Jammu V/s Kashmir

Unlike the sustained uprising in Kashmir in 1990 which was mostly orchestrated by Pakistani trained operatives, the uprising in the summer of 2008 was mostly indigenous, spontaneous and massive.The opening salvo, it would seem, was fired discreetly by the coalition partner, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Networking with a group of seasoned journalists who write for Srinagar-based newspapers, the PDP let out a canard ahead of the state cabinet meeting on May 20, 2008, that the Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board (SASB) under the patronage of its Chairman, the Governor of thestate, was planning to construct a large township in Baltal, to be named Amarnath Nagar, near the holy Amarnath Cave. There were other, even more serious accusations, the most disturbing of which was that the Governor was trying to change the demographics of the valley by using the SASB authority to resettle nonresident Hindus in the region.

It took time for this news to make the rounds among Kashmiri political analysts and public. The PDP hadperhaps hoped that Kashmir would be on fire by the time thestate cabinet would meet on Tuesday, May 20, 2008, but that did not happen. In the local media, other than a story or two, the SASB episode was treated with the same mixture of curiosity and disdain as the "Pakistani currency" or the "joint management of Baglihar hydel project," and a few other odd nuggets that PDP habitually threwout like the proverbial hand grenades once in a while.

Perhaps the most significant story on the SASB-related rumors was printed on 11th May 2008 in the leading pro-separatist newspaper in the valley, where a well respected political commentator mixed nationalism with religious chauvinism in opposing the "so-called Hindu invasion" by declaring, "Islam is a reality in Kashmir, which was chosen here by the people to liberate themselves from the highly oppressive social, economic and religious order established by the Brahaminical system." The same journalist would later claim that "the saddest part of the debate surrounding the Amarnath Yatra is that it has attained communal colors, when the question is fundamentally environmental." But that would come much later.

Interestingly, both senior PDP ministers -- the Law Minister Muzaffar Hussain Baig (who also served as the Deputy Chief Minister) and the Forest Minister Qazi Mohammad Afzal-- attended the May 20 cabinet meeting. Neither of the PDP ministers made any specific objections when the cabinet voted in favor of the Forest Department’s written recommendation to allow the SASB request seeking non-proprietary transfer of 38.88 hectares (about 800 kanals) of land toSASB. It should be remembered that the SASB had made the request for nearly 180 hectares in 2004 and it had taken nearly four years of due diligence, reviews, court orders, negotiations and official approvals by various departments and ministries that eventually ended up paring down the original request for land transfer to the very minimum for building comfort facilities for Hindu pilgrims in transit.

The Cabinet Decision Number 94/7 of May 20, 2008, clearly states that the SASB has only non-proprietary rights to the land and is explicit regarding the compensation that must precede any construction -- a payment of Rs. 2,31,30,400, and an additional Rs. 19,94,000 on account of compensatory afforestation to be carried over twice the requested land surface (79.66 hectares). The Cabinet Order also mentions that SASB had agreed to follow strict ecological damage containment before proceeding with any construction: it would take all possible environmental safeguards in consultation with the State Soil Conservation Department, State Pollution Control Board, State Forest Department and even the orders of the Indian Supreme Court.

Following the cabinet meeting, the Forest Department issued Government Order No:184-FST of 2008 dated May 26, 2008, transferring land to SASB under terms listed in the Cabinet Decision 94/7. It was clear to all parties that transfer process would not be completed until the landwas demarcated, and no construction would take place until the SASB made the advance payment of Rs. 2 crores. Incidentally, neither of these actions was taken.

But, it would seem that the former Chief Minister (CM) Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, who had never reconciled to having been replaced by someone from the Jammu region, was not yet ready to give up. Recall that it was his daughter and theparty president, Mehbooba Mufti, who during the power sharing negotiations between the PDP and the Congressparty, following the fall 2002 elections, had declared that, "blood will flow in streets of Srinagar if a non-valley politician becomes the chief minister."

Mufti Sayeed, after stepping down as the CM in October 2005, had treated the new Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad with utter disdain, going repeatedly over his head to discuss state matters directly with the national Congressparty leadership that should have been normally discussed within the state coalition. This was not accidental – Mufti knew that the "Delhi Durbar" always had the last word in so far as Kashmir is concerned. The Durbar courtiers – modern day political nawabs – had more power and authority than the CM.

Ghulam Nabi Azad had spent a long time in the Durbar and tormented Dr. Farooq Abdullah when the latter was the CM. Now,ironically enough, it was Azad’s turn to be on the receiving end, and Mufti, by running to New Delhi, was making things difficult for him. Azad was well meaning and honest, but having spent a lifetime in the Delhi Durbar meant that he was mostly ignorant of the opportunistic, corrupt and sycophantic nature of Kashmiri politics. Simply put, Azad was not "rascal enough" to be an effective chief minister of the state.

Following the issuance of the Government Order by the PDP led forest ministry; Mufti kept working behind-the-scenes on a separate but a related issue that was crucial to his future plans. This dealt with uncertainty regarding selection of the new state Governor. Mufti had a long standing feud with Governor S. K. Sinha and Amarnath yatra was in fact a leading cause of friction between the two.

While the SASB was formed after being voted in the state assembly during the time that the National Conference (NC) was in power, Mufti did his best to scuttle the pilgrimage in every way possible after he became the new CM. It seemed to matter little to him if yatris were not properly housed or protected because to himthe whole idea of Hindu pilgrimage to Kashmir was perhaps an abhorrent thought.

In 2000, as many as 22 people were massacred by terrorists during the yatra in a series of communal attacks attributed to Lashker-e-Toiba (LeT) that year. Seven pilgrims and five workers were killed in a terrorist strikethe next year during the pilgrimage. In 2002, 8 people were killed and 30 injured by terrorist strikes and the SASB, finding the state efforts lukewarm and indifferent, sought authority from the state to protect pilgrims.

But Mufti did not even bother to reply to the letter from the SASB Board. The matter ended in the J&KState High Court, where in two rulings in 2005 (Mufti sought the higher bench ruling after the first court decision went against him), the verdict was identical – SASB had the responsibility to set the timing and define security needs for the yatra. Mufti,it would seem, never recovered from that judicial defeat and never reconciled with the Governor.

The term of Governor Sinha was expiring on June 4, 2008. Mufti wanted him out but Governor Sinha wanted to extend his stay, and more importantly, Chief Minister Azad liked the Governor and wanted him to continue in the post. This was unacceptable to Mufti, who was working very hard in the Delhi Durbar to force a change, and as usual was able to trounce Azad.

Among the candidates under consideration was N. N. Vohra, a distinguished Indian public servant who had served at the highest levels in the Indian bureaucracy and was the Prime Minister’spersonal interlocutor on Kashmir. Mufti pushed for Vohra and on June 3, the central government announced Mr. Vohra as replacement for Gen. Sinha. The only thing that was uncertain was the date on which the changeover would happen becauseGen Sinha kept postponing his departure. Once it was publicly announced that Vohra would take over as the Governor on June 25, Mufti went for the kill.

First, most media elements took upon themselves to ignore the SASB dispute in terms of being a sordid drama and an exercise in crass political opportunism between two coalition partners ahead of the upcoming state election. Second, the"civil society" intelligentsia began sounding drumbeats of an earlier turbulent era and,after starting to harp on the "threat to Islam" theme, stepped up their rhetoric in public.

On June 23, a leading pro-separatist daily in Srinagar ran the story (dated June 22)saying that it "had documents in its possession that the construction of pucca buildings[was] going on a war footing at Dumhel, one of the resting points for Amaranath Cave bound pilgrims." Baltal Traders Association was co-opted to express its indignation which was prominently splashed by thedaily. The fact that SASB was in no position – legally or otherwise – to start any permanent construction was of little interest tothe rabble rousers.

Sadly, the daily would not tell its readers that the J&K government had after1996 -- when 250 pilgrims died due to heavy snowfall during the yatra and before the passage of the SASB Act in thestate assembly in 2000 -- built a number of permanent comfort facilities for pilgrims. In fact, the earliest such structures were built in1980s. Also, the media conveniently ignored that the SASB had donated most of its tear-down comfort facility kits to the people of Tangdhar and Uri after the October 2005 earthquake and there was an urgent need tobuild replacement facilities along the yatra route.

The same day (June 23), having received confirmation that Governor Sinha would be replaced, the father and daughter duoseemed to have lobbed another incendiary device and like master tacticians disappeared from thescene: Mufti announcing that he was headed to America for medical checkup and the daughter to a seminar in London. The "bomb" was an ultimatum to their coalition partner – Congressparty – that if the Government Order 184-FST was not revoked by June 30, PDP would pull out of the government. It was not a difficult decision for the PDP as they believed that they would improve their political standing in an election, especially with Sinha gone for good. Mufti Sayeed had initially indicated that he would exit the country before the new Governor took over, buthe did not actually leave for the U.S. until after attending Governor Vohra’s oath ceremony on June 25.

The Muftis are, after all, masters in harnessing communal tension towards a political advantage. They had executed similar tactics in the past, and the one that seems particularly apt, as reminded to me by a journalist friend in Srinagar, was in 1986 when Mufti ran a similar dirty campaign which targeted Kashmiri Pandits in the Anantnag district that led to burning and loot of hundreds of Pandit properties and temples and caused the fall of the Gul Shah government. In fact, the record shows that Mufti has been involved in triggeringthe maximum number of central government interventions in the state through the Governor’s rule, hoping to improve his political standing in subsequent elections.

While Muftis were conducting their divorce proceedings with the Azad-ledcoalition government in public, the valley newspapers were having a field day. Suddenly, a new picture emerged in the valley. Almost every editor and columnist tried to outdo each other in rhetoric anddemagoguery. The SASB, a creation of the state assembly eight years earlier, got transformed by the media into an alien institution, imposed by Indian authorities, a state-within-a-state, and a conspiracy that was at the vanguard of a Hindu invasion in the valley.

None of this was true, but it mattered little to the Kashmir’s civil society that habitually behaves as an appendage to separatistorganisations mixing human rights, commercial interests and politicking to feed personal egos, bank accounts and community interests. Chief Minister Azad was more focused on his political problems and totally glossed over the changes taking placeon the street.

The streets were about to erupt. The public had already been informed that a delegation of Hurriyat, consisting of Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Prof. Abdul Gani Butt and Bilal Gani Lone, would be leaving for Pakistan on June 21. While the two Hurriyat factions were conducting their demonstrations against the SASB separately, Pakistani officials most likely advised Mirwaiz that he would receive a warmer welcome in Pakistan if he patched up with his nemesis, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, ahead of his trip to Pakistan. Besides, Geelani also wanted to change his posture and end public bickering with his former colleagues without appearing to compromise hisprinciples. The moment was therefore opportune to show unity against the SASB order. Even though all allegations were baseless, what mattered was that an opportunity had presented itself that could not be missed.

On June 18, Mirwaiz announced that he would meet with Geelani at the latter’s residence on June 19, to chalk out a "common resistance program" against the land transfer to SASB. At the meeting, they agreed to combine their efforts under the Action Committee against Land Transfer (ACALT) and put Mian AbdulQayyum, the former President of the Kashmir Bar Council who had in the past tried toeffect a patch up between these two leaders, in charge. Previously feuding Hurriyat cadre rolled into ACALT which took over the organization of street demonstrations, formation of public kitchens formeal- giveaways, and volunteer corps to manage auxiliaries.

On June 23, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, succeeded in escaping the police who wanted him interned at his residence in Hyderpora and leda joint demonstration near Gow Kadal. Elsewhere in the Shahr-e-Khas, the demonstrations got out of hand, pitched battles took place among demonstrators and police, and security booths were burnt down. The engagement with paramilitaries on that day led to a death (first of many that would follow) and many more were injured.

It is difficult to comprehend how a request to build brick-and-mortar lavatories at 10,000 ft altitude in an inhospitable area where not a tree grows and where it snows for nearly 8 months a year could be seen as a land give-away that could provoke sucha violent reaction. But this is Kashmir, where the powerful and the rich have succeeded in maintaining their authority and control ("the status quo") by hatching conspiracy theories and seeding alienation, while the poor pay the price and continue to stay poor.

Meanwhile, the three-member Hurriyat team reached Pakistan on June 21. Their most important day during the visit was Monday, June 23. On that day, they held many meetings in Islamabad but the three most important were with the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani in the morning, with the leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami Qazi Hussain Ahmed later in the day, and in the evening with the chief of the United Jihad Council (UJC) and leader of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) Syed Salahuddin in a local hotel.

Interestingly, the government of Pakistan made no public statements about either the Mirwaiz-Geelani "Common Resistance Program", or the uprising in the valley. Based onthe recent expose about ISI-Taliban nexus in planning and executing the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, and more recent violations of the Line of Control (LOC), it would appear that new Pakistani civil government is a confused lot and unsure of its Kashmir policy-- at least for now.

When the news of Hurriyat meetings in Islamabad hit the airwaves and print media in the valley on June 24, every district in the valley was witnessing massive outpouring of public outcry. Srinagar was brought to a complete shutdown and protests led to more defiance, more deaths and more injuries. Vandals destroyed public property (buildings, vehicles, etc.) and the total destruction of a recently rebuilt park that brought fresh life to the historic almond orchard at the foothills of the Hari Parbat hillock. The uprising seemed unstoppable.

The state government appeared paralysed. But more importantly, no one in the Delhi Darbar seemed to care. Delhi was busy with its own shenanigans dealing with the instability in the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition ruling thecenter, and the subject of Kashmir was as usual left to courtiers like Saifudin Soz and Makhan Lal Fotedar who are generally more critical of the man at the helm in Srinagar than hisdetracters.

The courtiers continued to believe that the PDP would not pull out of the government and asked Azad to convene an all party meeting to sort out the matter politically. Ironically, no one had any idea in New Delhi (since most reports from security services are routinely ignored, or worse not even read, by Delhi-based rulers) about the extent of damage that the PDP had caused not only to the state coalition but also inunleashing a deadly mix of nationalism and religious chauvinism in both regions of the state.

Given the state of affairs, it was no wonder that on Friday, June 27, following prayers in various city mosques, protesters raised anti-India, pro-Islam and pro-Pakistan slogans and raised not Pakistani flags (as reported in the media) but three green flags that bore the crescent-and-star logo of Islam on the clock tower of Srinagar’s historic Lal Chowk. As reported by the Greater Kashmir daily, the nearby contingent of local and Indian police personnel did not even raise their eyebrows.

On Saturday, June 28, PDP formally withdrew from the Congress-led coalition citing reluctance of theChief Minister to withdraw the Government Order 184-FST.