'Islamic Agenda'?

The October 1 election catapulted the Jamaat-I-Islami (Jamaat) and the IslamiOikya Jote (IOJ) to power as the smaller partners of the Bangladesh NationalistParty (BNP)-led government. But the same event also became the catalyst for anorchestrated attack by the Awami League (AL), the ideological nemesis of Islamicascendancy in Bangladesh politics.

Sheikh Hasina, the AL leader may not suffer from Islamophobia, but she isconvinced that the electoral coalescence of the two Islamic parties (and afaction of the Jatiya Party) with the BNP and their 'crude rigging' preventedher party from returning to power. So, the Islamists are the scourge that she isbent upon decapitating as a viable force!

The BNP-led alliance's spectacular victory has sparked off questions like:Are the Jamaat and IOJ poised to create an Islamic state? Does that electionshift the tectonics of Bangladesh politics?

Hasina looks upon the connection between the Jamaat and the BNP as a threatto her own political future. The Jamaat and the IOJ are in the government forthe first time in Bangladesh, but it is not a seismic transformation of nationalpolitics although some people may think so.

Bangladesh is at a new juncture of coalition politics that should send awarning to the political actors. A few among the Bangladeshi Islamistsattributed their success to the billowing pan-Islamic sentiment long beforeOsama bin Laden's shadow lengthened over the Muslim world. A diffused but widelyperceived Muslim identity possibly swayed the centrist BNP victory againstHasina's brand of secularism. But Islamic militancy was not the centrestage inthe election.

The most recent ruling party's (AL) performance in the last five years wasthe core issue of the 2001 election -- it was not fought on a do-or-die Islamicagenda. Yes, the Islamists and the BNP made a common  cause against the AL,but Khaleda Zia did not share the same manifesto with the Jamaat and the IOJ.This was the first election since 1991 when India did not figure as a prominentissue although the Jamaat and the IOJ joined the BNP as a unified electoralfront.

The secularists apprehend that the new Bangladesh Parliament, with two-thirdsmajority for the BNP and its partners, would push for an accelerated Islamicprogramme. Once the BNP-led alliance won the election, Maulana Nizami, theJamaat leader, now a minister, proposed a constitutional amendment to convertBangladesh into an Islamic state.

Khaleda has already disassociated herself from the Jamaat's desire toIslamize the country; and importantly, she has no compelling reason to do so.Any deliberate move to institutionalize orthodoxy in Bangladesh  politicswould be an uphill slog for the Jamaat and its cohorts in the near future.

The Islamic fervour at the state level, even in an incremental form, wouldgive the AL a rallying ground against the BNP-led government. But the BNPaccepts that the Muslim consciousness is an essential component of Bangladeshnationalism.

Hasina's dislike for the Islamic parties is clear, but a blatant denial ofthe electoral gains of the Jamaat and the IOJ would only provoke a stridentIslamic rage as we have seen in several Muslim countries. Besides the cabinetslots that they have achieved, the Jamaat (and to a lesser extent the IOJ)surely helped the BNP to stop the AL's re-election to power. The drasticallyreduced strength of the AL in the Sangshad now is a serious blow to Hasina.

Simply put, the BNP's decisive partnership with the Jamaat, a splinter of theJatiya Party (JP) and the IOJ has changed the political map of Bangladesh forthe coming five years. But the AL is using that unified feat as the road map todestabilize Khaleda.

Hasina's antics against the BNP and its partners are designed to avenge thehumiliating defeat on October 1. All the Islamic parties, put together, are notyet capable of winning a major electoral victory. They would need a partnershipwith one of the two larger parties.

However, for any such coalition, the Islamic parties will have to compromiseon their ideologies. Although there is no major election ahead of her, Hasinaworries that the estimated 10-12% right wing voters actually tilted the balanceof power against the AL.

According to one published report, the Jamaat got about 5% of the popularvotes in 2001, but its number of legislative seats jumped from 3 (1996) to 17. Ido not see any dramatic shift of popular votes towards the Islamic groupsalthough their legislative seats have increased, and their representatives inthe government might influence certain policies.

Narrow margins from a few hundred to a few thousand votes decided the winnersand losers in more than half of the 300 constituencies. The BNP-led alliance hasdone better than the AL in about 30 keenly contested constituencies.

I am not certain if the Islamic groups or simply a melange of floating votersheld the balance in such marginal contests. Only in-depth electoral studieswould establish the actual voting behaviour. If the Jamaat supporters or anarray of right wing voters held that balance of power, a juggernaut is hauntingthe AL.

Depending on the prospective electoral dynamics, the BNP-Islamist coalitionmight become a familiar political arrangement. A plethora of parties contestedthe last three elections, but the BNP and the AL are no doubt the two preferredparties, yet none of them decisively won in  the 1991 and 1996 elections.

It was the open and organized centre-right coalition in 2001 that broughtdecisive victory for the BNP, which is sharing power with its smaller partners.Has Bangladesh then become a 'two plus a couple-of-smaller-parties' system?

If the answer is yes, then none of the two major parties would possibly winwithout lesser partners who can mobilize about 5-10% of extra voters. For theirovert secular stance, the AL would possibly be shy of an open electoralassociation with the Jamaat although the two parties had worked together againstthe BNP regime in the past.

If there was a hung Parliament, Hasina would have invited General (retd.)Ershad's Islami Jatiya Oikya Front (IJOF) (his JP allied with a small Islamicfaction and won 14 seats), who were ready to join the AL to keep the BNP outof  power. Now the AL is foaming its scorn for the Islamists in the BNPgovernment!

Well known as it is, certain segments of the BNP do not like the coalitionwith the right wing groups and they might like to jettison the Islamic partnersfor the sake of neutralizing Hasina's assault on them.

Although the coalition has produced solid results for Khaleda, the fraternitybetween the BNP and the Jammat (and IOJ) is not yet a well-nourishedrelationship. It is too early to say how the centre-right coalition would workin power. In 1991 the Jamaat initially helped the BNP to form government but didnot claim any cabinet position.

The AL did not spare any tricks to break the BNP's united front -- Hasinacoerced Ershad to break away from the anti-AL combination. Many feared it wasthe end of the alliance that Khaleda put together. Hasina's second array ofmanoeuvers to further erode the combine also did not work.

Since the BNP won a clear majority without the partners, many argue that theywere not necessary for Khaleda to defeat Hasina. Any further chipping away ofthe BNP-led alliance would have been perceived as Khaleda's inability to holdthe coalition together on the eve of the election.

The Islamist bashing fits into the AL's larger anti-BNP strategy. Hasina isclose to screaming 'Our bin Ladens' at the Jamaat  leaders at a time whenthe whole world is caught in the US confrontation with Osama bin Laden.

Hasina hopes to be politically correct with her negative assertions againstthe newly elected Islamists in the BNP government and also to launch asuccessful battle against the new cabinet. She wants to put Khaleda in a spotand the AL is using BNP's Islamic partners as political tripwires.

Bangladesh has seen a deluge of political killings and communal rioting in several areas since the election and the AL is using such violence as apropaganda point against the recently sworn BNP-led government. Shrewdly, the ALis using the Hindu issue to further its cause against the BNP and its Islamistregime.

The AL wants to cash in on the Hindu fear of the Islamists and since theJamaat is part of the government now, the BNP administration is also part of theHindu problem in Bangladesh. Or so runs Hasina's attack.

Hasina's harangue against the BNP-government will not unfold as a majormovement, not even against its Islamic partners. It is too soon for an agitationto take off after the new election. The earlier the AL realizes that it lost theelection for its own failures, the better it is for the party's prospects in thefuture.

To believe otherwise would only weaken the AL, unable to be an effectiveopposition, and incapable of building winning coalitions in the future.

M. Rashiduzzaman, from Bangladesh, teaches Political Science at the RowanUniversity, Glassboro, New Jersey.