Q&A: Options Against Pakistan

This paper seeks to answer a number of questions which I have received fromthe readers after the Mumbai blasts of 11/7 .

Is hot pursuit an option against Pakistan for continuing to sponsor jihaditerrorism against India?

No. It is not. The doctrine of hot pursuit acquired some prominence duringthe Vietnam war against the Americans. Taking advantage of the lack of governmentcontrol over the border areas of Laos and Cambodia, the Vietcong set up itssanctuaries there.  Vietcong groups used to cross into South Vietnam,attack American troops and withdraw into their sanctuaries in Laos or Cambodia.The Americans said they would exercise their right of hot pursuit, chase theVietcong into Laotian or Cambodian territory and put an end to the sanctuariesand kill those who attacked the Americans. 

A similar situation does not prevail with regard to Pakistan-sponsored jihaditerrorism. There is no part of Pakistani territory over which the Pakistani Armydoes not have effective control. The jihadi terrorists do not have de facto territorial control in the border areas. The Vietcong would start from a point,enter South Vietnam, attack American troops and go back to the point from wherethey started. Jihadi terrorists do not operate that way. They do not indulge inhit and run raids. They come into India from different points through differentroutes and disperse in different directions after their terrorist strikes. Theyrarely escape directly into Pakistan. Moreover,  many jihadi terroriststrikes are acts of suicide terrorism. 

To talk of hot pursuit of suicide terrorists would be absurd.

How about targeted killings of jihadi terrorist leaders based in Pakistaniterritory?

A policy of targeted killings of terrorist leaders may work in the case of aterrorist organisation such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) andorganised crime groups such as that of Dawood Ibrahim, but is unlikely to workin the case of jihadi terrorist organisations. Jihadi terrorists are taught that it is glorious to kill a non-Muslim and it is even more glorious to diewhile trying to kill a non-Muslim. They are dying to die. They believe in theglories of martyrdom while waging a jihad. Targeted killings would add to theirmartyrs' gallery. The killed leaders would be easily replaced.

Why don't we make an air strike on their training camps in Pakistaniterritory since we know where they are located?

These training camps are improvised structures. Mostly tents. The jihaditerrorists are like gypsies. They keep moving their training camps from place toplace. Air strikes may temporarily put a training infrastructure out of action,but not permanently. The American Cruise missile attacks of October 1998, andtheir post 9/11 air strikes have not destroyed the training infrastructure of AlQaeda and the Taliban. The terrorists did suffer some casualties, which theywere able to absorb and move to other places.

How do the US and Israel act against state-sponsors of terrorismthreatening the lives of their nationals and their national interests?

They follow a mix of the doctrines of passive and active defence. Passivedefence is you tighten your physical security and keep your counter-terrorismoperations confined to your territory. Active defence is you take yourcounter-terrorism operations outside your territory, if it becomes necessary.Active defence can be used against the terrorists operating against you from aforeign territory or against the state using terrorism against you or both.Active defence can be open through the conventional armed forces or covertthrough special forces. 

Examples of open active defence: the US bombing of an alleged terrorist basein Libya in 1986, the Cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda camps in Afghanterritory in October 1998, the post-9/11 military action in Afghanistan and thecurrent operations of the Israeli army in the Lebanon. 

Examples of covert active defence: Israeli attacks on Palestinian leaderswhen the Palestine Liberation Organisation was based in Tunisian territory inthe 1980s, their counter-terrorism operations in other places such as Malta, and  France's alleged kidnapping of Carlos in Auguast 1994, from Khartoum.

Have the policies of the US and Israel succeeded?

Not so far.

Why have they not succeeded?

Because they have been targeting their action against the terroristsoperating from foreign territory and not against the states sponsoring and usingthe terrorists. The US-led coalition is unlikely to succeed in Afghanistan solong as they do not end the Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban and itscomplicity with Al Qaeda. Israel is unlikely to succeed against the Hezbollahand the Hamas so long as it does not end their sponsorship by Iran and Syria.The collapse of the ideological terrorist groups of West Europe after thecollapse of the Communist states of East Europe shows how state-sponsoredterrorist organisations find it difficult to survive when deprived of supportfrom their state-sponsors. The international community will continue to facedifficulty in prevailing over global jihadi terrorism unless and until it acts unitedly against the triumvirate of state-sponsors -- Pakistan, Iran andSyria.

Why are the US and Israel not acting against Pakistan, Iran and Syria?

In its war against terrorism spawned and nurtured in the Pakistan-Afghanistanregion, the US has four objectives:

• to pre-empt the possibility of another 9/11 in US territory;
• to prevent the jihadi terrorists from getting hold of Pakistan's nuclear assets; 
• to prevent a Talibanisation of Pakistan; and 
• to create normalcy and political stability in Afghanistan. 

