Instant Deals, Lasting Peace?

The third Roundtable Conference, chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, was convened at New Delhi on April 24, 2007, amid the usual boycotts and condemnations by extremist and separatist groups. The deliberations focused primarily on recommendations of four of the five Working Groups that were formed in the Second Roundtable in May 2006. The five Working Groups focused on:confidence-building measures across segments of society in J&K; strengthening relations across the Line of Control (LoC); economic development; ensuring good governance; and strengthening relations between thestate and the centre. While four Working Groups have completed their deliberations and submitted their reports, the group oncentre-state relations is likely to hold another one or two sittings to finalise its report. 

Predictably, the terrorist groups rejected the Roundtable Conference. In a jointstatement, the Al-Nasireen, Farzandan-e-Millat, Save Kashmir Movement and Al-Arifeen (believed to be front outfits of the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed) said tripartite or bilateral talks and conferences were putting the Kashmir issue into the "cold storage" and its solution lay only in the UN resolutions.

While the major separatist groups, including the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), unsurprisingly boycotted the Roundtable, participants from mainstream political parties and representatives of other sections of the society endorsed suggestions of the Working Groups. These, if implemented, could provide relief and rehabilitation to widows, orphans and other victims of militancy and violence, simplify procedures to facilitate travel across the LoC, enhance cross-border linkages, expand people-to-people contact, including promotion of pilgrimage and group tourism, increase responsiveness, accountability and transparency of the administration, strengthen localself-government, institute zero tolerance for human rights violations, provide other economic benefits, etc. The fifth group oncentre-state relations is to deliberate on matters relating to the special status of Jammu and Kashmir within the IndianUnion and methods of strengthening democracy, secularism and the rule of law in thestate. This group (it evidently handles the more contentious issues, perhaps explaining the delay in its report submission) will also deliberate on effective devolution of powers among different regions to meet regional, sub-regional and ethnic aspirations.

Even if a handful of these measures are implemented effectively in the immediate future, it would go a long way in providing some relief to the terrorism-wrackedstate. But the trajectory of the past provides very limited space for optimism. The record of implementation of legislation and executive decisions has been appalling not just in J&K but across many conflict theatres and in the country as a whole. 

One of the glaring imperfections of the Roundtable was appropriately conveyed by Agnisekhar, Chairman of the Panun Kashmir (A-faction), a group fighting for the rights of the Kashmiri Pandits, who have been displaced by the jihadis from their ancestral homes in the Valley. Pointing to serious "omissions" in this regard, he noted, "It is amazing that the perpetrators of violence and the victims are being weighed on the same scale." It is, indeed, important to also note, as an earlier Conference of representatives from all parts of undivided J&K recorded, that "the discourse on Jammu and Kashmir is currently and overwhelmingly defined by those who resort to terrorism, their sponsors and their frontorganisations."

On the ground in J&K, the secular decline in terrorist violence, a trend discernible since 2001, continues. But the terrorists’ capacity to strike at important targets and to maintain a threshold level of violence, nevertheless, remains undiminished. Approximately 219 people, including 79 civilians and 111 terrorists, have already died in militancy-related violence in 2007 (Data till April 27. Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal). 

According to the Annual Report 2006-07 of the union home ministry, during 2006, the number of incidents was lower by 16 per cent, those of civilians killed by 30 per cent and Security Forces (SF) killed by 20 per cent, over previous year. 

Meanwhile, Pakistan and its proxies continue to demand ‘demilitarization’ in J&K, with Srinagar, Kupwara and Baramulla identified as the three areas where a withdrawal of the Army is sought. President Pervez Musharraf has claimed that such a move would help build the 'impetus for peace'. The issue of troop reduction has been a central part of Pakistan's long-standing demands on Kashmir and had, in the past, been projected as a pre-condition for talks with India. The demand for demilitarization also gives an indication of the end-game Musharraf proposes, comprehending a partition of the Valley under which thesedistricts, with overwhelming Muslim majorities, would be ceded to Pakistan.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, however, has repeatedly stated that demilitarization and progress in the peace process could only be contingent on a cessation of cross-border infiltration and terrorist violence. To the extent that terrorist violence continues in J&K, there is no rationale for any dilution of operational military presence. 

A scrutiny of the trajectory of violence in J&K helps understand why General Musharraf is insisting on troop withdrawal specifically from these locations, and indicates that the rationale goes beyond concern for the 'impetus for peace' or for the welfare of the people of Kashmir. Further, it goes well beyond the fact that Kupwara and Baramulla aredistricts close to the LoC. Baramulla and Kupwara have traditionally served as a gateway to terrorism in the Kashmir Valley, and have, for long, been crucial to the jihad in Kashmir. 

