State Complicity: Police Misbehaviour

Crime Against Humanity 
Volume 2 An inquiry into the carnage in Gujarat -- Findings And Recommendations by Concerned Citizens Tribunal -Gujarat 2002

State Complicity
Police Misbehaviour

2 Communalisation of the Police Administration
3. Legal Remedies
4. Communalisation of the Bureaucracy

Annexure –Police andHindutvawadi Organisations

1.1. Evidence before the Tribunal clearly establishes the absolute failure of large sec-tions of the Gujarat police to fulfil their constitutional duty and prevent mass massacre,rape and arson — in short, to maintain law and order. Worse still is the evidence of theiractive connivance and brutality, their indulgence in vulgar and obscene conduct againstwomen and children in full public view. It is as if, instead of being impartial keepers ofthe rule of law, they were a part of the Hindutva brigade targeting helpless Muslims.

1.2. To start with, the Godhra incident would not have taken place had the policetaken due precautions right from the beginning. Given Godhra’s history and communalbackground, the police should have maintained a strict vigil as kar sevaks crossed Godhra,on their way to Ayodhya and on their return journey, more so because the climate in thecountry was already tense because of the VHP’s Ayodhya plan. On their way to Ayodhya,the kar sevaks had indulged in provocative acts at Godhra station. Despite these warningsigns, there was not enough deployment of forces. (See chapter on Godhra, Volume II). Inthe circumstances, one may well ask whether this was a case of intelligence failure onthe part of the police force, or a deliberate absence of pre-emptive action?

1.3. Once the Godhra tragedy had occurred, the Gujarat police made no preventivearrests. (See Annexures Police statistics, Volume I). The only two arrests made on February27 were those of Shri Mohammed Ismail Jalaluddin and Shri Fateh Mohammed, whowere picked up at Astodia that night, for shouting slogans.

1.4. Significantly, the police waited in the wings as subsequent events unfolded. Bythe evening of February 27, the VHP had made its intentions apparent with its stridentcall for a ‘Gujarat Bandh’ the next day and a ‘Bharat Bandh’ the day after. Seeing theGodhra incident as ‘a manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism’, the VHP gave a 24-hour ultimatum to the state government to bring the culprits to book. (Two years ago, inthe Gujarat Bandh it enforced on August 1, 2000, the VHP and the BJP had gone on therampage, destroying Muslim property worth Rs. 15 crore. (See chapter on Build-Up in Gujarat,Volume II). This recent history alone should have been sufficient reason for the police tomake preventive arrests and take other precautionary measures.

1.5 Since 1998, there has been a proliferation of hate speech and incendiary pam-phlets all over Gujarat. The Gujarat government and the police had enough evidenceof this incendiary and provocative literature, printed in hundreds of thousands andthrust even on those opposed to the violent brand of politics that they typify. Variouscommunal Hindu groups — Dharam Raksha Samitis (Committee for Protecting Hin-duism), the VHP, the Bajrang Dal — have been circulating these pamphlets incitingits cadres to rape, humiliate, destroy and kill. As of early February this year, a highlyprovocative pamphlet exhorting cadres to economically boycott Muslims was in cir-culation throughout the state.Another anonymous pamphlet decreeing filthy conductagainst Muslims, especially women, was not only in circulation but had it’s desiredeffect as the bestiality of the violence reveals. The Gujarat police are guilty of notinitiating or pursuing criminal action against the hate-mongers for four long years,even after hate speech and hate writing had frequently been used to create an ‘appro-priate’ social climate to precipitate violence against the minorities. To argue that hatespeech is not related to engineered violence would be puerile. In August 1998, theVHP’s pamphlet, ‘Onward To Sanjeli’ resulted in anti-Muslim violence in Sanjeli andRandikpur. In December 1999, the Sangh Parivar’s reign of terror in the Dangs in southGujarat was preceded by anti-Christian pamphlets that were distributed in lakhs. (SeeAnnexures, HateWriting, Volume I).

1.6. There is adequate evidence recorded by the Tribunal from rural and urban Gujarat,which points to systematic data collection by the VHP/RSS/BD outfits, aided by sectionsof the state administration under the direct control of the fraternal BJP. The exhaustivesurvey included drawing up of lists using revenue and sales tax records, electoral rolls,information from the registrar of companies and door-to-door information collection drivesby shakhas (cells) of these outfits, to enable action, both precise and swift, at the righttime. Throughout the sinister planning and plotting, the Gujarat police maintained a dis-creet distance, adopting a non-interfering stance to blatantly unlawful activities. On March12, rediff.com posted an interview by the Gujarat VHP chief, KK Shastri on its website. Herevealed in the interview: “In the morning (February 28), we sat down and prepared thelist (of Muslim shops ands establishments to be targeted). We were not prepared in ad-vance.” The police have not thought it fight to initiate any inquiry or action against ShriShastri despite his self-confession of the VHP’s criminal misconduct.

1.7. The Tribunal received direct information through a testimony from a highly placedsource of a meeting where the chief minister, two or three senior cabinet colleagues, theCP of Ahmedabad, and an IG police of the state were present. This meeting took placeon the late evening of February 27. The meeting had a singular purpose: the senior-mostpolice officials were told that they should expect a “Hindu reaction” after Godhra. Theywere also told that they should not do anything to contain this reaction.

