Sample and Spread/ Nos of Statements

Crime Against Humanity 
Volume I An inquiry into the carnage in Gujarat 
List of Incidents and Evidence 
By Concerned Citizens Tribunal -Gujarat 2002
Incidents of Post-Godhra Violence

Annexure 5 
Sample and Spread/ Nos of Statements 

Totally 2094 statements, written and oral were processed by the Tribunal.Naroda: 49 testimonies and 73 written statementsGulberg Society, Chamanpura: 23 testimonies and 7 written statementsRest of Ahmedabad: 51 oral testimonies and 603 written statements

Kheda and Nadiad: 43 testimonies and written statementsBanaskantha: 6 testimonies and 20 written statementsSabarkantha: 29 testimonies and 52 written statementsMehsana: 9 testimonies and 10 written statementsGodhra: 20 testimonies

Panchmahal District: 63 testimonies and 34 written statementsBharuch: 53 statementsBharuch city: 18 testimonies and 78 written statementsAnkleshwar: 19 testimonies and 20 written statementsRajpardi: 7 testimonies and 11 written statements

Vadodara 68 testimonies and 79 written statementsVadodara tribal: 5 testimonies and 19 written statementsVadodara rural: 13 written statements

Dahod: 13 testimonies and 29 written statements

This totals 1547.

Another 187 copies of FIRs, panchnamas, post mortem reports were puton record and 313 detailed collective statements of damages. This totals 2094.This sample gave us a good spread of the carnage across the state of Gujarat. Age of thewitnesses also varied between 25-60 years of age. This shows a representative sample that isreasonably representative of the ground level. Over 50 per cent of the witnesses were self-employed, either skilled workers or small traders, small businessmen while at least 40 per centwere agriculturists, small and large families and landless labourers.

Migrations

The data analysed deals with the issue of migrations caused by the riots. Movements ofvictims and survivors were analysed and an average of over 78 per cent of people affected bythe violence had shifted residence as a result of the fear and terror generated by the violence atleast for the first few months (at least three months). This indicates the scale of violence thatwas unleashed.

The scenes of the worst massacres have seen migrations that have been detailed in theIncidents of Violence—Volume I have also resulted in near-permanent migrations and shifts ofpopulation. In these locations only a bare 20 per cent of the original population has returned totheir original homes. This is true of Mehsana district, Panchmahal, Anand, Dahod, Gulbergsociety and Naroda gaon and Patiya. The fear and terror experienced until we go to press byvictim survivors of Dahod, Mehsana and Panchmahal is significant. The fact that the govern-ment has determinedly turned it’s back on rehabilitation and the fact that the perpetrators ofthe crimes have been named as powerful politicians still in power has contributed to the inse-curity and fear experienced.

Spread of Violence

The evidence before the Tribunal speaks eloquently of the vast spread of the violence in thefirst 72 hours just after Godhra, that is between February 28-March 3, 02. Trends are discern-ible too in various districts of the pre-planning and preparations made even before the Godhraincident. The worst incidents of gruesome massacre were effected with precision in thosedates though the violence simmered on for months and is continuing still.

Significant data also points to the second bout of violence between March 12-15,02 [thedate of the Shlila poojan planned by the VHP at Ayodhya; then again at the end of March—April 3, 02 on the eve of the PM’s visit to the relief camps. May 02 also saw many bouts ofviolence in at least eight locations in Gujarat. On May 7, 2002 there were brutal killings of strayMuslims in Ahmedabad city. This was while the Tribunal hearings were on.

Causes

An analysis of the data before us clearly shows that the construct around the Godhra vio-lence was consciously and deliberately used at the town, city and district levels to foment anger,hatred and a sense of revenge among the mobs that struck. Zerox copies of the photos of theburning coach were distributed widely. The slogans shouted by the violent mobs clearly showedthat they had been deliberately instigated using Godhra as the reason and excuse.

Loss to Life

Our data shows details of the sheer brutality in the manner of killing. The computation ofthis data also shows that it is the manner of the killing that has made the loss to life shattering.Detailed evidence of the manner of killing and destruction of the bodies of loved ones makesthe crimes even more difficult to bear. In many cases there are no traces of the dead. TheTribunal has collected data about the lists of missing persons and annexed these in Volume III.The state government has not computed any official data on the violence.

Damage to property

A detailed analysis of 2094 strong evidence points to economic destruction as emerging asa major motive in the violence. Where the mobs did not kill or maim, they had a clear-cutmotive, of destruction of homes and properties. Independent computation of losses puts thisat a primary loss of Rs 3,800 crores to the Muslim community of Gujarat.

Law and Order

Throughout the data analysis what emerged was either a) absence of the police fromthe scene of mass crime when they ought to have been present; b) actual connivance andparticipation in the destruction of properties and the arson. It would be safe to concludefrom this data analysis that a committed and hard core of about 30 per cent police per-sonnel in Gujarat are committed soldiers to the agents of the crime. Many of the balanceare terrified and just a handful rises above these considerations and function as is requiredof them under the Constitution.

Over 50 per cent of the victims who’s data was processed spoke of repeated pleas for helpto the police being turned down. Another 30 per cent spoke of first hand knowledge of thepolice telling the victim community to protect itself and not expect anything from the police.The few instances of shining valour from the police stand out but offer little hope in terms ofscope and percentage.

Relief Operations

Relief operations were almost entirely manned by community leaders who organised reliefcamps. It was weeks before the state government began their supply. A fair amount of aidfrom other groups and individuals and the rest of the country came in but the state govern-ment unabashedly not only assumed no responsibility for the relief and rehabilitation, but alsogave it grudgingly while heaping abuse on camps and the refugees staying there. The dataanalysed shows that in 60 per cent of the cases victims have stayed in camps for over twomonths, that mental and physical state of the survivors is fragile. With no genuine efforts arerehabilitation, despair and hopelessness was reflected in the responses of over 85 per cent ofthe deponents.

NGOs

Social groups, and other non governmental organisations have been involved in some reliefmeasures. However over 70 per cent of the deponents spoke of the need for more sustainedneed-based support that centres around building up of livelihoods, rehabilitating communities and families inafashion that caters to their trauma, loss and yet enables them to draw out of it. Women andchildren victim survivors especially expressed the need for more sustained and creative sup-port in over 70 per cent of the statements recorded by us.