North Korea's Nuclear Gamble

Updated on: 11 October 2006 12:00 am

The North Korean underground nuclear test on 9 October has sent shockwaves—weak on the Richter scale but shaking the core of the East Asian security and the existing geopolitical balance in Asia underpinned by the US nuclear umbrella.

North Korea has taken a giant step backward by choosing the nuclear option in its desperate attempt to avoid regime collapse and thwart the reunification of the peninsula under South Korean control. Instead of reinforcing the shaky Kim Jong Il regime weakened by decades of economic mismanagement and Stalinist dictatorship, the nuclear gambit is likely to put the country and its population to the severest test of its existence. Yet, given the complex calculation of its neighbors, a concerted move to restrain North Korea won’t be easy either.

From Beijing to Tokyo to Seoul and Washington, Kim’s dangerous gambit has set the alarm-bell ringing for a need for tough response from the US or United Nations. But with China and Russia reluctant to back a tough sanction on the North, the administration of US President George Bush seems has little option but to deal with the crisis in a non-military way.

Depending on the level of tension, however, the US, though mired in the war against terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, could respond with a naval blockade in the Sea of Japan or the Yellow Sea. A strong enforcement of Proliferation Security Initiative under which all North Korean ships will be halted and searched for potential exports of weapons of mass destruction, could add to the North’s economic and security hardships.

Across the DMZ borders on the land, the US-South Korean military alliance stands poised to counter all forms of provocations which Seoul officials say are likely.

Beyond Korea’s border, the North’s nuclear test has raised widespread concern for a domino effect in Asia with analysts suggesting that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan could eventually opt for their own nuclear programs to counter threats from North Korea if they find the US distracted. This feeling appears especially palpable in Japan following North Korea’s repeated test-firings of missiles in the direction of Japan. Not only has this inflamed public opinion, it has triggered a fresh debate in Japan over revising its postwar pacifist constitution that restricts its defense forces to home defense. The North Korean provocation also comes on the heels of the rise of a new assertive Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He has termed the nuclear test as "unpardonable."

A hardliner, Abe has hinted at taking further actions including a total suspension of trade and banning of North Korean vessels from docking in Japan or navigating inside its territorial waters. That, according to specialists in Seoul, would mean blocking the shipment of Japanese electronic parts and components that could be used for the North’s missile development. Reports here have said that the North depends on Japanese electronic parts for its missile guidance system.

Most immediately, Japan is the prime sponsor of tough sanctions against North Korea at the UN. As rotating chairman of the 15-member Security Council, Japan is drafting a resolution calling for tougher sanctions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, authorizing the use of military force in the event of the North failing to comply. It is the kind of resolution that was imposed on Sadam Hussein’s Iraq before the US invasion of that country. It is thus much tougher, with far more implications than the resolution 1695 adopted on 15 July that called on member countries to ban transfer of money or other resources that could be used for development of the North’s nuclear weapons.

The key question is whether China and Russia—Pyongyang’s former backers—will find it comfortable to reject the second resolution in view of international condemnation the North has provoked. China opposed inserting the Chapter 7 clause in the first resolution, arguing that the US could use it to seek an Iraq-like military strike on the North.

Immediately after the nuclear test, Beijing issued a toughly worded statement criticizing it as "brazen." That was the strongest expression China has used against Pyongyang so far. Shortly thereafter, however, it reverted to calling for "calm" and "dialogue" in resolving the crisis, in an indication that Beijing may not join in the Chapter 7 draft.

Kim conducted the test against the background of China and Japan holding their first summit meeting in years to mend relations soured by previous Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine honoring Japan’s war dead, including those convicted of war crimes. In the same vein, Abe was visiting Seoul for similar fence-mending talks with President Roh when the news hit him.

At Abe’s talks with Hu Jintao and Roh Moo Hyun, China and South Korea closed ranks with Japan announcing they will cooperate in responding firmly to the North’s provocation.

Whatever Kim sought to achieve with his nuclear test, he appears destined to pay a high price for his defiance. In Seoul, President Roh came under heavy criticisms for underestimating the North’s belligerence; the ruling center-left party began debating the need for overhauling his "sunshine" policy of reconciliation. Roh, normally accommodating of the North, has accused Pyongyang of "playing with fire." By far the biggest casualty of the North Korean test is Roh himself and his engagement policy.

With the ruling party members of parliament alarmed at the growing prospect of losing the forthcoming presidential election slated for December 2007, their policy of accommodation and reconciliation based on largess for the Kim regime will undoubtedly be entirely overhauled. Among the prospective casualties of the policy review are the Kumgang Mountain tourism project, which the Roh government has subsidized with taxpayer money and the Kaesong Industrial complex for which South Korean businessmen have invested tens of millions of dollars. Halting these two projects will have the effect of choking the financial pipeline to Pyongyang worth tens of millions of dollars each year. Even without the nuclear blast, Seoul is already under pressure to modify these payments under the recently passed UN resolution banning money transfer.

Suspension of the money flow will deliver a staggering blow to the North’s battered economy, which depends on China and South Korea for food and fuel following the 1994-2000 famine that reportedly killed up totwo million people—but even more crippling will be imposition of military blockade by the US. In the worst-case scenario, such a blockade, by adding military pressure over food shortage, could shake the regime’s foundation. China is reportedly petrified by the prospects of millions of hungry North Koreans flooding into its territory in the event of regime collapse or other forms of instability. Beijing could be exaggerating this danger, but there’s no denying that an unstable Pyongyang is the last crisis China wants along its 1400-km border with North Korea.

That makes it unlikely for China to use its leverage to stop Pyongyang from abandoning its nuclear capability. A reunification of the peninsula under the South’s control has never been China’s option, given the North’s role as a buffer against Japan and the US. Already sharing borders with three of the world’s five nuclear powers, China does not want a military confrontation with the US across the border with the North. Given this strategic imperative, the US options on North Korea seem indeed limited.