Post Mush Blues

The resignation of Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf's  from the post of thePresident of Pakistan became effective on the evening of  August 18, 2008. As per the Constitution, Mohammedmian Soomroo, the Chairman of the Senate, theupper House of the Parliament, will be acting as the President  till thenew President is elected. The election has to take place within 30 days ofMusharraf's resignation.

All eyes will now be on the members of the National Assembly, the lowerHouse, who were considered the loyalists of Musharraf. Will they continue tomaintain their independent identity or will they go back to their mother partiesfrom which the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) engineered their split beforethe elections of 2002?

The present composition of the National Assembly is as follows:

The Pakistan People's Party of Asif Zardari -- 121 seats.
The Pakistan Muslim League (N) of Nawaz Sharif-- 91
The Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam), who were Musharraf loyalists-- 54
The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which supported Zardari's Party in the
Sindh provincial Assembly, but Musharraf in the National Assembly-- 25
The Awami National Party-- 13
The Jamiat-ul- Ulema-e-Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rahman--6
The Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) of the Pir of Pagaro-- 5
The Pakistan People's Party  of Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao --1
The National People's Party --    1
The Balochistan National Party (Awami)-- 1
Independents--18

If the PML (QA) goes back to the PML (N) from which it was split by the ISIin 2002, the two PMLs together will have a total of 145 seats. They may also beable to count on the support of the five members from the PML (F), thus making atotal of 150 seats in the Assembly with a total strength of 336 seats. IfZardari, who already enjoys the support of the Awami National Party and FazlurRahman's party and other one-seat parties, manages to win the support of the MQMand all the 18 independents, he will have the support of 186 members. Thusnumerically, Zardari and his PPP  will continue to be in a strong position.However, this could change if the MQM takes an independent position and all theindependents do not support him.

The question of the reinstatement of the former ChiefJustice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury and other Judges sacked by Musharraf lastyear for refusing to take a new oath after he imposed a State of Emergency will be tricky. Previously, Nawaz Sharif was insisting on the reinstatement of all ofthem through an executive order whereas Zardari  wanted the Constitution tobe amended to achieve this objective. He  wanted the  amendment fortwo reasons. Firstly, he did not want the Chief Justice and other Judges appointed by Musharraf after sacking Chaudhury and others to lose their jobs.Second, he wanted to re-fix the tenure of the Chief Justice in such a mannerthat shortly after being reinstated as the Chief Justice to vindicate his honour,Chaudhury  will retire. Neither Benazir nor Zardari liked Chaudhury becausethey felt he might overthrow the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) issuedby Musharraf under which the criminal cases pending against them were withdrawnto enable them to return to Pakistan and resume their political activities.

When he was the Chief Justice before being sacked by Musharraf  for thefirst time in March, 2007, Chaudhury had started emulating the Indian judiciaryby encouraging what in India has come to be known as public interestlitigation--that is entertainment of petitions from private individuals onmatters of public interest and enquiring into them. It was his entertainment ofa petition on the large number of missing persons picked up by the intelligenceagencies as Al Qaeda suspects and handed over to the US informally forinterrogation without following the due process of the law, which caused theinitial break between him and Musharraf and uneasiness in the US. Fears that hemight set aside the re-election of Musharraf as the President while holdingcharge as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) made Musharraf impose the State ofEmergency  and sack him for a second time after having reinstated him underthe pressure of the lawyers' community. Zardari's fears that Chaudhury mightentrtain a petition against the NRO is responsible for his lack of enthusiasmfor his reinstatement. Even today, neither Zardari nor the US is comfortablewith the idea of his reinstatement.

Nawaz was insisting on his immediate reinstatement through an executive orderin the hope that he would entertain a petition on the re-election of Musharrafand declare it unconstitutional. Till a few weeks ago, Nawaz was not confidentthat an impeachment motion against Musharraf would get the required two-thirdsmajority. Hence, his repeated insistence on the reinstatement. To delay hisreinstatement, Zardari managed to win two-thirds support for the impeachmentproposal and forced Musharraf to resign. He will now be hoping that with theresignation of Musharraf, Nawaz will not attach the same urgency to thereinstatement of Chaudhury. If Nawaz continues to insist on it, fresh frictioncould arise.

