Reluctant Hegemon

With at lest 1,401 fatalities in 2007 (till June 3) in the undeclared war between Colombo and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka is seething with tension. Rattled by the air attacks (at the Katunayake Air Port and the Muthurajawela gas storage facility in Colombo, and the Palaly Air Force Base in Jaffna between March 26 and April 29, 2007) by a rudimentary LTTE'Air Force' -- the Air Tigers -- and, at the same time, triumphal over its victories in the Eastern Province, the state has embarked on a buying spree, seeking to augment both its defensive and offensive capabilities with a range of military acquisitions. For a country at war, this is unsurprising, but is also proving somewhat unsettling for the equations of power and influence that exist in the South Asian region.

It is substantially to China and Pakistan that Sri Lanka is turning in its hour of need. Reports suggest a slew of deals with China to acquire a JY 11 3 D radar (a direct fallout of the failure to detect and prevent the air attacks on Colombo) and large quantities of ammunition and ordnance for the Sri Lanka Army and Navy. The latter category reportedly includes as many as 70,000 rounds of 120 mm mortar shells for the Army, 68,000 152 mm artillery shells and 50,000 81 mm high-explosive mortar bombs. The Sri LankaNavy's shopping list is said to include 100,000 14.5 mm cartridges, 2,000 RPG-7 rockets and 500 81 mm airburst mortar shells. The Navy is also looking to acquire 50 type 82 14.5 mm twin-barrel naval guns, 200 Type 85 12.7 mm heavy machine guns and 1,000 type 56 7.62 mm submachine guns.

From Pakistan, Sri Lanka is already reported to have acquired some refitted Soviet era tanks and MIG plans, as well as cartridges and augmentation charges for 81 mm mortars, and a range of unspecified'security equipment'. Sri Lanka is further seeking to acquire helicopters, VIP vehicles with B-7 protection and substantial quantities of Claymore type fragmentation devices and ammunition for its artillery. Military cooperation with Pakistan further involves the training of Sri Lankan pilots by the Pakistan Air Force. Significantly, Pakistan has been a major supplier of weapons to Sri Lanka for some time now, and in 2001 had provided a range of equipment, including Heckler and Koch G3 rifles, 120 mm heavy mortars and large quantities of ammunition.

China and Pakistan do not, of course, exhaust Sri Lanka's current efforts for military acquisitions. Russia and Israel are also significant sources, and reports suggest current efforts to acquire an unspecified number of MiG 29 Fighters from the former. India has remained a major supplier of what it describes as"defensive military equipment". Significantly, Gotabaya Rajapakse, Sri Lanka's Defence Secretary, had, on May 29, 2007, urged India to provide"urgent weapons supplies".

Nevertheless, the massive emerging dependence on Pakistan and China has had major reverberations in what Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wikremanayake described as"our very friendly country", India. India's National Security Advisor, M.K. Narayanan, on May 31, 2007, articulated thecountry's concerns, declaring bluntly: "We are the big power in this region. Let us make it very clear. We strongly believe that whatever requirements the Sri Lankangovernment has, they should come to us. And we will give them what we think is necessary. We do not favour their going to China or Pakistan or any othercountry..."

The remark, unsurprisingly, provoked some consternation across the region, with Pakistan reacting sharply, as the Foreign Office spokesperson declared that"Pakistan would not accept hegemonic tendencies from any country in the region," and further, that ''the matter is primarily for Sri Lanka to decide. Such statements raise questions about India's attitude and policy towards its neighbours." Within Sri Lanka, there were several angry responses, the most shrill among these coming from the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), personally accusing Narayanan of mischief and pointing to his past career inIndia's Intelligence Bureau where he "undoubtedly participated in formulating... anti-Sri Lanka acts by the then Indiangovernment". Official responses were, however, broadly restrained, emphasising at once, SriLanka's extraordinary relationship with India, but emphasising the freedom to acquire necessary and suitable military equipment from wherever this was available, particularly in view of the fact that India was unable to meet SriLanka's perceived needs. President Mahinda Rajapakse underlined the position that India was the only country"that can acceptably involve itself in Sri Lanka", but added, "There must be more support from the Indiangovernment." Through all this, China, though, maintained an inscrutable silence.

India faces a multiplicity of dilemmas here. Narayanan had admitted that India would"not provide the Sri Lankan government with offensive capability. That is the standardposition." In principal, this appears unimpeachable. A free supply of offensive weaponry could create conditions for the escalation of conflict in Sri Lanka.

On the other hand, it remains the case that the LTTE is, even today, designated as a terrorist organisation by India (with its Chief, Vellupillai Prabhakaran an accused, among others, in the assassination ofIndia's former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi) and it is not clear how such a position can be reconciled with a desire to restrain Sri Lankan'offensive operations' against this terrorist group. Further, any realistic assessment of the international arms bazaar would fairly quickly demonstrate that a withholding of particular supplies by India will have little impact on Sri Lanka, as other suppliers will immediately step into the breach-- as Pakistan and China have presently done.

Crucially, the intervention of players such as these will have necessary and proximate strategic consequences. Pakistan has a long history of mischief in the region, and, as G.H. Peiris notes,

... although Pakistan's official policy has throughout been unequivocally against the LTTE campaign, over the years, there have been several major arms deals between the LTTE and the suppliers in Pakistan/Afghanistan. To start with, there were the occasional reports from about the mid-1980s on shipments of firearms dispatched from Karachi reaching the Tigers, and of Sri Lankan Tamils (possibly under the direction of the LTTE) serving as conveyers for Pakistani drug dealers. Then, by about the early 1990s, such transactions appear to have become more substantial. Here again, the LTTE's acquisition of shipping capability appears to have been a vital ingredient in its advances. By the mid-1990s, these dealings had become important enough to attract the attention of intelligence agencies of the United States and India.

It is useful to note, in this context, the increasing activities of the Pakistani Tablighi Jamaat among the tiny Muslim minority in Sri Lanka, and reports relating to the radicalisation of elements within this community.

As regards China, India is already waging a losing battle against its expanding influence in South Asia. Critically,India's failure to respond adequately to Myanmarese expectations for developmental and military cooperation through the 1990s, and the freeze in relations between the two countries before that, has resulted in a virtual Chinese takeover of Myanmar. The Chinese influence in Pakistan has long been the source of difficulties for India, and China is also making progressive inroads into Bangladesh. Any strengthening of the Chinese stranglehold in Sri Lanka will simply completeIndia's encirclement.

India's quandary arises principally out of its apprehensions of the political fallout in TamilNadu of any unqualified assistance to Colombo in its war against the LTTE. It is significant thatNarayanan's remarks on weapons' supplies were made at Chennai, the capital of Tamil Nadu, after a meeting with thestate's Chief Minister, M. Karunanidhi. There is a strong undercurrent of sympathy in thestate for the 'Tamil cause' in Sri Lanka, and its political management is a necessary imperative both for thestate government and the centre.

It remains the case, however, that the pressures of local sentiments and sympathies have to be balanced againstIndia's strategic projections and calculations, as well as India's robust relationship with Colombo. There is a need, moreover, to clearly separate support for action against the LTTE from any sense of antagonism towards the Tamil population in Sri Lanka-- though this becomes somewhat difficult when the Sri Lankan state engages in patently discriminatory actions directed against the Tamil minority, as was the case in the recent forced deportation of Tamil migrants from Colombo (an act for which Prime Minister Wikremanayake has now apologised). The dismantling of discriminatory practices and laws in Sri Lanka could go a long way in separating the terrorists from the community, and pressure on Colombo to this end must be a necessary part of Indian policy.

On the other hand, a far greater measure of realism must attend the Indian position on military assistance. If Colombo is to resist the temptation of Chinese and Pakistani aid, it must have absolute confidence inDelhi's intentions and capacities to meet its requirements. Quibbles over 'defensive' and'offensive' weaponry have little place in the realpolitik that will define SouthAsia's future, and India's position within it.

Ajai Sahni is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.