Read It Yourself

During his press conference with President Karzai of Afghanistan,President Bush said it was a mistake to think that the Iraq war had increasedthe terrorism threat and the leaks from highly classified National IntelligenceEstimate was politically motivated in the run-up to mid-term elections inNovember. And then he amazingly announced that he was ordering parts of thereport to be declassified: "You can read it for yourself. [It] will stop allthe speculation."

The office of John Negroponte, the US intelligence director, released a 3½-pagesection of the 30-page report, containing its key judgments, hours after Mr Bushordered it to be declassified to counter media reports that he saidmisrepresented conclusions about Iraq.

Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism:Implications for the United States" dated April 2006

Key Judgments

United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership ofal-Qa'ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa'ida will continue topose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terroristorganization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—isspreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

• Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large bodyof all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists,although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number andgeographic dispersion.
  
  
• If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will becomemore diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.
  
  
• Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majoritynations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, suchprogress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting thevulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa'ida,could erode support for the jihadists.

We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent globalstrategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purposeand dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.

•  We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow inimportance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in theHomeland.
  
  
•  The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests.Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitaterecruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and2005 London bombings.

We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders andoperatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue thestruggle elsewhere.

• The Iraq conflict has become the "cause celebre" for jihadists, breeding a deepresentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters forthe global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves,and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carryon the fight.

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh itsvulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

• Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1)Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Westerndomination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) theIraq "jihad;" (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, andpolitical reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-USsentiment among most Muslims—all of which jihadists exploit.

Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposedand exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They includedependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of thejihadists' radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, andcriticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.

•  The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution- anultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning theMuslim world—is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing thereligious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propagandawould help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.
  
  
•  Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a fewnotable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of aconstructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This alsocould lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslimcommunities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize onpassive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as themost powerful weapon in the war on terror.
  
  
• Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinatedmultilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terroristleaders.

If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years,political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists andgroups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless,attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunitiesfor jihadists to exploit.

Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is exploiting thesituation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.

• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, andal-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture intosmaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on themission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements.We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a lessserious threat to US interests than does al-Qa'ida.
   
• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks againstMuslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a globalthreat.
  
• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa'ida in Iraq mightlead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations. 

Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al- Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional areas ofoperation.

• We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al- Qa'ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional or global ones.

We judge that most jihadist groups—both well-known and newly formed—will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.

• CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups. 

While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists.

Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.

• We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support.