Moles And Scotch & Soda Friends

My dictionary describes a mole as a "spy, who has infiltrated anorganisation and become a trusted member of it." In the craft ofintelligence, it has over the years come to acquire a looser meaning. A mole is a person consciously agreeing to work for a foreign intelligence agency eitherin return for a consideration (money, gifts etc) or favour (which could besexual or otherwise) or under pressure (blackmail). He is an informallycontracted employee of the agency, who performs the intelligence-collection ordecision-influencing or other tasks such as planting a bugging device given tohim by the agency. He is under the control of the agency and obliged to performthe tasks allotted to him.

Ever since India became independent in 1947, there have been many instancesof Indian public servants working as moles for the US Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) and other foreign agencies. Amongst the recent examples, one couldmention a ministerial employee in the office of Dr P.C.Alexander, formerPrincipal Secretary to Mrs.Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, who was allegedlyfound working for the French intelligence, the head of the Chennai office of theResearch & Analysis Wing (R&AW), who was allegedly found working for anofficer of the CIA posted in the US Consulate in Chennai when Rajiv Gandhi wasthe Prime Minister, a senior officer of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) posted inthe IB's headquarters, who was found allegedly working for a woman officer ofthe CIA posted in the US Embassy in New Delhi, when Narasimha Rao and Dev Gowdawere the Prime Ministers, Maj (retd) Rabinder Singh, an officer of theR&AW posted in its headquarters, who was found allegedly working for a CIAofficer posted in the US Embassy in New Delhi when Shri A.B.Vajpayee was thePrime Minister, and the recently reported arrests of two information technologyexperts of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), which is part ofthe Prime Minister's Office, for allegedly working for a woman CIA officerposted in the US Embassy in New Delhi.

The case of Rabinder Singh was unique because before he could be interrogatedhis controlling officer in the US Embassy helped him to flee to the US. If mediareports are to be believed, Rabinder Singh fled to the US with a US passportissued to him under a different name. This amounted to the CIA admitting that hewas its mole in the R&AW. To my knowledge, this was the only instance since1947 when the CIA had considered it necessary to help its mole to escapeinterrogation by the Indian counter-intelligence authorities. In all otherdetected cases, the CIA discarded its detected Indian moles like used condomsafter their utility ended due to exposure of their links with the CIA.

That is why I suspect that Rabinder Singh must have been just the tip of theCIA iceberg in the R&AW and possibly even in the corridors of power in NewDelhi. The CIA made him flee to the US, even at the risk of a misunderstandingwith India, in order to pre-empt the danger of the exposure of the identities ofother moles, who have apparently been more useful to the US. Rabinder Singhprobably knew their identities.

The CIA uses a second category of people in our establishment for thecollection of intelligence and for influencing decisions in a directionfavourable to US interests. These are the casual contacts, well placed in governmentwith access to sensitive intelligence or in a position to influencedecision-making. They are not under the control of the CIA officers and notobliged to perform the tasks allotted to them. Despite this, they facilitate thework of the CIA and promote the interests of the US. Whereas a mole knowinglybetrays Indian interests, a casual contact often does it without realising thathe is doing so. In this category would come people well-disposed towards the US,loose-talkers and persons given to bragging in order to show off theirimportance in the decision-making process. A founding father of the R&AWjocularly used to call such casual contacts Scotch & Soda (S&S)contacts .

New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai are suspected to be full of suchS&S contacts of the CIA. Whatever might be the state of the relations of theUS with India, many Indians have an uncritical admiration for the US and like tointeract more readily with American diplomats than with other foreign diplomats.Their tongues get loosened when they are in American company. Their ego istickled when they have an opportunity of interacting with American diplomats anddo not hesitate to talk freely with them throwing caution to the winds. Veryoften, such interactions with casual contacts are used by the CIA for spottinglikely moles, who may be amenable to a conscious recruiting approach bythe CIA officer.

In 1983, some details of a top secret meeting held by Mrs Indira Gandhi todiscuss an urgent request for military assistance from a friendly foreigncountry leaked to the Americans. One was told that enquiries indicated that theleakage was probably due to loose talking by one of the participants at MrsGandhi's meeting during a dinner hosted by an American diplomat andnot due to a mole.

A lot of sensitive intelligence also leaks out due to the sheer carelessnessand a lack of security consciousness of our political leaders and other publicservants. A minister, who had accompanied Rajiv Gandhi on an important foreignvisit, left in his car, belonging to the host government, a pad containing topsecret briefing papers given to him by his ministry. He did not even realisethat he had left the pad in the car till the local government driver returned itto him later.

It is believed that the intelligence agencies of the erstwhile USSR and Chinahad many co-operative contacts--but not necessarily moles--in the Indiancommunist parties. They willingly shared with the officers of the agenciesinformation coming to their notice because of their ideological sympathies withthe USSR and China. Similarly, it is believed that the CIA had some co-operativecontacts in the Congress Party, who shared intelligence with the CIA officersand other American diplomats. Ideologically, they identified themselves with theUS and felt uncomfortable with what they perceived as the pro-Soviet policiesfollowed by their party.

One was given to understand that the CIA had at least three such co-operativecontacts in the Council of Ministers of Jawaharlal Nehru and one in the Cabinetof Indira Gandhi.

In the current debate on the role of Indian moles working for the CIA duringthe prime ministership of Narasimha Rao, two instances have been mentioned. Thefirst instance has been cited by Shri Jaswant Singh, former Foreign Minister, onthe basis of a letter purported to have been written by a US diplomat to amember of the US Congress regarding India's nuclear programme. Shri JaswantSingh claims that this letter was triggered off by sensitive intelligenceallegedly leaked to the diplomat by a suspected mole in the office of NarasimhaRao. He also claims to know the identity of the mole, but has not divulged it tothe public. I have some reservations in my mind about the document citedby Shri Jaswant Singh. It is rather unusual for an American diplomat to addresssuch a letter to a member of the Congress.

The second instance cited by Shri Keki Daruwalla, former Chairman of theJoint Intelligence Committee (JIC), is much more serious and credible. Accordingto him, a senior US diplomat had come to know of the details of a top secretmeeting held in his office in 1994 to discuss India's missilecapabilities. He has said, in a media interview, that he had sent a note on thesuspected leakage to the then Cabinet Secretary. The leakage could have occurredeither through one of the participants in the meeting or through a buggingdevice got planted by the CIA. One does not know whether the then CabinetSecretary referred Shri Daruwalla's note to the IB for an enquiry and if so,what was the outcome. If he had done so, the IB would have definitelyinterviewed Shri Daruwalla to get a first-hand account of his suspicions. Thefact that the IB did not do so would indicate that Shri Daruwalla's suspicionswere probably not referred to the IB for an enquiry.

Our nuclear tests in 1998 took the US by surprise. A subsequent enquiryordered by Mr Bill Clinton, the then US President, attributed the surprise tothe CIA's inadequate stock of moles in the Indian political and scientificestablishments and the skilful concealment techniques adopted by our scientists,which fooled the US satellites. Since then, the US intelligence, which wasalready aggressively active in India before 1998, has further stepped up itsefforts to recruit well-placed moles in India. There is reason to believe thatthe CIA's budget for intelligence collection in India has been considerablyenhanced. It is said that it incurs the largest expenditure in China, followedby Pakistan and India.

In our enthusiasm for multi-dimensional relations with the US, we should notlet our guard down and let ourselves be penetrated by the CIA even more than inthe past.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia.