After nearly eight years of peace talks, it now appears to be clear that the faction of the rebel National Socialist Council of Nagaland headed by chairman Isak Chishi Swu and general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM) is ready to give up its demand for a 'sovereign' Naga homeland. New Delhi is obviously happy, and, consequently, not rejecting outright the next best option that the NSCN-IM is pushing for - the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the Northeast with the existing state of Nagaland to constitute a single politico-administrative unit.
By failing to gather the courage to tell the NSCN-IM leadership that the redrawing of the maps of this volatile region was no easy task, however, the government of India will not only lose the Naga rebel group, sooner rather than later when this reality has to be faced, but will also create more enemies within.
This was more than demonstrated in the June 2001 uprising in Manipur when New Delhi announced the extension of the ceasefire with the NSCN-IM "without territorial limits", which was interpreted by the people as a prelude to slicing off Naga-dominated areas of the state for integration in a 'Greater Nagaland'. The bloody protests that forced a reversal of that announcement - eighteen protestors were killed in police firing in the capital, Imphal, the Manipur state Assembly Complex and dozens of government buildings were set ablaze by angry mobs - are still fresh in the minds of the people of the region.
It is not the NSCN-IM, but New Delhi that is to blame for the lack of direction in its handling of the peace negotiations. The Manmohan Singh-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government had stated in its Common Minimum Programme (CMP) that "the territorial integrity of existing states will be maintained" in the Northeast, and that existing geographical boundaries would not be altered. If that is indeed the position of the Congress-led coalition in New Delhi, the question of redrawing the map of the northeastern states should not arise.
Regrettably, New Delhi has tended to muddy the waters, and Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil's contradictory statements over the past week have exposed an insensitivity to both the sentiments of the NSCN-IM and of the people in the states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, whose territory the Naga rebel group has set its sights on.
On a visit to Assam's capital Guwahati, Patil reminded journalists about the UPA's stand on not altering existing geographical boundaries of the states. Once back in Delhi, however, Patil refused to confirm reports that had quoted him on this, and his ministry officials said they were not aware of Patil having given any assurances to anyone in Assam, Manipur or Arunachal Pradesh that their territories would not be dismembered.
On February 3, 2005, moreover, after a meeting with Patil, NSCN-IM leader Muivah declared that the Home Minister had made it clear to them that the issue of integration of Naga areas would definitely constitute part of the negotiations that would follow between the insurgent outfit and the group of Union Ministers specially appointed to raise the peace talks to a political level.
On its part, the NSCN-IM has been consistent on its integration demand, while it has now chosen silence on its key slogan of an independent Naga homeland. At the end of the two-day Naga People's Consultative Meeting that ended on January 21, 2005, at Camp Hebron, the NSCN-IM headquarters near Nagaland's commercial hub, Dimapur, the rebel group issued a four-point declaration:
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- unification of all Naga inhabited areas is a legitimate demand of the Nagas and therefore non-negotiable;
- support for an honourable solution to the 'Indo-Naga problem' should be on the basis of the uniqueness of Naga history and situation;
- political solution should be found through peaceful means;
- government of India and the NSCN-IM should both uphold utmost honesty and sincerity towards reaching a political solution.
The NSCN-IM has come to regard the decision arrived at the Consultative Meeting, attended by up to 10,000 people, as a 'mandate' from the Nagas for the integration of all areas inhabited by them. Armed with this 'mandate', Muivah stated in an interview at New Delhi on February 1, 2005, that any attempt by the government of India to resolve the Naga issue by 'appeasing' the Assamese, Meiteis (of Manipur) or the Arunachalese, would be futile.
Muivah & Co. have certainly hardened their position on the integration issue, though there is a parallel and clear realization that pushing for sovereignty was not going to lead to a solution of the 58-year-long insurrection. The next best alternative, from their perspective, was clearly to try and annex parts of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh to achieve a 'Greater Nagaland.'
New Delhi is certainly aware of the public mood in the three states bordering Nagaland. Any dismemberment of their geographical boundaries would certainly lead to mass violence. Nevertheless, the centre appears still to be hoping to concede some areas to the Nagas in the hope of ending the protracted conflict. In this, the UPA government at the Centre may be gambling on the expectation that it may be able to bulldoze the Congress-ruled states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh into accepting whatever decision it might eventually take to 'solve' the Naga problem. This may tempt the Manmohan Singh government to push things forward in a hurry, before a non-Congress government comes to rule any of these three states. Only Congress Governments would be prepared to listen to the 'high command', though even that is suspect in the present case.
A tricky situation confronts the Indian government negotiators in the days ahead. If the talks with the NSCN-IM hinge on signals for the integration of the Naga areas, a sharp polarization of rebel and mainstream forces is bound to take place in Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. Insurgent groups in these three states are most likely to close ranks with the otherwise moderate sub-national forces and pressure groups, triggering mass uprisings. If New Delhi is then forced to change its soft approach towards the NSCN-IM on the issue of integration, the Naga rebel group could be pushed to the wall, and react by either snapping or threatening to snap the prevailing truce, to begin with. Either way, Delhi's ambivalence is progressively trapping it in a Catch 22 situation, with no solution and no winners in sight.
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Wasbir Hussain is Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