Both Zardari and Nawaz have repeatedly expressedthemselves in favour of abolishing all constitutional amendments introduced byMusharraf through executive orders and restoring the 1973 Constitutionintroduced under Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto. Under the 1973 Constitution, ZulfiquarAli Bhutto had made the President a figurehead with all powers concentrated inthe hands of the Prime Minister. Gen.Zia-ul-Haq amended the Constitution throughan executive order and inserted a provision enabling the President to dismissthe Prime Minister and dissolve the elected National Assembly. Zia used thisprovision in 1988 to dismiss Mohammed Khan Junejo, his Prime Minister, anddissolve the National Assembly when Junejo developed differences with Zia overthe Afghanistan peace talks then under way in Geneva and over the enquiry intothe explosion at the arms storage depot at Ojehri near Islamabad in which thearms and ammunition given by the US for issue to the Afghan Mujahideen werekept. There were allegations that the Army deliberately caused the explosion todestroy the records before the visit of an US inspection team. It was alleged tohave done this in order to conceal the issue by the Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI) of some of these arms and ammunition meant for use against Afghan andSoviet troops to Khalistani and other terrorists in India.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who succeeded Zia as the President, used this provision todismiss Benazir in August 1990 and dissolve the National Assembly. In 1996,Nawaz Sharif, then the  leader of the opposition, instigated Farooq Leghari,the then President, to dismiss Benazir and dissolve the Assembly. Leghari, oncea close confidante of Benazir, had developed differences with her and Zardariand obliged Nawaz. The PML of Nawaz won a two-thirds majority in the electionsthat followed. Nawaz used this majority to remove from the Constitution theprovision for dismissal. He then forced Leghari to quit and had Mohammad RafiqueTarar, an associate of his father and a member of the Tablighi Jamaat, electedas the President. Musharraf re-introduced the provision in the Constitution. 

Another  amendment introduced by Musharraf, which added to the powers ofthe President, related to the appointment of a National Security Council (NSC),to be chaired by the President, to discuss and approve national securitypolicies and decisions. He also laid down that the power for the dismissal ofthe Prime Minister and the dissolution of the Assembly could be exercised by thePresident only on the recommendation of the NSC. The suggestion for an NSC wasfirst made in a public speech by Gen Jehangir Karamat, Musharraf's predecessoras the COAS. Nawaz strongly disapproved of his speech and disagreed with theidea. Following this, Karamat took premature retirement and Musharraf succeededhim.

Nawaz has been critical of Musharraf's action in introducing the NSC. He hasbeen of the view that all such decisions should be taken by the CabinetCommittee on Security chaired by the Prime Minister and that there was no needfor an NSC for this purpose. While Zardari and Nawaz agree on the need toabolish the power of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolvethe National Assembly, there are differences on their approach to the NSC.Zardari wants the NSC mechanism to continue, but under the supervision of thePrime Minister, but Nawaz wants it to be abolished. However, this should notpose an insurmountable obstacle. If the powers of the President over the NSC aretransferred to the Prime Minister, Nawaz might reconcile himself to itscontinued existence.

The abolition of the power of the President to dismiss and the removal of theNSC from his control will once again make the Prime Minister the most powerfulpart of the Executive and reduce the President to being a mere figurehead.Neither Zardari nor Nawaz would like to be just a figurehead. They would beinterested more in the powerful post of the Prime Minister.

Zardari seems to be contemplating two options--make Yousef Raza Gilani, thepresent Prime Minister, as the figurehead President  and himself (Zardari)take over as the Prime Minister after getting himself elected  to theNational Assembly or propose one of his nominees as the President. Nawaz isopposed to this and wants that the PPP nominees should not hold both the postsof the President and the Prime Minister.He would have no objection to Gilanitaking over as the President, provided he (Nawaz) is made the Prime Minister. Toenable him to contest the election to the Assembly, his conviction in 2000 by ananti-terrorism court appointed by Musharraf on a charge of terrorism has to beset aside. For this purpose, he would need the assistance of a reinstated ChiefJustice Chaudhury. If he is reinstated, there would thus be the danger of hisfacilitating the election of Nawaz by setting aside his conviction and coming inthe way of Zardari's election by entertaining a petition against the NRO andstaying it. If there are irreconcilable differences between Zardari and Nawaz onthis issue,  there could be a deadlock.

The other issue on which there is not yet muchconvergence between Zardari and Nawaz is over the co-operation with the US inthe war against terrorism. Nawaz wants major modifications, if not a completebreak, with the policies followed by Musharraf. He does not regard the Talibanas a terrorist organisation. He looks upon it as a national resistance movementlike the Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s.  He is, therefore, against anyassociation of Pakistan with the NATO operations in Afghanistan. He wants theuse of the Karachi port and Pakistani territory by the NATO forces for thetransport of logistic supplies to Afghanistan to be re-considered. He favourscontinued co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda in the form of intelligencesharing and Pakistani operations in the Pakistani territory on the basis ofintelligence given by the US. He is against any joint operations with the US orany unilateral operations by the US in Pakistani territory. He wants a review ofthe reported presence of a large number of US intelligence personnel inPakistani territory for collecting intelligence. He is of the view thatintelligence collection in Pakistani territory should be done by the Pakistaniintelligence agencies. As regards action against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistanand Pakistani organisations in the tribal belt, he holds the view that thenature of these operations should be decided by Pakistan in accordance with itsnational interests and that there  should be no dictation by the US on thisissue. Like Musharraf, he does not accept US allegations that Al Qaeda andTaliban leaders are based in Pakistani territory. He is totally against thepractice of Pakistani agencies informally picking up suspects named by the USand handing them over to the US agencies without following the due process oflaw. Zardari favours the continuance of the mechanism for co-operation laid downby Musharraf. However, he agrees with Nawaz that the practice of informallypicking up suspects named by the US and handing them over to the US should stop.Ultimately, the advice of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the COAS, as to theco-operation mechanism with the US, which would suit Pakistan's nationalinterests ,will have considerable impact on the changes, if any, to beintroduced in the policies inherited from Musharraf.

As regards India, both Zardari and Nawaz are agreed on the desirability ofgradually delinking the question of promoting bilateral trade from the Kashmirissue. They are also in favour of pushing ahead with the project for theIran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. They are unlikely to act against theanti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. Terrorist activitiesin Indian territory, backed by the Inter-Services Intelligence, will continue atthe present level. So too the ISI operations against Indian nationals andinterests in Afghanistan. Though not immediately, the civilian government may beamenable to having a second look at Pakistan's present policy of not allowingtransit trade to Afghanistan from India through Pakistani territory. A re-organisationof the ISI will be undertaken in order to reduce its role in internal securitymatters without damaging its capability in external security matters. A greaterrole  for the Intelligence Bureau in internal security matters is likely.The policy of militarisation of the IB introduced by Musharraf will be reversed.A reversion to the past practice of the ISI remaining a largely militaryorganisation and the IB a largely police organisation is likely.

This is the second time that Pakistan will be reverting from military to civilian rule since it  became a nuclear power. When the firsttransition took place in 1988 after the election of Benazir, the US Embassy inIslamabad had played an active role in deciding the lines of responsibility innuclear matters. Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, the then COAS, agreed to her taking overas the Prime Minister only after she agreed that she would  have no role innuclear decision-making which was to be totally in the hands of the COAS. Zia was not driven out by a revolt against him. He was killed in a plane crash.The Army was in a strong position then. It was able to dictate matters. Now, the Army will be on the defensive vis-a-vis the political  class after thehumiliating exit of Musharraf. Will it be able to impose its will in nuclearmatters and deny any responsibility to the civilian Prime Minister as Beg did in1988? What role will the US play? There was no Al Qaeda in 1988. There is now anAl Qaeda looking for nuclear material. The question of effective control overPakistan's nuclear arsenal has assumed greater importance.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.