Red Spreads

In October 2004, the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) 'Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee Secretary', Kosa, haddeclared:

"Theway we made a base in Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and havebeen progressing in Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and WestBengal, we will be able to capture 30-35 percent of India by 2010." 

Itappears that the trajectory of Naxalite consolidation is going according to plan, and thisis clearly evident in Orissa, where Naxalite activities have increaseddrastically in the southern and northern parts of the state, since the formationof the CPI-Maoist on September 21, 2004. 

While levels of Maoist violence in the state remain low, the pace of Naxalite consolidation has accelerated rapidly,particularly after the launch of the offensive against the rebels in AndhraPradesh after the collapse of the peace talks there. With security forces (SF)pressure mounting in Andhra Pradesh, top Maoist leaders have shifted their baseto areas in the Dandakaranya region lying in Chhattisgarh and Orissa. 

OrissaChief Minister, Navin Patnaik, on April 15, 2005, disclosed in New Delhi that,"the activities of the extremists are spreading" and that 10 of the state's 30 districts were already 'affected'. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)Annual Report 2004 - 2005 confirms this trend:

In Orissa, though the quantum of violence declined during the period, the CPML-PW consolidated its hold in the districts of Malkangiri, Koraput, Gajapati and Rayagada while making inroads into the adjoining districts of Kandhamal, Nowrangpur and Ganjam in south Orissa.

[Note: CPML-PW: The Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist People's War, which merged with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) to constitute the CPI-Maoist]

The police in Andhra Pradesh have also indicated thatNaxalites who surrendered in Warangal, Guntur and Kurnool districts revealedduring interrogation that the Naxalite leadership in north Telangana andNallamala has moved out of the forest areas in Andhra and taken shelter in 'safezones' in the neighbouring states. The killing of 71 Naxalites in Andhra Pradeshsince January 2005 in encounters with the police, reportedly forced thisdecision on the Maoist leadership. 

Indeed, it was suspected that cadres fromAndhra Pradesh were involved when suspected Naxalites blew up a police outpostat Seshkhal under Ramanaguda police limits in Rayagada district in Orissa onApril 25, 2005. The blast was followed by an exchange of fire between theNaxalites and police personnel. 20 Naxalites had attacked the outpost at nightand ransacked the place, after which they blew up the building using improvisedexplosive devices (IEDs). There were, in fact, reports of diversion of some ofthe Andhra cadres to Orissa even while 'peace talks' were ongoing in the former.The Andhra Maoist leadership had used the opportunities of the interregnumto consolidate operations in several of the neighbouring states,including Orissa.

At present, the CPI-Maoist has a formidable presence in six districts -Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagada, Gajapati, Sundargarh, and Mayurbhanj - and has,more recently, spread to Sambalpur and Deogarh. The Naxalites also appear to betargeting Nabarangpur, Kalahandi, Bolangir, Phulbani, Keonjhar, Nawapada,Bargarh and Jharsuguda for an extension of their operational areas.

Thus, for instance, on February 9, 2005, some 40 suspected CPI-Maoist cadresabducted at least 19 labourers from two camps at Phulkusuma and Podanalavillages in the Sambalpur District. The Naxalites also damaged constructionmachinery worth about INR 10 million. Following the incident, the state policeput five districts - Sambalpur, Jharsuguda, Deogarh, Sundargarh and Anugul - onalert. 

Again, on February 13, the police arrested nine armed CPI-Maoist cadresfrom a forest under the Naktideul police station of Sambalpur District, andrecovered some firearms, other weapons, black uniforms and Maoist literature.The district police chief, Susant Kumar Nath, stated that the CPI-Maoist wastrying to penetrate into newer areas and was mobilizing unemployed youth to joinits cadres. 

He disclosed, further, that families in the villages were beingoffered INR 2,000 per month for each young member of the house who joined theMaoists. Five schools in the Northern districts shut down for more than a monthafter the abduction of a schoolteacher by Naxalites in Naktideul block ofSambalpur district. A total 48 Naxalites - 31 from northern Orissa and 17 fromthe southern part of the state - have been arrested in Orissa since January2005.

In Sundargarh district, the Naxalites have formed the Krantikari Kisan Committee(KKC, the Revolutionary Farmers' Committee), and Jungle Surakhya Committee (JSC,Forest Protection Committee) in villages adjacent to Jharkhand, includingBjharbeda, Kaliaposh, Tulasikani, Makaranda, Sanramloi, Badramloi, Jharbeda,Jareikel, and on the Jharkhand side, Thetheitangar, Samda, Reda, and Digha. 

Theprimary task of these 'committees' is to mobilize villagers and to recruitunemployed girls and boys. Each KKC consists of 30 members and the JSCs have 20members. Reports of coercive recruitment to these committees have also beenreceived, and since the presence of government authorities and police personnelis, at best, nominal in these areas, the people have little choice but to jointhe Maoist fronts. 

Seven police stations - Bisra, Kbalanga, Banki, Koida,Gurundia, Tathikata and Tikayatpalli - in Sundargarh District, are affected byNaxalite activities. In the Mayurbhanj District, Naxalite activities have beenvisible in the Gorumahisani, Jharpokharia, Bangiriposi, Bisoi, and Chirangpolice station areas.

The military formation of the Maoist cadres is organized on the Local RegularGuerilla Squad (LRG), which consists of 15-armed cadres and, above these, theSpecial Regular Guerilla Squad (SRG) with 15 to 30 armed cadres. These areorganized into 'military platoons' of 30 armed. Three LRG's are presently knownto operate in the Sambalpur and Deogarh border areas. The cadres in these areasare known to have used liquid explosives, SLRs, AK 47s, LMGs, grenades andmortars.

Having strengthened their base in the districts along the Orissa-Jharkhandborder, the Maoists shifted their attention to the districts adjoining thecoastal areas of Orissa. This move became evident following a letter sent by theNaxalites to the Sukinda Police Station in Jajpur district, demanding theimmediate eviction of traders from the Damodarpur Chhak (square) on theperiphery of the Sukinda mines, and threatening to blow up the trading centresif this demand was not met. 

Over the past two months Naxalite activities havealso been reported in the Kapilas Hills in Dhenkanal District. Meetings -particularly at night - have also been organized by the Maoists for the tribalsin the Kantapal, Phuljhar, Balikuma, and Ekul Sekul villages under theKamakhyanagar Block. The meetings focus on the problems of the tribals in theseareas, including access to water, and health services, as well as land disputesand the various restrictions on the collection of forest products. The Naxalitesexploit the tribal grievances, and have threatened forest officials against anyefforts to prevent tribals from venturing into and gathering produce from theforests.

In Southern Orissa, Naxalite activities have been noticed in the jungles of theKalahandi District. The Naxalites active in Chhattisgarh use the forest areas ofthis district which lie close along the state border. In Koraput District theMaoists have given arms training to more than 500 tribal youth in the Kopadangforest on the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa border. Sources indicate that the trainingcamp is headed by T. Ramesh, the 'commander' of the Jhanjabati Dalam(Squad), which operates in Malkanagiri and Koraput districts. Koraput districthas also witnessed Naxalite violence, and on March 28, 2005, three suspectedMaoists gunned down a shopkeeper near the Rayagada Railway Station. On April 24,the Police arrested two Naxalite sympathisers in Narayanpatna village in theKoraput district, and recovered two guns from their possession.

Much of this, however, is lost on the union home minister, Shivraj Patil, who,on February 12, 2005, complimented the Orissa Chief Minister, Navin Patnaik, forcontrolling the Naxalite menace 'very effectively': "I am happy to say thatthe law and order situation of the state is good and the state Government haseffectively contained Naxal activities." Ironically, Chief Minister Patnaikhas just requested the centre to add Sambalpur and Deogarh to its list ofNaxalite-affected districts.

Violence cannot be the only criterion to judge Naxalite presence and activities.The Maoists do not abruptly launch into 'armed struggle' or violence, but areknown for gradual consolidation, including a preliminary study of local socialand political conditions and the vulnerabilities of particular populations toextremist mobilisation. 

Tribal marginalization and grievances in Orissa createenormous opportunities for Maoist recruitment and activity, as is evident in thewidespread anger against the state Government's refusal to withdraw proceedingsagainst 156 suspected Naxalites in 34 cases, and to drop another 1,513 minorcases against over 2,000 tribals. 

Thus, on February 14, 2005, the RajnaitikaBandi Mukti Committee (RBC, Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners), anewly floated Maoist political front organization, staged a rally in Bhubaneswarprotesting against 'continued atrocities' against tribals in theextremist-dominated pockets of the state, and demanded immediate withdrawal of'trumped up charges'. 

The displacement of tribals as a result of large scaleirrigation and mining projects, with little compensation or effort forrehabilitation, has created a massive pool of resentment, which the Maoists haveeasily tapped into. According to one estimate, there have been as many as 149medium and large dam projects executed in Orissa since 1901, and of these 18 arepresently under construction. 

The administration's failure to rehabilitate theaffected tribals and rural families has been the main source of discontent andconsequent violence in western Orissa. For instance, the Machkund Hydro Projecton Duduma River in Koraput district displaced 2,938 families, of whom 1,500 (51percent) were tribals; 300 (10.21 percent) were scheduled castes; while theremainder were drawn from other castes. Only 600 of these families wererehabilitated (450 tribals and 150 others). Similarly, the affected people arestill fighting for their rights in the areas affected by the Hirakud Dam, theSalandi Irrigation Project, the Balimela Dam, the Rengali Dam, the UpperIndravati Hydro Project, and the Upper Kolab and Titilagarh Irrigation Projects.

Regrettably, there is little scope for improvement in the foreseeable future. Civil administration has collapsed in much of rural and tribal Orissa, withendemic absenteeism and the gradual dismantling of health, public distributionsystem, and the infrastructure for delivery of the entire range of public goods,including security. 

The Orissa Police is simply too weak to tackle the problem,with very few personnel trained or equipped to handle the Maoists. Most of thepolice stations do not have vehicles or wireless equipment - and often lack evena telephone connection. There is an acute dearth of both weapons and personnel.Immediately after the attack on the Koraput District Headquarters on February 6,2004, the then Deputy Inspector General of Police (Southern), BidhubhushanMishra, admitted that the Police administration had completely failed incombating organized Naxalite attacks. According to former Director General ofPolice Nimai Charan Padhi, "Many proposals to enhance security, especiallyin the Naxalite-prone pockets of the state had been submitted to the ChiefMinister. But in vain."

At one point of time, Naxalite activities in Orissa were only regarded as aperipheral 'spillover' from neighbouring Andhra Pradesh; it is now increasinglyevident that they have come to stay.

Nihar Nayak isResearch Associate, Institute for Conflict ManagementCourtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of theSouth Asia Terrorism Portal.