out under the leadership of the US has contributed to a global emulation of its methods of operation and added to the difficulties faced in containing the new kind of mass casualty terrorism. Counter-terrorism of the American brand has become a powerful root cause of aggravated jihadi terrorism since 9/11.The defining characteristics of the American brand of counter-terrorism are over-militarisation, disproportionate use of force, a willingness to use the Air Force and heavy weapons even at the risk of causing large civilian casualties and a perceived insensitivity to the feelings of honour and self-respect of the Muslims as seen from the conditions in which the Muslim detenus are kept at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba, the practice of rendition of Muslim suspects from country to country without observing the due process of law and the inhuman practices followed at Abu Garaith and other detention centres in Iraq. Since the US security forces have been mainly countering terrorists of foreign nationalities in foreign territory, the kind of restraints on counter-terrorist operations, which would normally apply while operating against one’s own nationals in one’s own territory, do not apply.
The unwise invasion and occupation of Iraq by the US-led coalition in 2003 and of Somalia by the Ethiopian troops in 2006 have added injured feelings of national pride to the injured feelings of religious pride and created a dangerously destabilizing and destructive mix. The globalization of the jihad by Al Qaeda and the IIF has led to a globalization of the prejudices against and suspicions of Muslims as individuals and as a community and of Islam as a religion.
If the international community has to prevail over international jihadi terrorism of Al Qaeda variety, there is a need for a re-evaluation of the methods followed so far and for the adoption of a new strategy, which should have three components.
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The first component has to be a more effective counter-terrorist approach based on an improved collection of preventive intelligence, better capabilities for dealing with improvised explosive devices (IED) and suicide terrorism, which have become the main weapons in the arsenal of the terrorists, better physical security for hard as well as soft targets, better crisis management and better methods of ground operations to kill or capture the terrorists, with the reliance on the Air Force and heavy weapons for this purpose reduced to the minimum unavoidable.
The second component has to be a more imaginative and sophisticated counter-terrorism approach, which seeks to contain the spreading anger in the Muslimcommunity--even if it is not possible to remove it immediately. This would call for measures for the avoidance of a disproportionate use of force against the terrorists and the resulting casualties among the civilians, a vigorous respect for the human rights of the Muslims in the affected areas, an end to the practice of using foreign military forces in ground operations against the terrorists, the winding up of the Guantanamo Bay detention centre and a definitive end to the practice of rendition and other similar extra-legal methods, which have unfortunately found acceptance in the campaign against AlQaeda.
The third component has to be a sophisticated intellectual approach to repair and restore the damaged bridges between the Muslims and the non-Muslims and to remove the unfortunate feelings in the minds of some sections of the Muslimcommunity--particularly the youth-- that they are a targeted community. By repeatedly proclaiming over the electronic media, in the print media and in gatherings such as this that they are not a targeted community would not remove their feelings of being insidiously targeted. Only a change in our behaviour, outlook and interactions would convince them that they are not. The intelligence and security agencies, whose day-to-day interactions with the Muslim community, largely contribute to the creation of feelings of counter-hostility in the minds of the Muslims, have an important role to play in this. The political leadership and the civil society too have an important contribution to make in this regard.
The fact that Al Qaeda and the member-organisations of the IIF have been responsible for some spectacular, well-planned, and well-orchestrated acts of mass casualty terrorism involving suicide volunteers since 1998 have created an unfortunate perception in the minds of large sections of non-Muslims across the world, which tends to equate terrorism with Islam. Many of the analyses coming from a new brand of post-9/11 terrorism analysts have tended to portray theMuslims--as individuals and as a community-- as more prone to violent behaviour and reactions than non-Muslims. The focus has to be not on Muslims and Islam, but on the terrorists of Al Qaeda kind, who have taken to jihadi terrorism in the name of Islam and the wrongs allegedly done to the Muslims and have been exploiting distorted interpretations of jihad to justify their resort to terrorism.
The correction of misperceptions and misinterpretations of each other is the equal task of Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Efforts towards such corrections are not making progress in the Muslim community due to various reasons. The most important reason is the non-availability of an affordable modern education system in many Islamic countries, which has been driving the impressionable Muslimyouth--particularly from the villages, small towns and tribal areas-- into madrasas or religious schools, many of which have become the purveyors of ideas of division, distortion and disharmony and advocates of resort to violence in the name of religion. Even amongnon-Muslims--despite their better access to modern education-- the minds remain closed, with embedded prejudice coming in the way of understanding the anger of the Muslim youth and devising ways to remove it. Making modern education easily available to the poor Muslim masses has to be an important objective of any long-term campaign against the terrorism of Al Qaeda kind. Attempts have been made towards it, but the progress has been unsatisfactory.
Another worrisome factor standing in the way of the effectiveness of the campaign against international terrorism has been the lack of a genuine democracy in many Muslim countries.
