Synchronized Onslaught

With the general elections round the corner, Left wing Extremists - popularly termedNaxalites - of the Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML), People's War Group (PWG), and theMaoist Communist Center (MCC) have begun efforts to resolve their differences and work towards anorganizational merger, potentially creating a grave threat to the electioneering process in the areas theydominate. In keeping with their ideological opposition to Parliamentary democracy in India, they have alreadycalled for a boycott of the election process, and large-scale preparations are said to be underway to ensurethe success of the boycott. Vigorous efforts are in evidence for the organisation of training camps,procurement of illegal firearms, fund-raising, as well as outreach and propaganda activities to gain publicsympathy.

Available reports suggest that the PWG and the MCC would merge under a new identity: the All India MaoistCommunist Center (AIMCC), and would acquire a more militant 'avatar'. Intelligence sources indicate that theMCC is currently holding talks with the PWG and a few other like-minded organisations in India, as well aswith Nepal's Maoist insurgents. Leaders of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) are believed tobe acting as mediators to strengthen the extreme Left in the region. Given the significant increase inNaxalite activities in Central India after the August 11, 1998, merger of the PWG with Party Unity, anotherrevolutionary group operating in Bihar, the possible union of the MCC and the PWG creates probabilities of asubstantial force multiplier for Left Wing insurgencies over a vast landscape.

The MCC is distinguished by its commitment to an earlier version of the 'Charu Mazumdar line' [Mazumdarinitiated the 'Naxalite' Movement in the mid-1960s], which envisions 'protracted armed struggle'. The MCC'sphilosophy revolves around two premises. The first is that, within the country, a revolutionary mass struggleexisted and the people were fully conscious and even prepared to take part in revolution immediately. Thesecond was that militant struggles must be carried on, not for land, crops, or other immediate goals, but forthe seizure of power. These assumptions are reflected in all their views, whether on organization, on strategyor on tactics. As a result, participation in elections, propaganda, meetings, demonstrations, education ofpeople through papers and pamphlets, are all viewed as being totally unnecessary, and all efforts andattention is firmly focused on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power.

Though the PWG also held a similar view till the early 1980s, it has since shifted stance and establishedseveral political front organisations. The PWG gradually discarded its initial assessment of the people'slevel of preparedness for an armed struggle, and consequently revised its strategy of immediate seizure ofpower. Though the armed struggle is not discarded, considerable differences emerged on the issue of theappropriate modus operandi. There is now increasing emphasis on the processes of party building and theencouragement of mass political organizations. Party organisation, though, remains secret in nature. Theirperspectives on strategy and tactics are also somewhat more nuanced, and there is an acknowledgement that theissues on which the struggle should be conducted necessarily depend on the level of people's consciousness andthe nature of problems faced by them.

Despite these differences, both the organizations share their belief in the 'annihilation of class enemies'and in extreme violence as a means to achieve the organisation's goals. The PWG and the MCC have beenresponsible for the maximum number of violent attacks and fatalities in Naxalite-related violence in the nine statesthat are significantly affected by Left wing extremism. While the MCC operates in Jharkhand and Bihar, the PWGdominates Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Despite a decline in the number of incidents and marginaldecline in total fatalities over the past year (2003 witnessed 546 incidents and 509 deaths whereas 2002 hadseen 1465 incidents and 482 deaths), Left wing extremist violence spread into new areas through 2003.

Thus, in Andhra Pradesh, a total of 280 persons were killed, including 164 Naxalites and 99 civilians, in2003. A break-up reveals an increasing number of killings in the Andhra Pradesh state Committee (APSC) zone,which had been comparatively less violence-prone in the past, as compared to the area under the NorthTelengana Special Zone Committee (NTSZC) and the Andhra-Orissa Border Special Zone Committee (AOBSZC). Themovement out of the areas of traditional dominance may be the consequence of a combination of factors,including:

• Massive police operations in Naxalite stronghold areas have forced the Naxalites to look for safer placesof operation;
  
  
• There has been a decline in popularity in earlier stronghold areas (an indication to this effect could bethe surrender of 588 cadres in 2003, the highest since 1992);
  
  
• A greater emphasis on, and success of, the Naxalite strategy to spread their ideology and influence invirgin areas or areas of peripheral influence.

It is the case that the increased combing operations subsequent to the attack on ChiefMinister Chandrababu Naidu on October 1, 2003, inflicted massive casualties on the PWG in the Telengana andNalamala forest areas. These reverses coincide with the PWG's resolve to spread their movement in the plainsby creating military formations, basic teams, village party committee, cell members and secret guerrillasquads. Their organizers have been instructed to concentrate mainly on strengthening the cadres by gaining thesupport of locals and not to involve themselves in any major operations.

These developments have great significance within the context of the anticipated general elections this year.The PWG and Jana Shakti in Andhra Pradesh have called upon the people to boycott the elections and intensifythe fight against 'state-sponsored terrorism'. In a joint statement, PWG Central Committee (CC) member Pradeepand Jana Shakti CC member Bahujan alleged that the ruling Telegu Desam Party (TDP), 'in league with fascistforces at the centre', had unleashed state violence targeting the Naxalites. Similarly, the PWG OrissaCommittee has asked people to boycott polls and directed its cadres to target the 'anti-people government' ofNavin Patnaik in Orissa and the 'pro-World Bank' TDP government in Andhra Pradesh. Sabyasachi Panda, theSecretary of the Vamshadhara Committee of the PWG, was quoted as having stated from a forest area in theRayagada district near the Orissa-Andhra border, "Our poll strategy is being chalked out and would ensuredefeat of ruling combine of the Biju Janata Dal and the BJP in Orissa and the Telugu Desam Party in AndhraPradesh."

The newly formed Jharkhand state is the second worst affected state in the country in terms of Naxaliteviolence, after Andhra Pradesh. In last six months, the state has been virtually under siege due to increasingNaxalite activities, and both the state police and district administrations of the Naxalite-infested areashave accepted their failure to tackle the menace. The success of the 24-hours bandh called by both the PWG andMCC in Orissa on January 8, 2004, is an accurate index of the gravity of the situation, as well as ofincreasing popular support to the groups. The People's Guerrilla Army and the People's Liberation GuerrillaArmy also supported the bandh. 

According to the Director General of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), S.C. Chaube, theNaxalites are virtually running a parallel government in remote parts of certain districts. During the bandhperiod, the rebels targeted railway establishments, mines and security forces. The railway establishments,mining and industries are generally regarded as soft targets by the Naxalites. During the bandh, Rail trafficon the Central Indian Coalfields (CIC) section of the Dhanbad Rail Division remained paralysed for severalhours and five electric engines were set ablaze at different places in the state. According to railwayofficials, in the six months since June 11, 2003, thefts of railway properties had been reported from theMcLuskiganj-Barwadih section on a regular basis, disrupting normal functioning of the railways. Rail driversoperating on the McLuskiganj-Barwadih section had refused to run the train following growing incidence ofassaults by extremists.

Mining is another badly hit sector in Jharkhand. The Naxalites collect a major chunk of their funds frommining area by extortion and abduction of senior officials. The MCC had abducted 15 employees of the HindustanConstruction Company from Hazaribagh district, on July 9, 2003, because of their failure to pay their 'levy'.Other recent incidents relating to the mining sector in the state include:

• January 3, 2004, the Ranchi District police arrested a conduit of the MCC operating from the coal belt. Theaccused was collecting levies amounting to Rs. 800,000 each month from coal transporters on behalf of the MCC.He was close to the MCC's Rajkumar Ganju squad and other extremists.
  
  
• December 5, 2003, some 12 activists of the MCC demanded Rs. 70 million from the management of the SteelAuthority of India Ltd. (SAIL)-owned Meghahatuburu mine in Jharkhand's West Singhbhum district.
  
  
• December 11, the rebels stormed the Indian Aluminium Company facilities at Bagdu in Lohardaga district, as aresult of which the loading and despatch of ore from the captive bauxite mines remained suspended for fourdays. The extremists had laid siege to the company's mines in the area, manhandled company officials,destroyed property and taken away Rs. 104,000 in cash.

The Naxalites had suffered a reverse in Jharkhand after the lynching of nine PWG activistsby villagers at Longo in East Singhbhum district on August 8, 2003. The Longo incident deeply demoralized therebels and led to a temporary suspension of the training camps they were organising. However, the killing of anewly recruited tribal policeman in Ghurabandha on January 1, 2004, indicates a resurgence of the group in thearea.

Jharkhand has been suffering as a result of the Naxalite extremism since the creation of this new state onNovember 15, 2000, when the tribal dominated areas were carved out of Bihar. Maoist Guerrillas are currentlyactive in 18 of the 22 districts in the state. Nearly 430 people, including 153 policemen, have been killedsince the creation of the state. The year 2003 saw 90 persons - the highest in three years - including 45civilians, killed in the state.

The infant state of Chhattisgarh, which was created by separating the tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh onNovember 1, 2000, is another badly affected area in terms of the intensity and scale of Left wing extremistviolence. According to the Annual Report of the Chhattisgarh Police, a total of 78 people, including 31 policepersonnel and 38 civilians were killed in 103 incidents in the state in Naxalite related violence in 2003. ThePeople's War Group and the MCC were active in 96 police station areas in the state spread over some seven ofits 16 districts. The report also confirmed that there had been a dramatic increase in Naxalite activities in2003 as compared to the previous year.

The high intensity of Naxalite activity and its recent spread to new areas, or increase in areas of marginalactivity, has created fresh challenges for enforcement agencies in the concerned states. Police forces in manyof these states (Andhra Pradesh is an exception) are poorly equipped to handle the challenge and areenormously demoralized. As a measure of some relief, the Union Government recently announced that the centrewould not demand any charge for deployment of Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs) in the Naxalism affected states.The centre would also deploy an additional 11 CRPF battalions in the affected districts. These limitedmeasures, however, will have very limited prophylactic or therapeutic value, given the absence of a coherentcounter-insurgency strategy across the affected states in the face of what is evidently and increasingly awell coordinated strategy on the part of the Naxalite groups.

Nihar Nayak is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the SouthAsia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal