Same Song, Same Verse

The operations of the Pakistani security forces against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliate the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)  have been marked by a lack of intelligence, physicalsecurity in the non-tribal areas, an over-all strategy, direction andprioritisation of different stages of the operations.

The disconcertingly inadequate intelligence is evident from the fact thatneither the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of the Army nor the IntelligenceBureau (IB) of the Ministry of the Interior seem to have the vaguest idea of thecommand and control of either the TTP or the TNSM. One knows more about thecommand and control of Al Qaeda than about those of the TTP and the TNSM. Oneknows a lot about their leaders -- Baitullah Mehsud of the TTP and Sufi Mohammadand Maulana Fazlullah of the TNSM-- but beyond that very little is known. Howare they organised, where are they trained, who are their individual commanders,where and how are they deployed--the answers to these questions areinadequate. 

So much is known about their ideology, but so little about their operationalcapabilities and potential.

A basic requirement of a good counter-insurgency operation is your ability toprotect your back as you are engaged in your battle against the enemy. Yourability to protect your back depends on good physical security behind you. Goodphysical security depends on the police and the IB of Pakistan. The fact thatthe TTP and the TNSM have been able to indulge repeatedly in terrorist strikesin non-tribal areas--even in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Sargoda-- even asthe security forces are confronting them in the tribal areas speaks poorly ofthe state of physical security in Pakistan. This is the result of long years ofneglect of the police and the IB. The need for their revamping and modernisationhas not received the attention of either Pakistan or the US.

No counter-insurgency operation can be effective unless it is sustained anddriven by a determination to succeed in the over-all national interest. Thecounter-insurgency operations of the Pakistani security forces in the Pashtuntribal belt have neither been sustained nor  marked by a determination tosucceed. One has been seeing this in the operations undertaken by them in 2003in South and North Waziristan, in the Swat Valley since 2007 and subsequently inthe Bajaur Agency, the two Dirs and Buner  districts of the MalakandDivision of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

The operations have been in fits and starts depending on the extent of thepressure to act exercised on the Pakistani leadership by the US. When thepressure is high, the action is high. When the pressure declines, the actiondeclines. The  repeated statements by President  Asif Ali Zardari,Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of theArmy Staff (COAS), on Pakistan's determination to defeat the TTP and the TNSMhave not been reflected in appropriate operational action on the ground. Thesestatements have been made to reassure the US leaders --President Obama as wellthose in the Congress-- of the determination of the Pakistani security forces toact. They have not come out of a genuine conviction in the Pakistani politicaland military  leadership that Pakistan's future would be in danger if theSecurity forces do not neutralise the Taliban.

Openly, to reassure the US, Pakistani leaders characterise the Taliban as athreat, but, in reality, they look upon it more as a worrisome nuisance than asa serious threat to the state of Pakistan. Since Pakistan became independent in1947, the Pakistan Army never had effective control over the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas  (FATA) and the Malakand Division, which hadalways remained the spawning ground of religious extremism. After 9/11, even thelittle control that was there before 9/11 has further weakened and the religiousextremism emanating from this area has further increased. Large sections of thePakistani civil society have been concerned over this development, but not thepolitical class and the military-intelligence establishment. The Army'sobjective is to reduce this nuisance to its pre-9/11 level and to contain it.

It thinks it will neither be possible nor advisable to totally eradicate theinfluence of the Taliban. It is not possible because it would not have therequired local support for its operations in the tribal belt. It is notadvisable because, in the Army's view,  the tribals such as the Mehsuds andthe Wazirs have acted as force multipliers against India during the pastconflicts with India and will be prepared to do so again  in any futureconflict. It is also not advisable because of the strategic potential  ofthe Taliban to serve Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan.

The lack of a determination to succeed is evident from the lack of anover-all strategy, direction and prioritisation of different phases of theoperations. The areas affected by the activities of the Taliban fall into threecategories. 

The first category consists of North and South Waziristan, which are underthe virtual de facto control of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their allies since2003. The increasing number of Predator strikes by the US in this area have keptthe terrorists on  the run without weakening their operational presence andcapability. Only sustained and effective ground operations either by the US orby Pakistan or by both can achieve this result. Pakistan is opposed to any USrole in  the ground operations. At the same time, it is either unwilling orunable or both to undertake such ground operations on its own.

The second category consists of Bajaur, Swat and other areas of the MalakandDivision. The Taliban has a certain measure of de facto control in these areas.There is no role for the US in these areas. Counter-Taliban operations in theseareas have to be the responsibility of the Pakistani security forces. Throughtheir open statements, Pakistani political and military leaders seek to give theimpression of admitting their responsibility for action, but this admission hasnot been translated into effective action. Instead of first identifying the weakest points in the control of the Taliban, targeting them, removing theTaliban from there and then expanding the operations to areas where the Talibancontrol is stronger, the security forces have been hitting around blindly hereand there without an over-all plan. There are too many fronts and too littleprogress.

The third category consists of the other districts of the NWFP where theTaliban's presence is more ideological than operational. No plan has been drawnup  for preventing these areas  from coming under the operationalcontrol of the Taliban.

The Obama Administration's policy of showering Pakistan with money and arms and ammunition even in the absence  of proof of sincerity andconviction and even in the absence of progress on the ground is once againcreating a worrisome impression in the Pakistani leaders that to continue tobenefit from US support and largesse all they have to do  is to create anillusion of motion without actual movement. That is what they are doing.

That is what Pervez Musharraf did when he was the President. The twoWaziristans came under the effective control of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and theirassociates and the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan, operating  from sanctuariesin Balochistan, staged its spectacular come-back in Afghanistan when he was thePresident and was the beneficiary of billions of dollars given by the BushAdministration. What promises he made to the Bush Administration to reform andmodernise the madrasas and prevent their misuse for jihad! How much money hetook from the US for madrasa reforms!  What happened to those reforms?

That is exactly what Zardari, Gilani and Kayani are doing now: Creating anillusion of motion without actual movement, while extracting  billions ofdollars from the US. The Pakistani leadership--political and military-- hasdeveloped the extraction of money from the US by exploiting the presence of AlQaeda and the Taliban in their territory into a fine art.

If the Taliban ultimately succeeds in further strengthening and expanding itscontrol in Pakistan, the US will have to share a major portion of theresponsibility for failing to make Pakistan act effectively instead of merelyseeming to do so.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.