One More For Ripley's Believe It Or Not!

Two days after the Havana meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh andGeneral Pervez Musharraf, there is considerable confusion, if not comprehensivedisbelief, over the import of the understanding the two leaders reached in theirhour-long meeting over a joint mechanism to deal with terrorism.

All that we know of this is contained in paragraph three of the jointstatement. It says:

"The two leaders met in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts. They strongly condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed that terrorism is a scourge that needs to be effectively dealt with. They decided to put in place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations."

There is no clarity on what this mechanism will look like, how often they will meet and what the body will discuss both in terms of initiativesand investigations. But it is not the mechanics of the device that is worrying,it is the preposterous nature of the suggestion that deserves closerexamination.

So far there have been four defining moments in the last few years when NewDelhi believed that it had found the solution to terrorism from Pakistan.

The first was inJanuary 6, 2004 when Musharraf undertook in a bilateral commitment toprevent any part of territory under his control from becoming a springboard forterrorism. Subsequently every time Manmohan Singh has met Musharraf this pledgehas been solemnly re-iterated for whatever it was worth (September2004, April2005, September2005)

In the meanwhile the canvas of the terrorist operations kept widening.Infiltration that had gone down after the January 6 statement to a really smallfraction of what it used to be, began to go up again. The January 6 intentionwas clearly not working. Terrorism as a subject was being discussed at the levelof the Home Secretary as one of the subjects under the composite dialogueformat. In these meetings, the Indian side would hand over the names of personslike Dawood Ibrahim, and the addresses at which the intelligence would say theywere staying. The infiltration patterns would be shared, as well as some of thecamps the terrorists were using. The radio frequencies in which theterrorists were communicating with their operatives in Jammu and Kashmir wouldbe given to the Pakistani delegation. In the meeting the Pakistani side wouldsay that all this was not true, but that they would check and get back. Later themilitants would simply change the frequencies.

There has not been a single instance when the Pakistanis have provided NewDelhi with any kind of lead or tip off on any potential terrorist threat oractivity. Not once have they called up to say that they had credibleinformation.

The mindboggles at the possibilities this new initiative presents Pakistan with: It would now use thisforum to air its charges on India fomenting terrorism in Pakistan, be it inBalochistan or elsewhere. In effect, it would become a case of their claimsversus ours at an official level - thus bringing about a parity that India hasalways scoffed at. You can imagine the kind of surreal conversation that happens roundthe table:

Dawood Ibrahim? We don't know him. What does he look like? Do youhave a picture? Professor Hafiz Mohammad Saeed? He is not a terrorist. He is intocharity. Oh that Salahuddin? He is not a terrorist, he is a freedomfighter. But we don't have anything to do with him. He does his own stuff.

In contrast, there have been at least two occasions in the last few years,when India has tipped off Pakistan, through the back-channels, of the plotsagainst Musharraf's life that the Indian intelligence had known about.

What could have happened between the Mumbai blasts and Havana meeting thathas injected such a large dose of touching faith into the system that New Delhiis now prepared to believe that at last Pakistan is one hundred per cent readyto co-operate with India in its fight against terrorism which New Delhi hasconsistently let it be known is being sponsored, supported, encouraged, aidedand actively abetted by the Pakistani establishment?

What could have happened for New Delhi to be now convinced that there is nodirect or indirect support for India-specific terrorism from Pakistan?

Far more serious in its consequences is the way in which New Delhi seems tohave changed the status of Pakistan from that of a state that sponsors terrorismto one that is a victim of terrorism.