For achieving the first three objectives, it thinks it needs the support ofthe Pakistan army. But continued support for the Pakistan Army and the presentmilitary-controlled regime headed by Gen.Pervez Musharraf would come in the wayof achieving the fourth objective. It has to choose between Musharraf andstability in Afghanistan. It has presently chosen Musharraf, but things couldchange if Al Qaeda carries out another 9/11 in the US homeland, which is provedto have been planned and executed from Pakistani territory. 

Israel does not attack Iran and Syria because of fears that it could lead toa wider war in West Asia. It would need the political, moral, economic,diplomatic and military support of the US if it has to face the risk of such awider war. Israel is, therefore, unlikely to attack Iran and Syria without agreen signal from the US. But Israel may not hesitate to act unilaterally towipe out Iran's military nuclear capability, even without approval from the US,if and when it decides that the international community is unlikely to actagainst Iran. Nuclear weapons in the hands of a state-sponsor of terrorism likeIran, which wants to destroy Israel, will not be tolerated by Israel.

What are the chances of the international community acting unitedlyagainst Pakistan, Iran and Syria?

Very remote, at present. Things could change if there is an act of masscasualty terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material andPakistan is found to have been the source of this material.

Why is the US repeatedly rejecting India's evidence regarding thePakistani State sponsorship of jihadi terrorism directed against India despitethe growing strategic relations between India and the US?

The reasons are partly strategic, partly tactical and partly historic. Thestrategic reason is that the US looks upon Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Indonesiaas the moderate core of the Islamic Ummah. It wants to preserve and strengthenthis core and expand its influence over the rest of the Ummah. The tacticalreason is that, in the US perception, the co-operation of Pakistan is essentialfor preventing another 9/11 in US territory. Preventing another 9/11 is moreimportant for the US than preventing any number of 11/7s in Indian territory.Pakistani co-operation helps save American lives. Indian co-operation does not.Only if and when it is proved that the Pakistani co-operation no longer helpssave American lives, is the US likely to re-consider its policy towardsPakistan. If the US has to make a strategic choice between India and Pakistan,it would choose India. If it has to make a tactical choice between the two, itwould choose Pakistan. The historic reason is the help extended by Pakistan tothe US during the cold war in its efforts to defeat international communism.

Why then are we repeatedly going to the US with our evidence againstPakistan when we know the US is going to reject it?

Public diplomacy against Pakistan on its sponsorship of terrorism has to bean important component of our counter-terrorism policy. This public diplomacyhas three  sides:

• first, to show to the international community that our repeated efforts to make Pakistan give up its sponsorship of terrorism have failed; 
• second, to tell the international community, particularly the US, that its repeated refusal to accept and act on our evidence against Pakistan has left us with no other option except to use other ways  to deal with Pakistan's state-sponsorship of terrorism against India; 
• third, to repeatedly remind public opinion in other countries that their governments' short-sighted policy of refusing to act against Pakistan is going to boomerang on them in the form of more 9/11s, originating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region.

The doctrine of the right of  active defence against a state-sponsor was first  enunciated by Mr George Shultz, who was Secretary of State in the Ronald Reagan administration, in a statement made by him after the death of nearly 200 US Marines in a car bomb attack in Beirut in the 1980s. Thiswas further reinforced by Mr  George Bush, the father of the present President, when he was the Vice-President under Reagan and chaired a SpecialTask Force on Counter-terrorism. Under this doctrine, the US would first try allconventional options against State-sponsors--political, economic, diplomaticetc-- but if these failed to produce results, it would not hesitate to resort tounconventional options to make it clear to the guilty states that theirsponsorship of terrorism would not pay. This counter-terrorism road map  isnow generally accepted all over the world. Public diplomacy is an importantstage in this road map. 

We have to make it clear to Pakistan and the internationalcommunity--particularly the US, which is the most important sponsor of this state-sponsorof terrorism--that we tried all reasonable and conventional means of putting anend to Pakistan's state-sponsorship. Since these have not produced results andthe international community has failed to stand by India, we have no otheroption but to take to unconventional means.

What has been the state of our public diplomacy against Pakistan on thequestion of its sponsorship of terrorism against India?

It started under Rajiv Gandhi and continued under Shri V.P.Singh, ShriChandrasekhar and  P.V.Narasimha Rao. It was neglected under Shri Dev Gowdaand Shri Inder Gujral. It was kept up in fits and starts under Shri A.B.Vajpayeeand totally neglected since Dr.Manmohan Singh took over as the Prime Minister.Since September 2004, there has not been a categorical and direct criticism byhim of Pakistan's continued state sponsorship. Even in his remarks after hisvisit to the scene of the Mumbai blasts of 11/7, he made only a soft, indirectallusion to Pakistan without clearly naming it. They appeared to be meant moreto respond to domestic public opinion in India than to convey an unambiguousmessage to Pakistan. 