1.8. The Tribunal also has evidence of a secret meeting, held late in the evening ofFebruary 27, in Lunavada village of Sabarkantha district. Between 3 and 6 p.m., a callwas made from the house of Dr. Yogesh Ramanlal Pandya, in Godhra to Dr. AnilPatel (a member of the Gujarat Doctor’s Cell), intimating him about the meeting. Acall was also made to the police housing corporation chairman, Dr. ChandrakanthPandya (from Kalol). Shri Ashok Bhatt, the state health minister who was then sitting inthe Godhra collectorate, was also intimated about the meeting. Transport minister, ShriPrabhat Singh Chauhan, who hails from Panchmahal, was reportedly also called to attend.One AP Pandya was also present at the meeting. The phone calls were made to invite 50top people of the BJP/RSS/BD/VHP and the plan was to assemble them at someone’shouse in Lunavada (Sabarkantha). Fifty top people, the Tribunal was told, met at thisundisclosed destination and detailed plans were made on the use of kerosene, petrol forarson and other methods of killing. The state intelligence did not or could not track suchmeetings and preparations for the gruesome violence that was to follow.

1.9. On the night of February 27, some companies of the State Reserve Police(SRP) were rustled into action: one was sent to Godhra from SRP Group-III Naroda,and another to Ahmedabad rural. Some more companies from Ghodasar were movedinto parts of Ahmedabad by early morning. But they were split into groups of four orfive jawans each, which rendered them largely ineffective against the mobs that wenton the rampage on February 28.

1.10. “The police tried their best, but they couldn’t stop the mobs. They were grosslyoutnumbered when the mobs grew,” Ahmedabad’s police commissioner, Shri PC Pandeyhad pleaded. But in most cases, inadequacy of forces is a mere excuse touted byserving police officers who fail in their primary duty. Even in Gujarat this time, inseveral cases where good officers held out against political pressure, the same smalldeployment was enough to act decisively and control the situation. In the vast major-ity of cases, however, the police either did not act or acted on behalf of the mob.

1.11. PC Pandey publicly changed his stand four months later when, on June 1,2002, in an interview he stated that “VHP and BD were responsible for the violencein the state.” (rediff.com--see Detailed annexures, Volume III).

1.12. On the evening of February 27, DD telecast the statements of DGP Gujarat,Shri K Chakravarty: “As a precautionary measure, since there was a possibility of aflare-up, the district authorities have imposed curfew in Godhra town and in all othersensitive towns in Gujarat; especially the towns and cities which are coming on thetrain route, maximum alert was kept… The entire state police machinery has been puton red alert. The state reserve battalions have been positioned in all the communallysensitive areas and instructions have been given to all the SPs and the commissionersto take strict action against all anti–social elements and such action is already is inprogress… since the incident took place all of a sudden, there was no possibility ofthat being prevented.” In retrospect, these comments proved to be farcical, given thesheer inadequacy and complicity of the police the very next day.

1.13. The shocking levels of police complicity in the Gujarat carnage cannot beover-emphasised. On February 28, of the 40 persons shot dead by the police inAhmedabad city, 36 were Muslims. This, despite the fact that it was the minoritycommunity which was being targeted by huge and well-armed mobs on that day, atboth Naroda Gaon and Patiya as well as Chamanpura. (See Annexure, Police Statistics, Volume I). Among the numerous instances of the police making victims the target, isalso one that took place on April 15, when two persons belonging to the minoritycommunity, Shri Ayub Khan Pathan being one of them, were shot dead at Dariapur,Ahmedabad. The police was effectively aiding an attacking mob that was peltingstones on the hapless Muslim residents in the area. Even minors were shot at, a fewfatally, by the police. (See Annexures, Police: Dereliction of Duty, Volume I).

Gujarat Police has finally admitted that it killed more Muslims than Hindus in itsostensible attempts to stop what was clearly targeted Hindu violence against Mus-lims. Of the 184 people who died in police firing since the violence began, 104 areMuslims, says a report drafted by Gujarat police force itself. This statistic substanti-ates the allegations of riot victims from virtually every part of the state that not onlydid the local police not do anything to stop the Hindu mobs; they actually turned theirguns on the helpless Muslim victims.

At some places in the state though, this trend, of more Muslims falling to policebullets than Hindus, was reversed. In both Bhavnagar and Banaskantha districts, fiveHindus died in police firing on rioters. No Muslim was killed in Banaskantha, onlyone died in Bhavnagar. The superintendents of police of both districts were promptlyremoved from their posts. The number of Muslim and Hindu deaths in police firing,despite having been computed by the Gujarat police, have, so far, not been released.Coming out with the truth would only inflame the situation, it is feared.

1.14. Shri Pandey’s comments, telecast during the ‘Newshour’ bulletin of Star Newson February 28, on the role of the police under his command was telling: “Thesepeople also, they somehow get carried away by the overall general sentiment. That’sthe whole trouble. The police are equally influenced by the overall general senti-ments.” Here we have a top police official being indulgent towards his policemen who“somehow” get carried away by “general sentiments”, when the least that could beexpected of him would be a categorical assertion that those in the force who hadfailed to enforce ‘the rule of law’ were a disgrace to the uniform they donned andwould themselves be punished in accordance with the law.

1.15. Shri Pandey pronounced on ‘Newshour’ (Star News) on March 2: “The situa-tion is well within control. In fact, it is fast returning to normal. So we hope thatwithin the next maybe 12-24 hours, we would have complete peace.” The people ofAhmedabad who lived in terror until late April know otherwise.

1.16. The police did not even conduct the mandatory police drill. They did not evenfollow basic procedure stipulated for such circumstances. It did not contact religiousand community leaders to make appeals for peace, nor did it take steps to arrest theculprits and give support to the victims.

1.17. On February 28, as carefully planned mass killings were engineered in 30different locations all over the state, two senior cabinet ministers sat in the policecontrol room in Ahmedabad and the state police control room in Gandhinagar anddirectly influenced police action, or inaction. Gujarat’s health minister, Shri AshokBhatt — who, incidentally, faces a criminal charge for the murder of a police headconstable, Desai, on April 22, 1985 at Khadia in Ahmedabad — was in the policecontrol room (PCR) at the Ahmedabad police commissionerate in Shahibaug for morethan three hours on February 28. And urban development minister, Shri IK Jadeja whois considered Modi’s right hand man, had parked himself in the state police controlroom at Gandhinagar for four hours from 11 a.m. onwards on the same day. Commis-sioner Pandey’s untenable explanation is that they were only there to facilitate the easyflow of government directions, as union defence minister George Fernandes was toarrive in the city on March 1. In a crisis situation, the control room is a critical area ofoperation since this is one place where every bit of information is sent to and receivedfrom various locations in the city, or the entire state. The officer-in-charge of the con-trol room is always kept informed on wireless about what is happening. To have cabinetministers sitting inside the state and city police control rooms can mean only one thing:they were there to influence the independent functioning of the police. The actions andnon-actions of the Gujarat police on that day and thereafter, are, barring a few sterlingexceptions, proof of the partisan, political control over the police.

1.18. The police chiefs of Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Rajkot, Mehsana, Panchmahal,Dahod and Sabarkantha stand individually indicted for their failure to control unprec-edented violence under their respective jurisdictions. The SPs of several of Gujarat’s24 districts are also directly culpable. (See chapter List of Accused: Policemen, Volume II).The general message sent out to the police was: minimum response to panic calls andminimal action thereafter; indulgence towards armed mobs as they went about theirbusiness of killing, rape, loot and arson; either non-registration or tailoring of com-plaints from victims. It is unpardonable that the police obeyed such unwritten directions from Shri Modi and other political bosses.

1.19. The Tribunal has enough evidence to establish that the Gujarat carnage wasnot simply a case of failure or abdication of duty; in far too many cases, the policewere accomplices in the carnage. (See section on Incidents of Violence, Volume I). We recallhere just a few of the most glaring instances of obvious police complicity:

• On February 28, former Congress MP, Shri Ahsan Jafri from the Gulberg societyin Chamanpura, made repeated frantic calls pleading for police assistance against ahuge mob in a murderous mood. He kept calling the control room for several hours,until, finally, with no one to check the mob, he was charred to death along with 65 ofhis relatives and neighbours. Pleading anonymity, police officials who met the Tribu-nal confirmed that Shri Jafri had also made frantic calls to the director general ofpolice, the police commissioner, the chief secretary and the additional chief secretary(home) among others. Three mobile vans of the city police were on hand around ShriJafri’s house but did not intervene. Finally, when he came out of his house with foldedhands and appealed to the crowd to spare all the others who had taken shelter in hishouse, the marauders cut him to pieces and then consigned him to flames. They alsoset fire to the house in an attempt to burn alive all those who were in the house. It wasonly nine hours later that the Rapid Action Force (RAF) of the central governmentintervened, by which time it was far too late.

• At around the same time as the carnage in Chamanpura was taking place, themassacre in Naroda Patiya began, in which, by the end of the day, over 91 Muslimshad been torched. Over two dozen survivors from Naroda Gaon and Naroda Patiyawho appeared before the Tribunal said that they had attempted over a hundred dis-tress calls to the police commissioner and other police officers for help, all in vain.They said that the commissioner’s mobile was permanently switched off. The re-sponse from most of the other top officers — additional CPs and DCPs — was equallycallous. Police finally arrived only around 11 p.m.

• Shri KK Mysorewala, police inspector, Naroda police station, was indicted byseveral eyewitnesses for being a mere bystander, watching the massacre of helplessmen, women and children at Naroda Gaon and Patiya.

• The police could not, or did not, respond to pleas for protection to a retired anda sitting judge of the Ahmedabad high court (Justice Akbar Divecha and Justice MHKadri respectively), compelling them to seek army help on the night of February 28-March 1. None less than the sitting chief justice of the Gujarat High Court told hisbrother judges not to rely on the police.

• The police did nothing while a very large number of shops, hotels and businesspremises were looted and burnt. Almost nine months after the carnage, they havemade no attempt to recover the goods looted even by people from educated, rich andmiddle-class backgrounds. In all probability, the looted goods could be recovered fromthe homes of the culprits even today.

• The state police was nowhere to be seen as huge mobs comprising several thou-sands looted and torched Muslim property, from farms to factories large and small, on theAhmedabad-Modasa highway, the Baroda-Godhra road and the Sanjeli/Randhikpur-Bariaroad in broad daylight. Armed mobs wreaked havoc all over, their actions co-ordinated bytroop leaders who issued instructions on their mobile phones as they were driven aroundon motorcycles. These motorcycle riders would track fleeing Muslims and instruct mobsthat would soon close in on them to rape, brutalise, hack and kill. This was particularly thecase on the Godhra-Modasa route, which runs through Panchmahal district. There was nopatrolling of the highways in Gujarat, which only demonstrates the police’s utter igno-rance of, if not indifference to, the modus operandi of the Sangh Parivar leadership and cadrewho have consistently mocked the law and order machinery in the past two years.

• In the Best Bakery Case in Vadodara, policemen from the Panigate policestation simply drove by the bakery, totally unmindful of the huge mob that had en-circled it. Not long after that, 14 persons were burned alive.When Vadodara’s commissioner of police, Shri DD Tuteja was contacted by con-cerned citizens and traumatised survivors to protest against the overall failure of thepolice to respond to complaints, he is claimed to have remarked, “Aapka naukar kiskakaam karega?” (“Who’s work would your servant do?”), implying that the police is subser-vient to the ruling party in power. In the meeting which he agreed to have with the Tribu-nal and which lasted for several hours, Shri Tuteja was urbane throughout and kept insist-ing that he and his police force did the best that was possible in the circumstances.The loot and plunder of the home of senior citizen and prominent human rights activist,professor Jussar Bandukwala in Vadodara city also exposes the police. Shri Bandukwalachose to live in a Hindu dominated (Sama) society. However, his home could not be saved.

• The Panchmahal and Dahod police were party and privy to the burning aliveand hacking of villagers. The police posted at Anjanwa, Mora, Pandharwada villages,as also those near Limkheda and Limwada and Fatehpura (Dahod district) did noth-ing to stop the killings. The Mehsana district police were also guilty of the samemisconduct, when they failed to prevent massacres like the ones at Sardarpura, Visnagarand Unjha. Similarly, in Anand and Kheda districts where massacres have taken place,the police presence was of no help. Detailed testimonies recorded from Ankleshwarand Bharuch also reveal complete dereliction of duty by the police.

1.20. One of the most shocking aspects of the Gujarat carnage was that theconstituencies of some ministers and sitting MLAs were the arena for the worstincidents of carnage. Bapunagar in Ahmedabad, one of the worst affected areas, isthe home constituency of the minister of state for home, Shri Gordhan Zadaphiya.Paldi, Ahmedabad is the constituency of Shri Haren Pandya, former state home minis-ter and, until recently, revenue minister in Shri Modi’s cabinet. Shri Nitin Patel, also astate cabinet minister, is charged with leading the violence (including sexual assault ofa woman) in Kadi, Mehsana district. Shri Nararayan Patel is transport minister in ShriModi’s cabinet, from Unjha in Mehsana district who allegedly inspired and abetted mobviolence, including sexual assault and arson. Rajkot, from where Shri Modi recently wonan election, had never witnessed a riot before. Shri Prabhatsinh Chauhan, transportminister from Panchmahal has been directly indicted by witnesses. Shri Ashok Bhatt,state health minister, is named in the evidence of victims. In all these areas, the policetook no preventive steps; worse, in areas like Paldi, Gomtipur and many district places,many eyewitnesses have charged them with helping and even leading mobs.

1.21. To begin with, police failure to quash rumours, deliberately floated to inflamepassion and fuel violence, is unpardonable. Justice Jagmohan Reddy’s commission ofinquiry report after the 1969 violence has recommended detailed methods for the po-lice, especially to tackle rumour. These should be revised and re-interpretated given thefact that 33 years have elapsed and immediately implemented. (See Detailed Annexures,Volume III). In addition, from February 27 to April 10, it failed miserably in taking deci-sive action to control the violence that followed. The daily newspaper Sandesh was usedto actively promote fear and insecurity in the minds of the majority while the minoritywas being targeted. However, the police did precious little to diffuse the situation.

1.22. As if this were not bad enough, the police itself committed atrocities againstMuslims, especially in Vadodara (Bahar Colony, Noor Park and other areas) andAhmedabad (Gomtipur and elsewhere). Even women were beaten and thrashed, oftenon their breasts and vaginas. In fact, such widespread sexual misbehaviour of the policewith Muslim women marks a new low in police misconduct against the minorities.

1.23. It is a matter of public knowledge that in the past 3-4 years the VHP and theBajrang Dal have distributed trishuls on a large scale in Gujarat. Barely disguised as a ‘religious symbol’, trishuls are sharp, three-pronged weapons that can easily cause fatalinjury. These organisations have had no qualms in publicising their arms training camps,even for young children and women. Witnesses from the area who deposed before theTribunal said that Kathwada, near Mehmdavad in Kheda district, is one of the loca-tions that the Sangh Parivar combine allegedly used for training in the use of weaponsand techniques of killing. The Gujarat police cannot pretend to be unaware of theregular camps that have been conducted in recent years, arming and training bands ofyouth. Besides, as is evident from the track record of these outfits that in Gujarat, andelsewhere in the country, the VHP/BD have frequently disturbed peace and harmony.Yet the Gujarat police took no steps to seize the weapons, stop the training camps or actagainst its practitioners in any other way. Significantly, even after the carnage, the distri-bution of trishuls, swords and other arms continued in Gujarat until late March. It wasonly in mid-April, after the orgy of violence had claimed a very large number of victimsand more or less run its course, did the police finally seize arms in Bejalpur, Shahpur,Maninagar, Vatwa and Kalupur in Ahmedabad. However, there has been no prosecu-tion, no arrest of persons indulging in such acts, no seizure of the trishuls and swordsdistributed on such a large scale. Carrying weapons that can be used to kill is an offenceand the police should have taken action against the offenders right at the outset.

