Indian Or Israeli?

West and South Asia are in turmoil yet again. 

A tenuous unwritten six months cease-fire brokered by Egypt between Israeland Hamas on June 19, 2008 expired on December 19 without an attempt at furtherrenewal resulting in the break out of massive violence in Gaza. For starters,the cease-fire was already in troubled waters due to the dogged posturing byboth sides: Hamas’s refusal to put an end to rocket launches into Israeliterritory; Israel’s refusal to open crossings like Rafah for the movement ofgoods into Gaza from Egypt. 

In effect therefore, the violent outbreak was predictable. On the one hand,an isolated Hamas wants to utilize rocket firings to coerce Israel intouplifting its strategy of economic blockades against Gaza which has virtuallyrendered the former incapable of meeting the basic needs of the Palestinianpeople. Israel, on the other, is utilizing a massive air and ground offensivesince December 27 till date to violently coerce Hamas into submission before anyattempts at a future cease-fire are made. 

Sadly, this time around, the role of international mediators has been limitedat best with the US undergoing a transition in its Presidency, the"trustworthiness" of Egyptian mediation under question by Hamas due to theformer’s false assurances that there will be no immediate Israeli militaryaggression post-December 19 and the EU’s 27 nations unable to come to aconsensus on the conflict.  Thereby, a historical tragedy of sorts isunfolding with heightened regional tensions between Israel and the Arab world. 

Meanwhile, in South Asia, India is also facing increasing tensions with itsneighbour Pakistan in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks. Consequently,certain security analysts have argued that India should perhaps emulateIsrael’s military offensive in Gaza in its own response to terror originatingin Pakistan. Indeed, public debates in India called for surgical air-strikes onLashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) camps in Pakistan during and immediately after the Mumbaiattacks. 

Unlike Israel however, the Indian government has resisted a "knee jerk"reaction to externally exported terror and by far has shown better judgementwith Manmohan Singh, India’s Prime Minister stating that a military strike onPakistan is at this juncture "off" the table. Instead, he stated thatcertain elements within official agencies in Pakistan support terror activitiesand must be brought to book by the international community. A diplomatic effortin this direction is underway with the Indian government sharing evidence ofPakistan’s complicity in the Mumbai attacks with other nations in order toisolate it for supporting terror as an instrument of foreign policy.

Indians are naturally angry at their country’s vulnerability to suchterror. It is becoming increasingly clear to them that terror outfits can striketheir cities and towns with impunity and that the state’s counter-terrormechanism is weak, ineffective and unable to avert these attacks. Datatabulation of civilian deaths in 2008 terror attacks on Jaipur, Ahmedabad,Bangalore, Delhi, Guwahati and Mumbai indicates a figure as high as 800. Thoughthe other terror attacks evoked public anger, it is the blatant nature of theMumbai attacks by 10 LeT Pakistani nationals holding the country hostage for 62hours that had raised the prospects of Indian air strikes on terrorist camps inPakistan.

In order to understand the character of both the Israeli and Indian responseto terror, it is rather pertinent to assess how they both measure up to the lawsof war. Such an analysis will bring to the fore the nature of both responses,the consequences as well as indicate whether a military or a diplomatic responseis the better of the two.

The Laws of War: Just War

The notion of "Just War" is a well honed historicaltradition on the rules of war. According to this tradition, there are twoaspects in war---recourse to war (jus ad bellum) and conduct in war (jusin bello). 

Jus ad bellum has six principles:

• The first principle is "just cause," indicating that war could be waged between two legitimate political entities either for self-defence or the protection of human rights. 
• Second, the authority that declares war must be a legitimate entity within the comity of nations. 
• Third, war must be guided by "right intentions" and not by any hidden intent of self- aggrandisement by an individual or a state. 
• Fourth, war must be the last resort. 
• Fifth, it must have a high "probability of success" for the wager state. 
• Sixth, the end result should culminate in positive benefits for the target state.

Jus in bello is based on two principles: 

• "Proportionality of means," indicating that the "means" employed must not negate the good that war brings about in the target state. 
• The last criterion is discrimination and non-combatant immunity: civilians cannot be targeted in a war.

Case of Israel

Locating the present Israeli military offensive in Gazawithin the Just War tradition throws up interesting insights on theeffectiveness of a military offensive as the first resort in a country’scounter-terror policy. 

First, Israel had a right to self defence since it was Hamas who firstlaunched 88 rockets into Israeli territory on December 24 following an end tothe cease-fire on December 19. It must be noted that independent analysts viewHamas’s act as a response to the killing of three of its operatives by Israeliforces at the border. Nevertheless, Hamas’s act constituted a violation ofterritorial integrity of another nation as cited in Article 2 (4) of the UNCharter. This is also justified under UN Charter Article 51 which states that"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individualor collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of theUnited Nations…"  Therefore, in this light, a military strike againstGaza is justified. 

Second, Israel is a legitimate entity in the international community andtherefore has a right to self defence. 

Third, coming to the Just War criterion of "right intentions", Israel’sintentions in Gaza are unclear. Ostensibly, it wants to stop the Hamas rocketlaunches from Gaza into its territory but the real goal could perhaps be toteach Hamas a lesson and brutally drive home the fact that it cannot view itselfas an equal with Israel.

Israel’s military offensive also does not fulfil the "force as lastresort" criterion as it did not provide mediators like Egypt or Turkey achance to work with Hamas towards extending the cease-fire. Neither did it giveHamas an opportunity for a truce by negotiating for a "phase by phase"opening of the crossings between Israel, Egypt and Gaza which could have broughtin the much needed basic goods into Gaza. In interviews to the InternationalCrisis Group, the Hamas fighters asserted that faced with an alternativebetween starvation and fighting, they would rather chose the later.

That apart, the Israeli military strikes also disqualify in the Just Warcriteria of "proportionality of ends", "probability of success","proportionality of means" and "discrimination and non-combatantimmunity".

The military strikes in Gaza have resulted in a severe shortage of basiccommodities like food, water, milk, meat and medicines. Banks have collapsedleaving people with virtually no money to buy provisions. The Israeli strikes onPalestinian government institutions like interior, justice, education, financeand culture have raised doubts not only about the question of "proportionalityof means and ends" but also starkly about Israeli intentions. The attacks onthe civilian police have resulted in a collapse of the internal structures oflaw enforcement in Gaza.

Though Hamas is no Lebanese Hezbollah, being far inferior in training andarms, yet the "probability of success" in terms of Israel’s so-calledprime objective, stopping rocket launches from Gaza, is also under suspect.Though the military offensive might stop short range attacks, there is noguarantee that long range attacks will be thwarted. According to some seniorIsraeli security analysts, though the Israeli military planning is precise andclear, there is a diplomatic and political inability to state clearly thedesired outcome/objectives of the war.

Worse still is the humanitarian disaster that Israel’s attacks have createdin Gaza. Till date, more than 640 people including children have died in the airstrikes and ground offensives. On January 6, an Israeli air strike on a UNschool resulted in the death of 40 women and children taking shelter there.Though Israel has claimed that it has given prior warnings to Palestiniancivilians of impending attacks, such warnings are ineffective as there is nowhere safe to go. A case in point is the Samouni family of Zeitoun, Gaza Citywho left their own house after being warned of impending air attacks by Israelisoldiers but perished in Israeli air strikes while taking shelter in arelative’s house.

Israel argues that Hamas utilizes civilians as shields but this does notnegate the fact that from its early focused targeting of the Hamas’s militarywing, the al Qasam Brigade’s15 training camps and limited port andcostal facilities, Israel has gradually activated indiscriminate aerial bombingson civilian areas. The consequences have been the displacement of 80 per cent ofcivilians in Gaza with UN observers on the ground stating that a humanitariantragedy is on the making there.

Case of India

While examining the Indian counter-terror responseagainst Pakistan within the context of jus ad bellum, it is clear by nowthat India has a case for self defence.

Intelligence reports confirm that the 10 LeT men responsible for the Mumbaiattacks came via the sea from Pakistan. Therefore, a military strike onterrorist camps in Pakistan is justified.

Second, India is a legitimate entity in the comity of nations and thereforehas the right to declare war in self defence.

An Indian air strike will also fulfill the Just War criterion of"right intention" since India’s intentions are to specifically targetterror camps in Pakistan’s territory in order to safeguard its own territoryfrom attacks orchestrated by terror groups there.

However, a war at this juncture may not fulfill the Just War criteriaof "force as last resort" as Pakistan has to be given some time to crackdown on terror groups in its territory. There has to be enough peacefulcommunication between the wager state and the target state before the decisionto use force is taken.

Significantly, India is making a serious effort in this direction by givingPakistan an opportunity to act against terror outfits in its territory. OnJanuary 5, India handed over a 69 page "evidentiary dossier" to Pakistanproviding detailed evidence of Pakistani hand in the Mumbai attacks. Pakistan,however, is not helping matters much by its belligerent approach of denying anylinks of its nationals to the Mumbai blasts despite being provided concreteevidence. Subsequently, Indian External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee iswriting about the evidence gathered to his counter parts in other countries toput diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

These are steps in the right direction regarding the "force as lastresort" criterion. The laws of war clearly state that any decision to useforce has to be preceded by a serious diplomatic effort providing the targetstate a chance to right the wrongs. Hence, India’s counter-terror response isby far superior to that of Israel within the context of Just War.

With regard to the criterion of "proportionality of ends", India willhave to do a real-time "action-consequence" assessment of any militarystrikes on Pakistani based terror camps. If air strikes do take place due toPakistan’s continued belligerent attitude, India has to ensure that suchstrikes enjoy precision and do not result in heavy "collateral damage"similar to that of the current Israeli offensive. Also, the end result afterIndian strikes should not leave Pakistan worse off than what it is today.

The most crucial criterion of jus ad bellum is, however, the"probability of success" aspect. The question we need to ask here is: whatis the "probability of success" of Indian air strikes killing terroristsstaying in terror camps, for instance, in LeT headquarters in Muridke, or campsin Muzaffarabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi, Multan,Quetta, Gujranwala, Sialkot and Gilgit? The "probability of success" appearslow as the terrorists are fully aware of arguments in India for strikes on theircamps and therefore must have deserted these camps by now and merged withPakistani civilians.

The criteria of jus in bello is also very policy informative withregard to any military strikes. Indian air strikes could be disproportionate interms of civilian deaths in Pakistan as some of the main terror camps are housednear civilian areas. This could result in intense internal unrest in Pakistan,more disturbances in India’s border areas like Kashmir and internationalcondemnation.

The US "war on terror" in the aftermath of 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraqhas taken a huge toll on civilians. Afghanistan has suffered almost 1000civilian casualties per year since 2001. Iraqi civilian deaths since 2003 arefar more staggering. According to the Brookings Iraq Index (May 2003-March2008), the US intervention in Iraq has resulted in 104, 317 civilian deaths.Israel’s current military offensive against Hamas may appear tough on terrorbut will result for sure in further militarisation of Palestinian society, angerat Israel and long term insecurity in the region.

Given this outcome, India therefore needs to tread with caution regarding themilitary option against Pakistan. Though there is a justified reason for goingto war, Just War criteria like "probability of success","proportionality of means and ends", and "discrimination and non-combatantimmunity" rightly indicates the dangerous consequences of a rapid reactionaryresponse. Also, given the porous nature of India’s borders and glaringloopholes in its internal security infrastructure, an Indo-Pak war may lead tofurther instability in the South Asian region. The possession of nuclear weaponsby both states is an added reason for caution about any war talk.

Pakistan, however, needs to act more responsibly and undertake seriousefforts towards dismantling the numerous terror networks existing in itsterritory. This is a debt it owes not only to itself but also to its South Asianneighbours as a whole.

Dr. Namrata Goswami is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for DefenceStudies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. The views expressed here are that of theauthor and not necessarily that of the IDSA.