Life After The Chinese Cracker

The Seoul Nuclear Suppliers’ Group Summit on June 23-24 is widely being seen as the first diplomatic setback for Narendra Modi. His supporters, keen as they were to see India doing even better than ‘the one-time waiver’ it got in 2008 under the Manmohan Singh government, are disappointed that it did not find a membership in this elite club.

His detractors see this as a much needed reality-check for the ‘high-flying’ Prime Minister. They feel Modi will take hard lessons from last week’s development to realize that the world of diplomacy is a little more than creating spectacles in different parts of the globe through much-publicized visits.

The Indian establishment holds China as the one country that was primarily responsible for keeping it out of the NSG. This view, gaining wide acceptance in the country, has now opened the door wide for the pro-American lobby to push India further in a stronger and tighter strategic embrace of the United States.

Taking advantage of the ‘anti-China’ sentiment in wake of the Seoul Summit the pro-Washington group in the Indian strategic community is now arguing for Delhi to end its ambiguity and wholeheartedly join the US-coalition against Beijing, particularly in dealing with developments in the East and South China Seas.

They feel that Sino-Indian partnership where the two countries are supposed to work closely in cooperation with each other to make the 21st century a truly ‘Asian century’ is a concept that remains mainly on paper. China, according to them, misses no opportunity to prevent India from attaining its rightful place at the global stage and therefore, India should also join forces, particularly the US-led coalition in Asia, to contain China and deal with its assertive rise.

But in the post-Seoul scenario some important questions that got buried under the ensuing debate needs to be looked at more carefully. First, China, unlike 2008 where it had not publicly aired its opposition to India, had made it clear right from the beginning that it was in no mood to bend the existing rules—where all NSG members also have to be a signatory of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—to accommodate fresh applicants in the Group.

Much of its opposition to India’s membership definitely came in view of Pakistan, which too had applied for a NSG membership, but Beijing’s opposition was well-known to Delhi.

It is true that by engaging President Pranab Mukherjee, the foreign secretary S. Jaishankar and finally the Prime Minister, South Block did try to enlist Beijing’s support. But it also continued to give out contrary signals and statements on developments in South China Sea, stressing on ‘freedom of navigation’ which the Chinese and others see as a euphemism for the US’ navy being able to patrol close to China’s coastline. Moreover, just a few days before the crucial NSG Summit India went ahead with the Malabar exercise with the US and Japanese navies close to the Chinese coastline.

Additionally, one wonders how much ground work was done by the Indian establishment to ensure that all the other countries in the 48-member NSG, despite the Chinese opposition, were firmly committed to see India in the NSG as a full member. The Seoul Summit made it clear that nearly a quarter of the members in the NSG, including some of the countries where Modi had visited to enlist their support, were ambiguous in opening up the Group’s membership at this juncture, even to accommodate India.

And finally, one must ask the logic behind South Block’s high-profile campaign for India’s membership in the NSG. Instead of relying on quiet diplomacy and behind the scene negotiations with key NSG members, especially potential ‘nay sayers,’ the Ministry of External Affairs decided not only to trumpet each engagement in the media but also put the Prime Minister on the frontline. Every single visit of Modi’s was highlighted to achieve the only goal: enlisting support from countries in the NSG to India’s membership.

It is a point to be noted that despite its initial failure, India’s quite diplomacy worked successfully in ensuing a place for it in an equally important body—the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). One can argue that China’s absence in that body made things easier for India. But the fact that India had been trying to get in this body for some years now and was also rejected in the previous year, shows that quiet diplomacy often has better chance to succeed than highly publicized ones.

The question, therefore, uppermost in the minds of many observers is whether Narendra Modi can now do what the previous BJP government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee had managed in wake of India’s Pokhran II nuclear test I May 1998. It had cited China as the ‘main threat’ to its security as a reason for going nuclear. This was mainly done to engage with the Americans and enlist its support to ensure India does not get isolated internationally in the wake of its nuclear tests. But the Vajpayee leadership also realized the importance of China and soon after made all efforts to engage with it in a serious manner.

The engagement between the two led to some serious confidence-building-measures where the two sides not only started the ‘ Special Representatives’ dialogue to address the unresolved boundary issue, but also got China to recognize Sikkim as part of India and subsequently entered into a ‘Strategic Partnership’ with India.

Modi has to now calm the ‘anti-Chinese’ sentiments in the country and give out a clear signal that relation with no country is based on a single issue. Therefore, India will continue to engage with China in a more robust manner to expand the areas of cooperation that are mutually beneficial for both countries. And in doing so, he will also be able to give out the signal that despite provocations, he is not willing to end India’s sovereign foreign policy by joining any alliance led by the US to corner China.

He has already indicated that after his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Tashkent he is hopeful that the process that began in the NSG in Seoul will be taken further and lead to a membership of India in the coming months. Modi will get two more chances at least of engaging with Xi—during the G-20 Summit in China and at the BRICS Summit in India later this year. Hopefully, these will lead to further consolidation of Sino-Indian relations in future.

On his part Xi is also required to make a proper assessment of the Chinese position to determine whether China’s support to Pakistan should come only at the expense of India. Like most countries, the Chinese political structure is also not a monolithic one. It also has its various lobbies that keep contesting with each other to determine and formulate key policies. If China manages to overcome its current opposition in extending support to India’s entry in the NSG, it will be seen as a major confidence building measure in strengthening Sino-Indian relations in the coming days.