Subversion Sans Borders

On November 4, 2006, union minister of state for home Sriprakash Jaiswal statedthat in view of Pakistani militants using Nepalese territory as a hideout andbase for infiltration into India, the government might re-draft its extraditiontreaty with Nepal. Speaking at Gorakhpur in Uttar Pradesh, he said Pakistanimilitants had "found a safe hideout in Nepal and it is a safe passage forcoming to India... The government would be unable to check this completely asNepal is a friendly nation and we have a porous border with it. If the needarises, we might consider a new extradition treaty with Nepal."

The minister's statement confirms a fact well-documented over the years.Nepalese territory has long been used by the Pakistani Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) as a launch pad for its activities against India. Takingadvantage of India's good relationship with Nepal that excludes a policy of'squeeze targeting' the latter, the ISI has been able to exploit Nepal'sterritory and the porosity of the 1,751 kilometre India-Nepal border to augmentits subversive campaign.

The India-Nepal 'open' border runs across 20 Districts in five Indian states:Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, West Bengal and Uttaranchal. The term 'border'is a misnomer in this context, as people of both the countries can cross it fromany point. The legality of the border is enforced through specific bordercheck-posts, including 19 agreed immigration check posts, 22 mutual trade routesand 15 third-country transit routes. There are six transit points for nationalsof other countries, who require entry and exit visas to cross the border.Locals, however, routinely cross over at any point, and the terms of the Peaceand Friendship Treaty of 1950 offer virtually uninterrupted passage for illegalsmuggling of goods, arms, ammunition and narcotics, as well as human traffickingfrom either side.

A 78-page Indian intelligence report dating back to the year 2000, titled'Pakistan's Anti-India Activities in Nepal', detailed various aspects ofPakistan's 'undeclared war' and its modus operandi, including support to NGOspromoting ill-will against India among the Nepalese Muslim community bycirculating propaganda material received from Pakistan and elsewhere, support toradicalization in an increasing number of mosques along the border and the useof such mosques and religious centres to facilitate the movement of subversiveand terrorist cadres and material across the border.

With the fencing of the India-Pakistan border in the Punjab and RajasthanSectors, the ISI has increasingly exploited India's open border with Nepal forinfiltration of terrorists, arms, ammunition and explosives, to carry outstrikes in various parts of India with the help of various Islamist groupsdirectly supported by Pakistani state agencies. Reports indicate that militantshave been crossing into and out of India through the porous Indo-Nepal border,particularly via Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar. Terrorist and subversive cadresbased in Bangladesh go to Nepal through the same route, crossing into India fromWest Bengal. According to one Police officer, "Young men from KashmirValley, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and other places, who are initiated into terrorism,often use the same route to reach the training camps apparently being run in theneighbouring countries."

The impact of such a permeable border has been felt on both the Indian andNepal side. The ISI has used the Raxaul sub-division in Bihar as a recruitingground for terrorists, with Birganj (the second largest city of Nepal),allegedly, being the nerve centre of such activities. Over the years Birganj hasemerged as a major hub for the distribution of counterfeit currency, narcotics,explosives and arms into different parts of India through Bihar. In addition tothe border districts of North Bihar, the Kishanganj area adjacent to West Bengalhas also reported significant ISI movement. In July 2006, the IntelligenceBureau Director, E.S.L. Narshimhan, visited Raxaul to take stock of reports ofgrowing activities of militants and smugglers along the border, allegedlypatronised by the ISI. Further, agencies indicated that at least 3,000 personsresiding on the Indo-Nepal border, particularly in Sikrahna and Raxaul, had beenenjoying dual citizenship by registering themselves in both India's and Nepal'svoters' list.

Further, smugglers (including the network of Pakistan-based Dawood Ibrahim)and narcotics peddlers have taken advantage of the open border since long. MaloyKrishna Dhar, a former Intelligence Bureau Joint Director, in his book Fulcrumof Evil: ISI-CIA-Al Qarda Nexus¸ has disclosed that the ISI has beenactive through two subsidiaries—Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous and JointIntelligence X— to carry out a systematic process of mobilisation amongNepal's Muslim population. Some of the groups aiding this process include theNepal Islamic Yuva Sangh, Jamait-e-Islami Nepal and Nepal Muslim Seva Samiti.According to a March 27, 2006, report, there are around 1,900 madrassas (seminaries)on both sides of the India-Nepal border, including 800 on the Nepal side.Muslims constitute just 4.2 per cent of Nepal's total population, of which96.7 percent is confined to the Tarai region bordering India, constituting some7.32 percent of the total population of the Tarai.

India's Task Force on Border Management, in its report of October 2000 alsoconfirmed ominous developments along the India-Nepal border:

On the Indo-Nepal border, madrassas and mosques have sprung up on both sides in the Terai region, accompanied by four-fold increase in the population of the minority community in the region. There are 343 mosques, 300 madrassas and 17 mosques-cum-madrasas within 10 kilometres of the border on the Indian side. On the Nepal side, there are 282 mosques, 181 madrassas and eight mosques-cum-madrassas. These mosques and madrassas receive huge funds from Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Managers of various madrassas and ulema maintain close links with the embassy officials of those countries located at Kathmandu (sic). Financial assistance is also channelizsed through the Islamic Development Bank (Jeddah), Habib Bank of Pakistan and also through some Indian Muslims living in Gulf countries. Pakistan's Habib Bank, after becoming a partner in Nepal's Himalayan Bank, has expanded its network in the border areas including Biratnagar and Krishna Nagar. It is suspected that foreign currency is converted into Indian currency in Nepal and then brought to India clandestinely… Madrasas and mosques on the Indo-Nepal border are frequently visited by prominent Muslim leaders, Tablighi Jamaats (proselytizing groups) and pro-Pak Nepali leaders. Officials of Pak Embassy have come to notice visiting Terai area of Nepal to strengthen Islamic institutions and to disburse funds to them. Pro-Pak elements in Nepal also help in demographic subversion of the Terai belt.

Indian intelligence now believes that several underground groups in Nepalprovide logistics and support to the militants taking shelter there. Some ofthese have been identified as the Kashmir Jama Masjid Democratic MuslimAssociation, Nepal World Islamic Council and Nepal Islamic Yuva Sangh. In somecases, such groups are known to have received funding from sympathisers based inJeddah and other Asian cities. One of these groups is alleged to have links withthe Islamic Youth Organisation based in Jakarta. Among others on the Indianintelligence watch list are Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Hadis, Millat-e-Islami (which haslinks with Jamaat-e-Islami) and Jam Seraj-ul-Alam, which is based in Kapilvastuin South West Nepal.

The serial blasts in Mumbai (July 11, 2006), in Varanasi (March 7, 2006), inDelhi (October 29, 2005), and a foiled terrorist attack on the disputedreligious site in Ayodhya on July 5, 2005, all exposed a Nepal connection. Thearrest of two Pakistanis, Moiddin Siddiqui and Gulam Hasan Cheema, from afive-star hotel in Kathmandu on July 13, 2006, by the Nepal Police furthercorroborated these linkages. Then, on August 7, 2006, the arrest of a DawoodIbrahim aide, Fazlu, from the India-Nepal border at Gorakhpur in eastern UttarPradesh had been preceded by the arrests of two suspects in Mumbai blasts,Mohammad Kamal and Khaleel Aziz, from Madhubani in Bihar, again on theIndia-Nepal border.

Security agencies are also concerned over the free flow of fake currencynotes in the denominations of INR 1,000 and INR 500. Police reportedly seizedsuch fakes notes in more than 200 different places on the Indo-Nepal border overthe past year. The printing and circulation of massive quantities of fake Indiacurrency has been an integral part of the ISI's strategy for decades now. Inone of the incidents of this kind, on August 7, 2005, the Uttar Pradesh Policearrested two suspected ISI agents, Mobin Ansari of Nepal and Ashfaq Ahmed ofGorakhpur in UP, from Delhi and recovered fake currency notes with face value ofINR 68,500. The duo reportedly confessed that they used to smuggle fake Indiancurrency via Nepal through their own agents and circulate them in the borderingdistricts of Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. In direct confirmation of the Pakistanirole in the circulation of fake currency through Nepal, a Pakistan Embassyofficial, Siraj Ahmed Siraj, was detained by the Nepalese Police at Kathmandu,and counterfeit currency amounting to INR 47,000 and USD 9200 was recovered fromhim.

Following the imposition of Emergency in Nepal in 2001 the Maoists startedtaking advantage of the open border to take shelter in bordering states in timesof adversity and also created a support arrangement with the Indian Maoists forsafe haven, medical treatment and assistance in training. The union ministry ofhome affairs in its 2006 annual report said that 180 Communist Party ofNepal-Maoist leaders and cadres have been arrested from different parts of Indiaover the last five years. It stated, further, that 140 Maoists had been arrestedfrom 2001 to 2004 while 40 were arrested in 2005, adding that Nepali Maoistsfrequently visit the Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh for medicaltreatment. After the November 7, 2006-agreement between the government andMaoists in Nepal, the infiltration by Nepali Maoists may witness a momentarylull. But without a solution crystallizing in Nepal, there is little grounds forlowering the guard on the India-Nepal border.

The Shasastra Seema Bal (SSB), a paramilitary force, which now guards theIndo-Nepal border in Bihar and West Bengal, is already in the process ofaugmenting its force and would position 45,000 personnel on the ground by March2007. It has already urged the Bihar government to connect all border outposts,presently numbering 148, through district roads and also favoured greatercoordination between central and state agencies against the growing ISI threatin the region. The union home ministry is also considering the setting up offour integrated check posts (ICPs) along the Indo-Nepal border in Bihar andeastern Uttar Pradesh. ICPs are expected to be in place shortly at Raxaul andJogbani in Bihar.

Grave dangers, nevertheless, continue to exist, and, given the nature of theneighbourhood and the campaigns of covert warfare against India by Pakistan andBangladesh, as long as the Indo-Nepal border remains porous, the dangers of bothsubversion and terror emanating from Nepal will persist.