Provoking Pashtuns

The Pakistani military operation against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)and its affiliates in the Swat Valley and the adjoining areas of the MalakandDivision of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) is increasingly being seenby sections of the local population as an anti-Pashtun operation forced on thePakistani Army by the US. 

Tribal sources report that pamphlets and posters accusing the Army of waginga war against the Pashtuns under the pretext of a war against the Taliban havestarted appearing in the interior areas of the NWFP.  US analysts are beingaccused of over-projecting the alleged threat from the Pakistani Taliban inorder to force the Pakistani Army to mount a full-scale military operation inthe Swat Valley and the neighbouring areas. Well-informed sources in the NWFPsay that it is also being  alleged that some American experts deliberatelyexaggerated the number of the Taliban volunteers who entered the Buner districtsome weeks ago in order to create a scare that the Taliban was marching towardsIslamabad. 

The large-scale exodus of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) -- estimated ata little over 2.5 million -- from the areas where the Pakistan Army has mounteda military operation against the Taliban, the failure of the Federal Governmentto make satisfactory arrangements for looking after them, the opposition to themfrom the local population in Sindh, Balochistan and the Punjab and the reportedplans of the Army to create a cantonment in Swat are leading to a freshpolarisation between the Pashtuns and the non-Pashtuns.  According to thesesources, the Pashtun refugees have started blaming the US for all theirtroubles.  

The Pakistan Army, which has claimed to have freed large parts of the SwatValley from the control of the Taliban, has intriguingly refused to allow thePashtun refugees  from the Valley to move back to their villages from thecamps for IDPs. No satisfactory explanation for this has been given. While theArmy has allowed the IDPs from the Buner District to go back to their homes, itis not allowing the IDPs from the Swat Valley to go back to their villages. Thisis adding to the resentment of the Pashtuns. 

One possible reason for the Army's refusal is that it does not want the IDPsto move back till the semblance of a civil administration is restored in thevalley. These sources say that the Army does not want to take up theresponsibility for looking after the re-settlement of the returning IDPs whenits hands are full with the military operations against the Taliban. 

Maj Gen Athar Abbas, a spokesman of the Army, told a media briefing on June6, 2009, as follows:

"The Army would stay in the area till a sense of security among the peopleis revived, a credible defence system by the law enforcement agencies, includingpolice, is put in place and the possibility of the terrorists hiding inmountains coming back to launch a second phase of insurgency is obviated. Thiswould not take less than a year." 

The visit of Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy to Pakistan andAfghanistan, to Pakistan from June 3 to 5, was projected as a humanitarianmission to monitor arrangements for looking after the IDPs and assess theirrequirements. The US has already contributed  US $ 120 million for thispurpose. The Obama Administration has promised to give US $ 200 million moreafter Congressional approval. 

The UN authorities have reportedly estimated the total requirements atpresent as US $ 543 million of which the US has already given US $ 120 millionand others US $ 137 million. 

While there are already pledges amounting to more than 60 per cent of therequirements, there is no relief and rehabilitation infrastructure on the groundto handle the disbursement of this amount. Apart from the UN High Commission ForRefugees, no other international organisation is well-placed to co-ordinate. Inthe absence of a national and an international humanitarian relief architecture,jihadi and anti-US organisations such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the political wingof the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), with  well-tested and devoted cadres tohandle humanitarian relief, have moved in.  

In addition to organising the humanitarian relief with greater efficiencythan the Government, they are also indulging in anti-Government and anti-USpropaganda. Al Qaeda, which sees a new opportunity in the humanitarian situationcreated by the military operations, has left it to the JUD to handle groundrelief operations, but it has started adding to the anger of the IDPs by blamingthe US for their plight. 

Apart from some high-profile, photo-opp visits to some camps of the IDPs,Holbrooke seems to have devoted little time to working out the requirements fora humanitarian relief infrastructure on the ground. He is essentially a diplomatpar excellence. Humanitarian relief is not his strong point. There is a need forthe US to appoint a humanitarian relief co-ordinator, who can assist Holbrooke.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.