If our own Prime Minister fights shy of calling a spade a spade, how can weexpect the international community to do so? At some international seminarsattended by me since September 2004, when I raised the issue of continuedPakistani sponsorship of terrorism, many in the audience remarked: "Yourown Prime Minister is no longer talking of it. Why do you keep harping onit?" The policy of  "See No Evil, Hear No Evil and Speak NoEvil", which the Prime Minister seems to be following in respect of Pakistan and the US could prove counter-productive.

Why do we keep asking the US to declare Pakistan a state-sponsor ofterrorism? Why can't we do it ourselves?

To my knowledge, the US is the only country in the world in which the conceptof state-sponsorship of terrorism figures in the statute book. When the USdeclares a state as a state-sponsor of Terrorism, certain punitive consequencesfollow such as stoppage of military supplies, economic sanctions etc. Pakistancould be hurt by a US declaration. We had seen how the invoking of the PresslerAmendment on the nuclear issue against Pakistan in 1990 by the US halted theprogress of the Pakistani economy, created difficulties for its Air Force andalmost brought its economy to the verge of collapse in the 1990s when Mr NawazSharif and Mrs Benazir Bhutto were Prime Ministers. An Indian declaration ofPakistan as a state-sponsor of terrorism will not have any impact on Pakistan.

Is military action against Pakistan an option?

It is no longer an option after 9/11. Pakistan is now declared as a majornon-NATO ally of the US. There is a growing American presence in Pakistan. USintelligence agencies, particularly the National Security Agency (NSA) which isresponsible for the collection of technical intelligence, have a strong presencein Pakistan to collect intelligence about Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The USA'sand the NATO's top priority is their operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.The Pakistan Army has deployed a large number of its troops in the Waziristanarea to help the Americans operating in Afghanistan. As a quid pro quo, it wouldexpect the US to ensure that India does not take advantage of this forcounter-terrorism related military strikes in Pakistan. The US would try toprevent any military strikes by us . Even if we take the US by surprise andlaunch a military strike, the US and the other NATO countries would try to bringthe strike to a premature conclusion before we had achieved ourcounter-terrorism objectives. In our planning, we have to take intoconsideration Pakistan's nuclear capability too.

Then how to make Pakistan pay a price for its state-sponsorship ofterrorism against India?

Through covert action, which is deniable para-political and para-militaryaction meant to make Pakistan's sponsorship prohibitively costly to it. Such acovert action would be directed against the Pakistan state and society and notagainst the terrorists. Covert actions do not produce quick results. They aregradual in their impact. They have to be well-prepared, well-executed and keptsustained. The liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 was preceded by nearly a decadeof covert action in the then East Pakistan at the political, para-political,cultural and other levels in order to create large pockets of alienation againstthe central government and  generate feelings of separateness between thepeople of West and East Pakistan. If we had not prepared the ground carefullyfor 10 years, the success would not have come  so decisively in 1971.

Why are we not doing it now?

Before 1971, our political leadership was determined that it was not in thenational interests of India to let the two wings of Pakistan remain united. Oncea political direction came that we should not allow the two wings to remainunited, the intelligence agencies and the security forces took the follow-upaction and facilitated the achievement of this objective by our armed forces in1971. In 1981, Pakistan started its sponsorship of Khalistani terrorism inPunjab. Between 1981 and 1987, our political leadership tried to deal with itconventionally. When the conventional options had no impact on Pakistan, adecision was taken by the political leadership that Pakistan must be covertlymade to pay a price for its meddling in Punjab.

The intelligence agencies implemented this directive effectively and themessage went home to Pakistan. It started cutting down its support to theKhalistani terrorists, which tapered off by 1995. But, in 1997, the politicalleadership decided, despite the increase in the involvement of Pakistan in thesponsorship of jihadi terrorism, to stop the use of the covert action option. Weare paying a heavy price for it since then.

The subsequent governments have been thoroughly confused in their mind aboutthe advisability of resuming covert action. Moreover, before 1997, the Americaninfluence on our political leadership and policy-makers was very small. Ourleaders and policy-makers rarely bothered about what the Americans would thinkof our actions. Since 2003 the American influence on us has increased so muchthat it has come in the way of an aggressive policy approach towards Pakistan.

One has the impression that so far as our policy towards Pakistan isconcerned, the US is doing the back-seat driving. We have to rid ourselves ofour inhibitions generated by our over-anxiety to keep on the right side of theUS, decide what needs to be done to Pakistan and do it. We should decide nowlucidly what kind of Pakistan will be in our national interest in the next 10 or15 years and resolutely work towards it. Our intelligence agencies are capableof doing it provided they have behind them a resolute political leadership whichwould guide and back them without wavering all the time depending on the signalsfrom Washington.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.