1.24. In one case, on May 16, the Rajkot police did seize 170 swords from MansukhPatel, a BD activist, and for which they arrested him. This time it was SM Soni, thefirst class judicial magistrate who let the accused off lightly.

1.25. Police conduct after the Gujarat carnage, with regard to the registration of crimes,conducting of investigations etc., has been marked by a desire to please political bossesand an utter disregard for the law of the land. This is nothing but calculated miscarriage ofjustice. The police are required to file separate FIRs for each incident. Instead, separateincidents of crime committed by different aggressors at different places at different timeshave been clubbed together in single omnibus FIRs. Panchnamas have either been made 3-4 weeks after the incidents or not at all. Also, if the charge-sheets filed in the Gulberg(Chamanpura), Naroda Gaon and Patiya massacres are anything to go by, the names ofthe main accused have been conveniently dropped. Worse still, in places like Pandharwada,Anjanwa, Mora (Panchmahal district), Randhikpur and Sanjeli, Fatehpur and Dailol (Dahoddistrict) as well as in villages in Bharuch, Sabarkantha, Mehsana and Himmatnagar dis-tricts, the Tribunal has evidence of the police bullying victim-survivors into filing FIRswherein only mobs are mentioned, without naming the assailants and mob leaders whomthe victim-survivors had clearly recognised during the incidents of violence. The CPs ofAhmedabad and Vadodara are also culpable for similar police misconduct.

1.26. In far too many incidents of violence, the police refused to intervene, sidedwith the perpetrators of crimes, itself indulged in criminal acts, and denied curfewpasses to social workers and human rights activists who, at great risk to life and limb,moved around nonetheless at the height of the violence, in a bid to restore peace.

1.27. The police completely failed in providing protection to relief camps shelter-ing traumatised and desperate survivors, for as long as six months in many cases.

1.28. Police conduct in compiling data and statistics about the loss of life, destruc-tion of property, missing persons, too, has been totally callous to say the least.

1.29. Continuing violence: In Ahmedabad city, Vadodara, Himmatnagar, and Mehsanadistrict, where violence continued unabated, as also in places like Panchmahal dis-trict, Rajkot and Bhavnagar where sporadic incidents occurred, the police inspired noconfidence amongst the affected, even after the first round of brutalities. It is respon-sible for highly dubious conduct from mid-March to mid-May. On the eve of PM AtalBehari Vajpayee’s visit to Ahmedabad on April 4, the police led an assault againstMuslims in the curfew-ridden parts of Gomtipur. In the presence of Shri Parmar, anofficial from the Ahmedabad collectorate, the police led by PI, SD Sharma, set uponthe 750 refugees of the Suleiman Roza Relief Camp (behind Nutan Mills), Saraspur,and actually shot two persons, Shri Pirujbhai Mohammad Sheikh (30) and Smt.Khatoonbi Sharfuddin Saiyed (45). As a result, the 750-strong camp was wound upunder threat of violence. On April 3, Advocate Shri Nizam was shot dead by thepolice inside his home while Dr. Ishaq Sheikh, vice-president of the Al Ameen GaribNiwas Hospital, was brutally assaulted. (See section Incidents of Violence: Continuing Vio-lence, Volume I). On April 14, the police shot dead two more persons at Dariapur, even asthey were being attacked by a violent mob. The Tribunal is certain that the number oflives lost due to deliberate police criminality is astronomically high. (These figures arebeing withheld by the state government.) All its acts of commission and omission aresufficient to indict the Gujarat police before any forum for justice.

1.30. As late as November 12, as CEC, JM Lyngdoh, was visiting the state to overseeoperations for safe elections, rampaging mobs terrorised Muslim families who had re-turned from Dasaj town to their nearby villages Mehrwada, Jaska and Kohda (Mehsanadistrict). Minister Narayan Laloo Patel was actively involved in instigating the violenceand the SP Arun Sharma did not quite inspire confidence among the targeted community.

2 Communalisation of the Police Administration

2.1. Evidence before the Tribunal clearly indicates that since the assumption ofpower by the BJP in Gujarat in February 1998, there was a calculated move to side-line Muslim police officers. Muslim officers were given non-executive posts. (theywere assigned to crime investigation etc.). The eight Muslim officers, from a total of141 IPS officers in the state, were kept away from decision-making posts.

2.2. The Tribunal notes with shock that, as a result of this discriminatory practice bythe Gujarat government, the younger batch of Muslim IPS officers who joined servicein ’92-’93 have not known executive policing because they have simply been denied theopportunity to test their executive capabilities.

2.3. Gujarat is the only state in the country where IPS officers who are Muslim havenever been assigned the post of deputy SP of police. For an IPS officer, the charge of SP,or DySP is a critical training opportunity to gain in executive and supervisory experience.

2.4. The Tribunal recorded the testimonies of many police officials who, for obvious reasons, cannot be identified. In every police chowki, the normal practice is tomake head constables in-charge of a beat or outpost. Since the BJP assumed power inGujarat, it has ensured that in the few instances where a head constable might be aMuslim, he would not be in-charge of the beats/outposts under the chowki.

2.5. Evidence led before the Tribunal indicates that ministers in the BJP govern-ment in Gujarat made public statements to ensure that Muslims in the state’s policeforce were sidelined. For instance, in 1999, Shri Mahen Trivedi, the minister of statefor home, stated publicly at a police function: “We have told you that we don’t wantMuslims in controlling posts. Why is he posted there?” (Confidential testimony ofpolice officers before the Tribunal).

2.6. Currently, there are 65 Muslims in police service, at the DySP and inspector levels, in Gujarat. With the exception of one, who has a close relationship with a minister, therest have all been shunted to CID crime, computer training, civil defence and railways.

2.7. Discrimination in the police force is in line with the discrimination in othergovernment departments in the state. In the three critical government departmentsconcerned with recruitment — the Gujarat Public Service Commission, (GPSC), thePanchayat Service Selection Board and the Gram Seva Samiti — there is not a singlemember from any minority community. In the vital departments of government —establishment, recruitment, law and order, finance and loans department, there are nominority persons at all. This is blatantly anti-constitutional as it violates the principlesof non-discrimination and equal opportunity.

2.8. Politicians of all hues resort to punitive transfers, which only reinforces theoft reiterated demand for an independent police force in the country. (See chapters onDisturbing Trends in the Indian Police & Recommendations, Volume II). In Gujarat, suchtransfers take place at the behest of the Sangh Parivar.

2.9. After the carnage, several police officers suffered for their upright behaviourin controlling violence and preventing further loss of life. From the evidence placedbefore the Tribunal these are:

• Shri Vivek Srivastava, SP, Kutch: The young officer arrested a Home Guard com-mandant after he assaulted a Muslim woman. The commandant is a known VHPworker. Shri Srivastava was shunted to the post of SP (Prohibition).
• Shri Praveen Gondia, DCP Zone IV, Ahmedabad City: Shri Gondia registered FIRsagainst prominent BJP and VHP leaders for their role in the rioting. He was trans-ferred to Civil Defence.
• Shri Himanshu Bhatt, SP, Banaskantha: He suspended a sub-inspector who hadallowed a Hindu mob to plunder a village in the district. The PSI is close to severalBJP and VHP leaders. Shri Bhatt was transferred to the Intelligence Bureau.
• Shri Rahul Sharma, SP, Bhavnagar: The riots erupted when he had only been incharge for 25 days. Shri Sharma fired on a mob that was trying to set a madrassa(school) on fire, and put all its leaders behind bars. By his firm act, 400 young lives weresaved. A local BJP leader wanted the culprits released but Shri Sharma refused to oblige.The officer is now DCP (Control Room). On March 1, the 1992-batch officer broke upa rally led by a Shiv Sena leader and VHP activists. For several days, Shri Sharma held his ground, resisting pressure from BJP MLAs, minister of state for home, Shri GordhanZadaphiya and others. When leaders in the rally including the SS leader, Shri KishoreBhatt and 21 VHP activists raised inflammatory slogans, the SP issued instructions fortheir immediate arrest. This brought the situation under immediate control.On the evening of March 1, when mobs were prowling the streets, the Bhavnagarpolice, who had never faced a riot before, momentarily seemed to lose confidence.“Sensing that my men were hesitating, I got out and fired the first round and theyimmediately joined me. We managed to disperse the mob and did not allow them toregroup,” Shri Sharma had told the press at the time. For this, he had to face the heatfrom political bosses. The BJP MLA, Shri Sunil Oza, called up Sharma, accusing himof stirring up trouble by arresting Sena and VHP leaders. The MLA, in fact, threat-ened the police, saying that if the arrested were not released, it would cause a seriouslaw and order problem. But the police stuck to their principles.Shri Oza is reported to have then exerted pressure on the DGP’s office, but afterconsidering the case, the DGP’s office chose not to pressurise Shri Sharma. They thentried to instigate riots to get Shri Sharma into trouble. All of a sudden, 22 incidents werereported from his district. That is when the police decided to use force. The Bhavnagarpolice were on their toes, opening fire wherever and whenever necessary. By March 3,there was nothing to report but peace. When the Army eventually reached Bhavnagar, ithad little to do. But the interference did not stop here. Shri Zadaphiya called up theBhavnagar city police and told them not to register cases against those injured in policefiring. The police refused to oblige. Shri Sharma paid the price for his uprightness. uShri Ajit Srivastava, PI, Khanpur police station, surveillance branch, Ahmedabadcity: On February 28, this officer saved the lives of 35 Muslim women who weretrapped inside some hutments with a mob surrounding them within his jurisdiction. Ittook him over 40 minutes to convince the women to trust an officer. He then riskedhis life and limb by jumping into the fire that had already started and fortunatelysaved them. Later that day, around 8 p.m., while he was in the Madhopur policestation area, Shri Srivastava risked his left for the second time the same day to rescue134 Muslims surrounded by an over 20,000-strong mob. In the process, he preventedwhat could very likely have been two more incidents of ghastly massacre inAhmedabad city.
• Shri Shivanand Jha and Shri VM Parghi, additional CP and DCP of Ahmedabad:They were transferred on April 8 and appointed as DIG, Armed Unit, Rajkot andcommandant of SRP, Group Eight, Gondal, respectively. Shri Parghi was the officerwho beat up journalists at the Gandhi Ashram on April 8, while Shri Jha had admon-ished him and tried to do his duty
• Shri Vinod Mall, SP Surendranagar: For having efficiently controlled violence andfoiled attempts at provocation in his district, he was given a promotion posting inAhmedabad which effectively deprived him of direct charge of a district.2.10. The Gujarat government under the BJP has used the IB (Intelligence Bureau)to promote the sangh parivar’s political agenda of targeting the minority community. Inthe past, police stations maintained details of places of residence and business ofmembers from the minority community, to ensure them protection whenever neces-sary. The present government grossly misused the IB machinery to find out who livedwhere, making their cadre’s job of loot and arson easy.

2.11. A secret circular, issued by Gujarat’s director of police (intelligence) to thetop brass of the state police in 1999, reveals the hostile attitude of the BJP-led stategovernment towards Muslims over the last three years. The circular directed all policecommissioners, district police officers and range IGPs/DIGPs to “intimate details ofpersons (Muslims) involved in communal riots which occurred in their city/districtduring the last five years — viz., offence registration section, place, what was thejudgement by court, how many times the person was booked under CrPC Sections107,151,110, or PASA, NASA.” According to the circular (No. D 2/2, Com/Mus-lim/Activity/84/99 of 1/2-2-99), the district police officials and others were askedto “intimate (to the state) how many darul ulmas (madrassas) were functioning in theirdistricts/cities and where they are located.”

2.12. The present government had attempted to use the police to put together aselective census of Christians and Muslims but was compelled to withdraw after anation-wide protest. The Gujarat police, under instructions from the government,instituted a ‘Cell to Monitor Inter-Community Marriages’, a step that is in gross viola-tion of the Indian Constitution. That the police could undertake such activity with-out questioning its inherent anti-constitutional and sectarian basis is a sorry reflectionon the state of the Indian police.

2.13. One of the gravest charges made by the victim-survivors and also senior policeofficers too who deposed before the Tribunal, is of the great danger to the neutrality of theGujarat police force by overt and covert measures to infiltrate it with persons owing alle-giance to the thinking and mind-set of the RSS/VHP/BD and BJP. The dangers of suchdevelopments cannot be over-stated. Instead of a man or a woman wedded to constitu-tionalism and attendant values, the result of such placements could be a police officialwho does not care to protect lives without fear or favour, regardless of caste, creed andcommunity. He or she is more concerned with furthering a particular thinking that has onmany an occasion in the present been the cause of the perpetration of violence.

2.14. Some lists of politically convenient appointments to the police departmentwere placed before the Tribunal. (See Box, Sangh Nexus with Police). This needs furtherinvestigation and, if true, the situation must be redressed. This is imperative if a cleanand politically untarnished police force is to be put in place to ensure justice and peace.

2.15. Apart from the police, the BJP has filled several posts within thestate’s Home Guards with members of the VHP. The head of the Home Guards inMehsana district is also a senior VHP functionary. (Significantly, the public prosecu-tor in Mehsana district, Dilip Trivedi, is also the VHP’s district chief. Moreover, thedistrict magistrate/collector, Amrut Patel is a close relative of Shri Narayan LalooPatel, a BJP minister and one of the prime accused for leading attacks in the district).There is a policy decision under the Home Guards’ scheme to create a new post, ‘suraksha sahay’ (security assistant) akin to the existing post of ‘shikshak sahay’ (assis-tant teacher) Under this scheme, policemen are hired on a monthly remuneration ofRs 2,500 for four years. The recruitment procedure is ad hoc and does not follow thenormal rules. The intention is, obviously, to make them permanent after four years.Over the last 5 years more than 8,000 VHP workers have been inducted into the stateHome Guards, with many district chiefs being VHP office-bearers. The Home Guard’sposition is a critical one for the maintenance of law and order in rural areas. Throughmassive infiltration over the past four years, the BJP and its rabid wings have virtuallytaken control of the Home Guards machinery. The fact that in the testimonies re-corded by the Tribunal victim survivors spoke of the launching of attacks on theirpersons and property by Home Guards is both shocking and revealing. (See section onIncidents of Violence, Volume I).

2.16. The intense insecurity felt by Muslims in Gujarat is borne out by the fact thateven Muslim policemen are/were afraid to put name tags on their uniforms and hadsought special permission to be on duty without their name tags. Special IG, Shri AISaiyed, with over 25 years of service, was asked to help a group on his way to Karaiin Gandhinagar district. When Shri Saiyed tried to help the hapless people, he washimself attacked when the mob saw his name.

2.17. On May 3, the police made attempts to restore peace, by serving notices on manysarpanches who “failed to inform the authorities about the violence in their villages.” Morethan two dozen sarpanches in Chhotaudaipur, Kanwat and Pavi Jetpur talukas were shockedwhen they received notices under section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)asking them to explain why they did not inform the police when mobs ran riot.

2.18. The Tribunal was informed that police only wanted to keep the sarpanches onalert and was not intent on pursing the notices seriously. The idea was merely to ensurethat they would prevent further violence in their areas. Contrary to what the police hadexpected, none of the sarpanches divulged the names of persons involved in riots. Thenotices require the sarpanches to appear and explain their side of the story to the police.

2.19. The height of the ‘fear and favour’ policy of the current political dispensationis borne out by CM Modi’s treatment of senior officials. On September 18, the Gujaratstate intelligence bureau chief and his two deputies were summarily transferred onpunishment postings because Star News gained access to police tapes on Shri Modi’sshocking anti-Muslim remarks made at Bahucharaji near Mehsana on September 9,2002. The additional director general of police Shri Srikumar was transferred to thepolice reforms department. He had joined the state IB just four months earlier. Deputyinspector general of police, Shri E Radhakrishna, in-charge of political and commu-nal affairs, was transferred to Junagadh as principal of the Police Training College,while DCP, Shri Sanjiv Bhatt, in-charge of internal security, was transferred as princi-pal of the State Reserve Police Training College.

2.20. The Tribunal is of the view that a significant section of the Gujarat police isguilty of gross dereliction of duty and of flouting the Indian Constitution and Indiancriminal law. Therefore, all the individual policemen named by the Tribunal in the list of accused must be promptly prosecuted. The shameful and brazenly partisan con-duct of the police in the Gujarat carnage is a blot on Indian democracy and Indiansecularism. Our democratic and secular credentials are truly tested only in times ofsuch acute crisis. In such situations, the police have been utterly partisan and commu-nal, repeatedly failing to protect and even themselves trampling on the fundamentalrights of India’s religious minorities. This highly disturbing trend needs to be dealtwith urgently and comprehensively.

3. Legal Remedies

3.1. Sections 107-110 and sections 143-152 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)give adequate preventive and punitive powers and deem it the duty of district magistratesand police chiefs to prevent breach of peace and ensure the rule of law. They havethe power and the duty to:

• Demand execution of bonds, with or without security, from persons likely tocommit breach of peace (sec 107);
• Demand security for good behaviour from any person who intentionally dissemi-nates or attempts to disseminate or abets the dissemination of any material that islikely to incite communal passion or religious hatred (sec 108);
• Demand security for good behaviour from suspected persons (sec 109);
• Demand security for good behaviour from habitual offenders (sec 110);
• Prohibit repetition or continuance of public nuisance (sec 143);
• Issue orders in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger (sec 144);
• Arrest without warrant (sec 145-148);
• Prevent cognisable offences (sec 149);
• Inform (to immediate seniors) of design to commit cognisable offences (sec 150);
• Arrest to prevent the commission of cognisable offences (sec 151);
• Prevent damage to public property (sec 152).

If the above-mentioned provisions of the CrPC spell out the powers and duties ofdistrict magistrates and police chiefs to ensure the rule of law, the All India ServiceRules (1969) provides for the punishment of errant IAS and IPS officials:

3.2. Apart from violating Indian penal and constitutional law, dereliction of duty is aclear violation of the ‘All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, Part III –Penalties and Disciplinary Authorities’. Under these rules, there already exist provisions forthe dismissal from service of IAS and IPS officials guilty of “any act or omission whichrenders him liable to any penalty specified in rule 6.”I (See Detailed Annexures, Volume III).

4. Communalisation of the Bureaucracy

4.1. The Tribunal has received substantial evidence of the deep communalisationof the state bureaucracy. Collectors and deputy collectors are appointed on the basisof political expediency. Again, in these posts they do not perform their constitutionalduty. They have in fact been subverting basic rights guaranteed through the Indian Constitution and to which they are sworn, whether in the matter of relief and reha-bilitation or compensation claims or law and order. The Tribunal, for instance, re-ceived specific complaints about three deputy collectors from Naroda, Rakhial andAhmedabad city who have not only served more than their four-year term but are patronised by BJP MLA SushriMaya Kotdani who is directly indicted in killings and massacres and Naroda Gaon and Naroda Patiya. Their namesare Shri Manoj Macwana (deputy collector, Rakhial), Shri Manoj Patariya (deputy collector, Naroda) and ShriGaurav Prajapati (deputy collector, Ahmedabad). Besides this, many DMs/collectors have been indicted inspecific cases as in Bharuch and Ahmedabad city and their names have been included in the List of Accused witha strong recommendation from this Tribunal that they be swiftly prosecuted and punished.

Annexure –Police andHindutvawadi Organisations

All vital and sensitive postings in the Gujarat police were systematically politicisedand saffronised by the BJP immediately after coming to power.Here are some examples of the police-parivar nexus:

Ahmedabad1. Police Inspector VB Raval, (PCB, Ahmedabad City) Crime Branch: He par-ticipated in the demolition of the Babri Masjid as a kar sevak and proudly displaysa photograph thereof as a trophy. This deed of his is said to have fetched himsuch a plum post.

2. Shri RD Makadia, DCP Zone IV: Very close to VHP leader Shri PravinTogadia; works as his agent.

3. Shri Savani, DCP Zone V: A close ally of Shri Togadia.

4. Shri RB Jebalia, DCP Zone VI: Hails from Amreli district, as does ShriTogadia. He is said to be under a personal obligation to Shri Togadia, though hemay not be outright communal.

5. Shri PB Gondia (IPS), DCP Zone III: His father is an ex-MLA (Congress.)He was offered a BJP ticket from Panchmahal dist. during the last Assemblyelections. He was ready to contest but his father persuaded him not to.

6. Shri Parghi (IPS), DCP Zone I: Brother-in-law of Shri Gondia. He wasseen moving in his official vehicle along with Shri Haren Pandya during the riots.

7. Shri DJ Patel, DCP Zone II: Also very close to Shri Togadia.Himmatnagar (Sabarkantha)

8. Shri ND Solanki, SP Himmatnagar: His father is an active office-bearer in the VHP.