Sectarian Terror In Quetta

Even as President Pervez Musharraf was addressing a news conference in Paris to round off his 18-day tripto the United States and Europe, at least 53 persons were killed and 57 others injured when three armedterrorists, including a suspected suicide bomber, attacked a Shiite Muslim mosque in Quetta, capital of theSouthwestern Baluchistan province, during the Friday prayers on July 4, 2003.

Hundreds of worshippers were praying at the mosque, the Jama Masjid-o-Imambargah Kalaan Isna Ashri, whenthe terrorists opened indiscriminate fire with automatic weapons and set off explosive devices. The Head ofthe Federal Interior Ministry's National Crisis Management Cell, Brigadier Javed Cheema, said that at leastone of the assailants appeared to be a suicide bomber as he had grenades tied to his body and was blown up.

The massacre, the first sectarian attack in Quetta in which a suicide bomber was used, appeared to be aneffort to ignite a cycle of violence between Sunnis and Shias (Sunnis constitute 77 percent of Pakistan'spopulation and Shiites 20 percent) and destabilize the country, said officials. Pakistan has witnessed a longhistory of violence between the Sunni and Shiite sects, most of which has been perpetrated by groups thatemerged in the 1980s during General Zia-ul-Haq's rule. Between 1989 and 2003 (till July 6), 1,468 persons havebeen killed and 3,370 others injured in some 1,813 sectarian incidents in Pakistan (Source: Institute forConflict Management Database).

While no group has claimed responsibility for the latest massacre, members of the Shia community havepredictably blamed 'Sunni extremists'. Large numbers of Shias have protested on the streets after thekillings, attacking government property and setting ablaze vehicles. Curfew has been proclaimed with troopspatrolling the streets of Quetta and other cities in an effort to prevent any retaliatory attacks. The latestattack unambiguously suggests that Islamist sectarian extremists, many of who went underground after aprolonged crackdown during which several top leaders were arrested or killed in 2002, are resurfacing, despiteofficial efforts at containment.

President Musharraf, on his return to Islamabad, condemned the attacks, declaring: "Whether they arereligious extremists or sectarian extremists they are ignorant and wild." The incident comes in the wakeof increasing Islamist fundamentalist / extremist opposition to his regime's current engagement with theUnited States. Islamists may have intended to send a message regarding their uneasiness with Musharraf'scurrent agenda.

Such incidents also indicate that the jehadis retain substantial striking capacities, negatingMusharraf's 'feel-good message' in USA that the Al Qaeda and its affiliates were on the run. While theimmediate provocation for the massacre is still unclear, Federal Information Minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmedsaid that sectarian terrorists could have been retaliating against recent arrests: "In Punjab and inSindh there was a crackdown… Day before yesterday [July 2], their important people were all arrested".

The incident in Quetta, a city affected by relatively few sectarian killings, suggests an extension of thesectarian strife in Pakistan. The Punjab province and Pakistan's commercial capital, Karachi, in the Sindhprovince, have been the primary hubs of sectarian violence over the past two decades. However, the two majorattacks, including the latest one, during year 2003 have occurred in Quetta.

On June 8, 2003, 13 trainee police personnel belonging to the local Hazara community of the Shia sect werekilled and eight others injured at Sariab Road in Quetta. There is also a tribal dimension to the Quettaattacks. A majority of the Shia victims are Hazaras, hailing from Afghanistan but who have been living inQuetta for generations. However, officials in the area have said that the Afghan origin of the Hazaras is onlya coincidence. Quetta, which lies close to the border with Afghanistan's Kandahar province, has been a hotbedof Islamist extremist activities for years.

In sharp contrast to his ambivalence to Islamist terrorist activities elsewhere, President Musharraf's intenthas been unambiguous as far as domestic sectarian terrorism is concerned. His 'war against terror' hasvigorously targeted sectarian terrorist groups, and has had substantial impact domestically.

Year 2002 witnessed a marked decrease in the fatality index of sectarian violence with 121 persons killedand 257 others injured in 63 incidents, as compared to 261 persons killed and 495 others injured in 154incidents during the year 2001. Among the major incidents of sectarian violence in 2002 was the February 26attack at the Shah Najaf Mosque in Rawalpindi in which 11 persons were killed and over 19 others injured whenthree terrorists opened fire on a group of approximately 40 worshippers. In another major attack, seven womenand five children were killed while 25 others were injured in a bomb explosion in the women's section of aShia religious ceremony at Bhakkar in Lahore on April 25.

The relative reduction in casualties in sectarian violence is primarily traced to the fact thatLashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the main Sunni group, was vigorously targeted by state agencies following itsJanuary-12, 2002, proscription. A significant number of its cadres, including the top leadership, were eitherarrested or killed during various encounters. Approximately 26 LeJ cadres, including many top leaders, werekilled and 32 of them arrested during year 2002.

Those killed included Riaz Basra and Asif Ramzi, two top LeJ leaders. Basra, Pakistan's most wantedsectarian terrorist, was killed along with three of his accomplices during an encounter in Mailsi on May 14,2002. He is reported to have established a training camp at Sarobi near Kabul in Afghanistan where recruitsfrom Pakistan were trained in the use of firearms and explosives for carrying out sectarian attacks inPakistan and against the Taliban's Afghan opposition (the erstwhile Northern Alliance).

Asif Ramzi, a most-wanted LeJ terrorist and a proclaimed offender for over 12 years, was a key link betweenlocal Islamist terrorists, and the Taliban and Al Qaeda. He was wanted for involvement in more than 87 casesof murder, attacks on embassies and other terrorist acts, and had a price of Rupees three million on his head.US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials suspected that Ramzi manufactured the bombs used in the May8, 2002, blast outside the Sheraton Hotel. He was among the seven persons killed in the December 19-explosionat a chemical warehouse in the Korangi area of Karachi.

Akram Lahori, another front ranking LeJ terrorist involved in 38 cases of sectarian killings in Sindh, wasarrested in Karachi on June 17, 2002. After Riaz Basra's death, Lahori was acting as the LeJ chief and he hadhimself monitored and taken part in sectarian killings in Karachi, where he was residing for the preceding oneand a half years. Lahori, arrested along with five accomplices from Orangi Town in Karachi, reportedlyconfessed that dozens of the group's activists had been prepared for suicide missions under the guidance oftop Al Qaeda leaders holed up in different parts of the country. In the continuing crackdown, on May 29, 2003,Qari Abdul Hayee, the succeeding acting LeJ chief, was arrested during a surprise raid conducted in theMuzaffargarh district.

Despite these various reversals, however, the group appears to have retained a substantial capacity to strike,and it has emerged as a key provider of logistical support and personnel to the remnants of the Al Qaeda andTaliban currently present in Pakistan. Indeed, many LeJ cadres are reported to have joined various frontoutfits of the Al Qaeda that emerged in the aftermath of the January 12-proscription. The LeJ was also said tobe involved in a majority of the attacks on Christians and Western targets in Pakistan during 2002.

Among the others, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a Sunni group, and the Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP),a Shia extremist group, lay low temporarily in the aftermath of their proscription. They did not, however,alter their organizational structure and, though their cadres went underground for some time, openly resumedtheir political activities after a brief hibernation.

The SSP even re-commenced publishing its official organ, the monthly Khilafat-i-Rashida, which it haddiscontinued immediately after its proscription. It also ran a highly effective electoral campaign for itscandidate, Maulana Azam Tariq, who won a parliamentary seat from the Jhang constituency in Punjab province inthe October 2002 General Elections. Similarly, while retaining its existing organizational infrastructure, theTJP joined the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) under a different name - the Tehrik Millat-i-Islami Pakistan. Thecentral command of this group also formed new groups to function as front outfits. TJP office-bearers werereportedly accommodated in the new Azadari Council and Haideri Foundation.

At the other end, the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a militant Wahabi tribal group whichoperates primarily in the tribal belt, such as in Swat and the adjoining districts of the NWFP, has, accordingto recent reports, suffered the most in the countrywide crackdown on Islamist extremist organizations with adomestic agenda and activities. A large number of its cadres were arrested in Afghanistan after the fall ofthe Taliban, while those who managed to escape were subsequently arrested on their return to Pakistan. Underalleged US pressure, Pakistan's military regime could not show any leniency towards the TNSM, as its cadreshad more directly challenged the American forces in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Sipah-e-MohammadPakistan (SMP), the main Shia group responsible for sectarian violence in the past, remained dormant through2002 and the first half of year 2003.

While President Musharraf has acted stringently in dealing with domestic terrorism emanating from sectariangroups, the prevailing law and order situation in the country demonstrates that terrorism is not an afflictionthat can be dealt with in a piecemeal fashion - encouraged and supported in one direction, and suppressed inanother. The crackdown targeting sectarian groups, it appears, is failing to produce the desired impact, andincidents like the latest massacre in Quetta suggest that the underground networks and support structures ofsectarian groups, particularly that of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, remain unimpaired, and may, indeed, haveachieved greater complexity and resilience through their linkages with other terrorist organizations. Clearly,a more comprehensive strategy is required to destroy the source of their lethality.

Kanchan Lakshman is Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution and ResearchAssociate, Institute for Conflict Management. This article appears courtesy, South Asia IntelligenceReview of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.