With borders that are mountainous and heavily forested, Baramulla and Kupwara are two neighbouringdistricts to the north and northwest of the Valley, with their topography clearly demonstrating their strategic importance. Baramulla, spread over 4,588 square kilometres, is bordered by Kupwara in the north, Budgam and Poonchdistricts in the south, parts of the summer capital, Srinagar, and Ladakh in the east, and Muzaffarabad, capital of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), in the west. Kupwara (2,379 square kilometres) was carved out of Baramulladistrict in 1979. To the east and south of Kupwara is Baramulla, while in the west and north is the LoC, which separates it from Muzaffarabad. According to those who oversee security in J&K, the prevailing situation in the twodistricts does not warrant any re-adjustment of the counter-insurgency grid, and any dilution offorces is bound to affect the grid and the security base. 

Terrorist groups active in the districts include the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), which has a northern division for Kupwara-Bandipora-Baramulla; Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT; also known as the Jama’at-ud-Da’awa), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Al Umar Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen and Al Badr. Kupwara and Baramulla witness high levels of infiltration and terrorist activity, and any lowering of guard there would allow the terrorists, who have been under extraordinary pressure lately, to regroup and recover lost ground. It would also mean granting unhindered access to the Valley, especially to capital Srinagar, which is to the south-east of Baramulla. 

Being border districts adjacent to the LoC, any withdrawal of troops from Baramulla and Kupwara would undermine the internal security grid and would facilitate infiltration into the Valley. The operational advantage in thesedistricts, vis-à-vis the execution of operations, accruing primarily due to terrain and location, lies with the terrorists. Troop withdrawal would simply cede the entire territory to the terrorists. Furthermore, the flow of actionable intelligence of terrorist movement into otherdistricts in J&K would also be adversely affected. 

Although official sources indicate that infiltration was down marginally by four percent in 2006 over 2005, there are apprehensions that militancy could escalate once the snow melts on the mountain passes along the LoC. Intelligence inputs indicated that terrorist groups were planning "a calibrated infiltration during the forthcoming summer to ease pressure from the security forces." In his three-page letter to former J&K Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed on March 15, 2007, the Prime Minister himself has cited "intelligence inputs that suggest that militants might raise the level of violence in coming months." Sources added that infiltration continues with constantly changing ingress routes and new techniques being deployed. Theunion home ministry has noted that there is "infiltration of better-trained and professional groups, equipped in breaching fences and negotiating hurdles." For the record, during 2006, an estimated 573 infiltrators crossed over into Jammu and Kashmir (Source: Annual Report 2006-2007,union ministry of home Affairs) 

Estimated Infiltration in J&K

2001: 2417 
2002: 1504 
2003: 1373 
2004: 537 
2005: 597 
2006: 573 

Source: Annual Report 2006-2007, Union Ministry of Home Affairs

On April 11, 2007, the Army disclosed that there was a substantial force of militants currently operating in J&K, and others waiting in readiness across the border. Northern Command’s General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Lt. Gen. H. S. Panag in Reasistated, "I don’t think Army can go back to barracks at this stage. Militants can take advantage of the situation. And, we can’t leave people under the shadow of gun and allow insurgents to operate… There are at least 1300 to 1500 militants operating in thestate. A large number of trained militants in Pakistan are awaiting infiltration from across the border. Militants’ infrastructure in Pakistan is also intact." He added, further, that out of the estimated 1,300 to 1,500 militants, nearly 40 per cent are Pakistanis from the Punjab and Sindh provinces, who have nothing to do with Jammu and Kashmir: "These militants are purely controlled by the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence]." 

The J&K government, which believes that nearly 50 terrorist training camps are in place across the LoC, is reported to have passed on to theunion home ministry a list of 120 militant leaders wanted for terrorism in the state. All of them are currently based somewhere in Pakistan and PoK. They include Syed Salahuddin, chief of the HM and of the Muttahida Jihad Council, LeT chief Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, LeT ‘operations chief’ Bilal alias Salahuddin, Shah Faisal and Madni, JeM ‘operations chiefs’ and Yousuf Baloch of the JeM. 

Security forces have reportedly noticed some enhancement of terrorist capacities on the ground. There is a greater reliance on grenade attacks, with 226 such attacks in 2006, as against to 152 in 2005 (Source: Annual Report 2006-07,union home ministry). The militants are targeting the troops with greater accuracy than before and the number of ‘sharp-shooters’ is also reportedly increasing. There has also been a tactical shift towards soft targets, including minority communities, tourists and migrant labourers. Terrorist groups have also reportedly begun to ‘outsource’ in order to change the complexion of militancy. They are now recruiting "young men with a clean slate" who lob grenades, plant improvised explosive devices, and engage in other operations, subsequently to return to their ordinary life. 

On April 24, 2007, General Musharraf had claimed in Madrid that a ‘solution’ to the Kashmir issue would soon ‘appear’. In his closing remarks at the Roundtable, Dr. Manmohan Singh did some plain-speaking and noted that "some publicstatements in this regard emanating from Pakistan do not give the correct picture… Lasting peace will not come through instant deals." 

The various manifestations of the ‘peace process’, including both domestic and bilateral negotiations, as well as the frequent and competitive posturing of the parties in dialogue, remain essentially a tactical sideshow in regional conflict scenario. Despite a significant and continuous decline in terrorist violence over the years, thecentrestage is yet to be vacated by the shadow of violence in J&K.

Kanchan Lakshman isResearch Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal