Prabakaran Is Passé

Territorial control where possible; withdrawal wherenecessary. That has been the tactics being followedby the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Eastern Province of SriLanka where the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, with the help of the trained cadres of"Col" Karuna, the former LTTE Commander for Batticaloa, have mountedan offensive since September last year in an attempt to eject the LTTE from theEastern Province. Karuna, who had deserted the LTTE in March, 2004, followingdifferences with its leader Prabhakaran, has since then been co-operating withthe Sri Lankan Armed Forces in their counter-insurgency operations in theEastern Province.

For an insurgent organisation, territorial control isan advantage, but not necessary. Territory lost today, can be re-gainedtomorrow. But, trained and motivated  cadres lost today cannot be easilyreplaced tomorrow. That is the logic, which dictates the conventional tactics ofall insurgent organisations. One saw it during the Algerian war of independence.One has been seeing it in Afghanistan since the US military intervention-- sinceupgraded into a NATO intervention-- started on October 7, 2001. Faced with theoverwhelming superiority of the US forces, the Taliban decided to cedeterritorial control and withdraw its men from Kabul, Kandahar and other placesinstead of getting involved in a frontal confrontation with the better armed,but not better motivated American forces. Its priority was the preservation ofthe hard core of its trained fighters in order to be able to strike back at aplace and time of its choice. That is what it has been doing since the beginningof last year-- with a mix of suicide terrorism and set-piece conventionalbattles. The Taliban knows that its lack of an anti-aircraft capability wouldrule out spectacular victories against the NATO and Afghan government forces andthe capture and occupation of territory. Its aim is, therefore, to keep the NATOforces bleeding, disrupt the economy and bring about battle fatigue in the ranksof the NATO forces. It is calculating that time and ground realities are on itsside and that ultimately the NATO forces would realise that theircounter-insurgency operations are faced with the law of diminishing returns.

Since September last year, the LTTE, faced with thesuperiority of the Pakistan-assisted  Sri Lankan Armed Forces, has cededterritorial control in its two  bastions in the Eastern Province-- Sampurin the Trincomallee area  and Vaharai  in the Batticaloa area. Itwithdrew from Vaharai on January 19, 2007. Sampur and Vaharai were not capturedby the joint forces of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the  soldiers ofKaruna after a face-to-face battle with the LTTE. After a prolonged exchange of artillery fire, the LTTE decided to withdraw from there in order to preserve itshard core of fighters, with experience of conventional warfare and withknowledge of the terrain in the Eastern Province. Its withdrawal enabled theArmy and Karuna's  soldiers to move in.

The withdrawal from Sampur and Vaharai has been atactical set-back for the LTTE, but is not a strategic territorial victory ofany major significance for the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. The real gains for theArmed Forces are more psychological than territorial. These are an improvementin morale and self-confidence, which are important factors in anycounter-insurgency operations. The LTTE continues to be as resilient as before,but is no longer as innovative as before. The strength of an insurgentorganisation comes from the unpredictability of its moves on the ground, whichkeeps its adversary constantly off balance. In the past, the LTTE earned alegendary reputation as an insurgent organisation because of its unpredictableoperational tactics. These have now been blunted-- after the desertion of Karuna--andthis is coming in the way of the effectiveness of its actions.

The recent operations of the LTTE and its politicalactions have once again called into question the qualities of leadership ofPrabakaran. His leadership has been consistently marked since 1990 by an erraticand irrational  streak. One saw it in the LTTE's brutal assassination ofRajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Laxman Kadirgamar, the former Sri Lankan ForeignMinister, in 2005, and in his humiliation of Karuna. The LTTE has been paying aheavy price for these erratic and irrational actions of Prabakaran. Theassassination of Rajiv Gandhi cost it the support of the Indian people,including the people of Tamil Nadu. The assassination of Kadirgamar marked thebeginning of the end of international sympathy for the organisation. Thehumiliation of Karuna has deprived it of the services of its most talentedconventional commander.

Like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Hezbollah inthe Lebanon, the LTTE follows a mix of conventional and unconventional(terrorism) operational tactics. The desertion of Karuna has definitely dentedits conventional capability. Prabakaran does not understand conventionaltactics. He is essentially a terrorist leader, who can think only in terms ofacts of suicide terrorism. The post-9/11 world is still prepared to tolerateorganisations, which use conventional methods of fighting for achievingpolitical objectives, but not those who rely on terrorism.

An organisation headed by a leader, who understandsonly terrorism, is unlikely to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of theinternational community. Prabakaran is a liability for the LTTE and the SriLankan Tamils in the post-9/11 world. The time has come for the LTTE leaders andthe Sri Lankan Tamils-- including  their overseas diaspora--  to introspecton their future course of action.  If they have to preserve the gains madeby thousands of their cadres since 1983, they have to find a new leadership.

Prabakaran is no longer the man of the future. He is passé.He has become a liability for the Tamil cause. The sooner the Sri Lankan Tamilsrealise it, the better for them.