Inherent Incoherence

The unexpected gift of power conferred by the electorate on the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA),and the installation of a new coalition Government at New Delhi, have brought critical responsibilities onparties substantially unprepared for the challenge. This is particularly the case with regard to broad issuesrelating to terrorism and internal security, where many of the constituent parties of the UPA have little byway of coherent perspectives to offer, and substantial inter-party conflicts--at least some of which arealready manifest.

The Congress party, when it sat in an often-belligerent Opposition, had articulated its position on manycritical issues of defence, security and foreign policy--but has often remained pointedly ambivalent onterrorism. Many of the Party's positions are defined in its document on the Security Agenda circulated shortlybefore the elections: Issues before theNation: Security, Defence and Foreign Policy. The document--scathingly eloquent on the BJP-led NDAcoalition's "record of grave failures on the management of national security, foreign policy and defence"--containsa single, ambiguously worded paragraph on terrorism, which promises "a comprehensive multi-facetedstrategy to cope effectively with the twin challenges of terrorism and insurgency". Apart from"paying particular attention to intelligence gathering", in this context, the document contains nohint of any specific strategic or tactical departures from the past, and remains reminiscent of thepredecessor Government's unfulfilled rhetoric on 'proactive' counter-terrorist policies.

Some constituents of the UPA, however, have not been ambivalent on at least one point: their strong oppositionto, and demand for withdrawal of, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002--currently India's only speciallaw against terrorism. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu and the Communist Party ofIndia-Marxist (CPI-M)-- two of the Congress Party's largest supporters in the new Parliament--have made itabundantly clear that POTA would have to go.

The Congress Party's own position on POTA is conflicting. At the time when the passage of the Act was beingdebated in Parliament, the Congress had hotly opposed its passage, despite the fact that it was, in fact, amuch-diluted version of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), 1987, earlier draftedand implemented by a Congress regime. During the debates on POTA, the Congress had argued with the glibfacility of an irresponsible opposition that, just because they had made 'mistakes' (the 'draconian' TADA),they were not going to allow the NDA to repeat these. These arguments will certainly return to haunt the new government,even as parties such as the DMK, which had broken away from the NDA coalition on precisely this issue, and theCommunist Parties, press for a scrapping of the law.

An added problem with abandoning POTA, however, is that all member countries are now bound by United Nation'smandate to pass and implement suitable laws for the prevention and suppression of terrorism, includingfinancing, provision of safe haven and 'any form of support' to terrorist acts and entities. Absent acounter-terrorism law, India would be open to accusations that it was failing to pull its own weight at a timewhen it was stridently demanding action against terrorism from other countries and from the internationalcommunity. Within this context, it is useful to note that the Indian record of convictions for acts ofterrorism--under both 'special' and 'normal' laws--remains abysmal.

Counter-terrorism policy, however, in the complex global order that currently prevails, comprehends much morethan an adequate framework of legislation and enforcement, and it is useful to examine the broad internalsecurity, defence and foreign policy parameters that the Congress party has articulated. Central to these isthe orientation to Pakistan and the current 'peace process', which Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh haspromised to continue. Citing the example of the Berlin wall, Dr. Singh had, in one of his first statements asPrime Minister-designate, declared that "the friction and unfortunate history of our relations withPakistan" could be overcome, and that it was his intention to "seek the most friendly relations withour neighbours, more so with Pakistan than with any others."

Nevertheless, qualitative changes in the peace process and the policy orientation to Pakistan are inevitable,as the party promises to infuse a measure of 'political realism' in its foreign policies. The party's agendadocument had specifically noted that the NDA Government's policies on Pakistan had "been a saga ofcontradictions and confusions", and were "full of contradictory extremisms and ambiguities."Accusing the NDA of a failure to follow up on what it had defined as the "principal problem inJ&K" - Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism - the Congress accused the NDA Government of having"agreed to discuss the territorial status of J&K with Pakistan", and of lacking"transparency in approach". The Congress promised to establish a "stable working, cooperativerelationship with Pakistan under the framework of the historic Shimla Agreement of 1972 and subsequentagreements and confidence-building measure initiated by later Congress Governments well upto 1996", whileremaining "firm and decisive and prompt in responding to terrorist violence structured againstIndia." None of this will strike any sympathetic chords in Pakistan.

The sub-text, here, is that much of the character of somewhat murky back-channel diplomacy that had beenengaged in by the predecessor regime would be negated; relationships would be cast into a more structured andinstitutional role; and the extra-constitutional powers that were being exercised by a small cabal within theNDA Government, and including powerful representatives of influential business houses, would not be allowed todefine the 'national interest' to the exclusion of oversight by the cabinet of ministers. It is clear,moreover, that the theatre of the peace process failed to translate itself into electoral advantage for theBJP, and there is, consequently, now greater political freedom to bring the process into a more sober andinstitutional phase under the successor regime.

While the Agenda document is silent on these issues, there is, again, evidence to suggest that a harder linewill emerge on Pakistan, and that there could be no question of diluting Kashmir's status as an integral partof India, or to consider any set of 'solutions' that envisage a transfer of populations or territories, oralter the status quo on sovereignty - a possibility that was at least being considered as a constituentwithin the proposed scheme of negotiations under the predecessor regime.

The Congress Agenda does speak explicitly of the need for strengthening India's defence posture,infrastructure and coordination mechanisms, accusing the BJP-led Government of a failure "to modernizeand update" the defence forces, asserting that, "Despite tall claims about the high priority beinggiven to defence, expenditure on defence as a proportion of GDP has fallen to an all-time low of 2.12%",and that the NDA Government had "failed even to effectively utilize resources amounting to nearly Rs.24,000 crores (240 billion) sanctioned by Parliament to modernize our defence systems." The DefenceForces will, quite naturally, observe with great interest Dr. Singh's orientation on defence expenditure.Commentators also note that the last two Prime Ministers have successively and systematically led to thedegradation and ruin of India's covert assets in Pakistan, even while Pakistan has done everything to sustainits covert operations in India. These trends would certainly come under the scrutiny of the new regime.

The Congress party has also been troubled by elements of India's foreign policy vis-à-vis America.While explicitly endorsing the objectives of strengthening ties and strategic cooperation with the US, theParty points to "a lack of transparency" that characterized the NDA Government's policies towardsthe US, noting that India had been "reduced to having a subordinate relationship with the USA." Thenew Government would, at once, pursue a closer but more transparent relationship with the US; and would seekto "retain for India freedom of options in conducting its foreign relations, in response to India'snational interests. "

In sum, there is a measure of determination to restore institutional responses, and to dismantle some of theelements of personality-dominated foreign and security policies that had become entrenched under the NDAregime.

Notwithstanding these elements, however, the truth is that the UPA government's perspectives remain inadequateto deal with the sweeping security challenges--and particularly with the range of insurgencies, terroristmovements, and their cross-border sponsorship--that plague the country. There is no evidence that acounter-terrorism strategy or perspective has been thought through by any of the constituent elements of thenew regime, and there are huge and visible vacuums in thinking with regard to a number of issues, includingthe burgeoning Left Wing insurgency, the problems of the Northeast, as well as the troubled relationship withBangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Worse still, the melange of ideologies--mixing in a number of incompatible sub-regional, linguistic, ethnic,social and economic agendas--that constitutes the UPA, may make any lasting commitment to a national strategicvision problematic. Within this context, the Left parties, collectively the largest element of support for thegovernment--with 62 seats in Parliament--are the most potentially problematic and disruptive elements, notonly on the issue of terrorism, but more specifically on the broad structure of foreign and economic policiesthat are integrally linked to international cooperation on counter-terrorism.

Within the imaginary world that the Left parties inhabit, the formation of an Indo-China axis, possiblyincluding Russia, as a counter to 'US hegemony', remains within the realm of aspired reality. Such absurditiespersist, despite cumulative evidence of China's consistent efforts to contain India--particularly throughunprecedented nuclear and strategic cooperation with Pakistan. The Central Committee of the CPI-M recentlycalled for resistance against "imperialist penetration"--essentially an euphemism for the growing USrole in the region--and has been systematically opposed to India's deepening economic and strategic relationswith the US. Such an orientation does, in some measure, coalesce with the past tradition of non-alignment andentrenched anti-US reflexes that survive among at least some elements within the Congress.

These many contradictions and ambiguities will require an extraordinary focus of mind and effort if they areto yield a coherent strategic response to terrorism in South Asia. Prime Minister Singh does have the personalcredentials and capacity for such a decisive endeavour. Regrettably, the Cabinet he has assembled from themotley congregation of ideologically incompatible parties and anachronistic survivors within the Congresswould tend more to impede than to advance his enterprise.

Ajai Sahni is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal