It is an honor to appear before the Senate ForeignRelation's Committee again and a particular pleasure to beinvited to comment on the new and most welcome changesin relations between India and Pakistan. In the course of mytestimony, I will try to provide the background and identifythe dynamics in the new situation. I will also assess theirimportance to the United States and offer thoughts abouthow the United States should position itself to assist theparties as they embark on very difficult negotiations, theoutcome of which could profoundly effect South Asia's futureand key American national interests. But that prognosis willnot be easily achieved and the dangers on the way aremany, especially given the history of the Indian andPakistani relationship, marked as it is by deep seatedanimosity which resulted in three wars over the past 55years, serious military clashes short of full scale warfare,typified by the Kargil Crisis of 1999, and almost two decadesof cross border violence and terror. The path to the presentis also marked by frequent attempts to negotiatedifferences, including meetings and agreements at the Chiefof State and Prime Ministerial levels.
I bring to the table today my experience as Ambassadorto India in the 1990's; time with my corporation, theAmerican International Group, which is active in the Indianmarket; my work with the US-India Business Council; andthe contribution I made over the past two years to theCouncil on Foreign Relations and Asia Society Task Forcewhich assembled leading experts on South Asia and resultedin a recent publication, "New Priorities in South Asia: USPolicy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan." My cochairman,the Asia Society's President, former AmbassadorNicholas Platt, and I took the conclusions of our study toAfghanistan, Pakistan and India in early December 2003 toobtain reactions from governments, media, intellectual andbusiness. We were joined by former Ambassador DennisKux, whose hard work made the study possible and MahnazIspahani of the Council on Foreign Relations and a greatscholar of South Asia. The conclusions of our study and thereactions we garnered will be included in my testimonytoday.
Background
First, a brief word of background to provide perspectiveto your deliberations. India and Pakistan began 2003 withdaggers drawn. The terrorist attack on the Indian parliamentin December 2001, followed by a mobilization of nearly amillion men along the Indo-Pakistani border and the line ofcontrol in Kashmir brought tensions, borne of history, war,decades of insurgency and cross border violence and terrorto a head. Armed as both nations are with nuclear weapons,the Indo-Pak rivalry shot into international prominence. Wenow know that incidents which followed the 2001 attack inNew Delhi brought the two nations to the brink of openconflict.
India, in the wake of these events, set out her conditions-- an end to Pakistani supported violence before talksbetween New Delhi and Islamabad could begin. Buried wereattempts at détente and normalization begun with PrimeMinister Vajpayee's visit to Lahore and the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit in Agra.
In April, 2003, India modified her position, with Vajpayeeproposing a fresh initiative, provided, of course, thatPakistan would make good on repeated pledges, given inpublic and through the United States, to end support forviolence. In the wake of this initiative, India undertook aseries of carefully calibrated steps to lessen tensions andbuild confidence. Pakistan, which had called for negotiationsand a new look at Kashmir, reciprocated. Diplomaticrepresentation in New Delhi and Islamabad was restored; airlinks between the capitals were reinstated, followed by anIndian proposal to open a road service between Srinigar inJammu and Kashmir and Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir; averitable stream of "people to people" contacts began andwas accelerated with prominent citizens form the two sidesvisiting for the first time. Pakistan offered a ceasefire alongthe line of control, and extended it to the Siachin glacierwhich India accepted. Long awaited trade ties wereadvanced during the South Asian regional summit in lateDecember.
More confidence building gestures of this nature areplanned. Direct negotiations between the two governmentsoverall outstanding issues, including Kashmir, are scheduledto begin in February and will add thereby an importantdiplomatic and political dimension to the confidence buildingmeasures which the two governments have undertaken.Of great importance is the signal sent by bothgovernments to their security establishments, politicalinstitutions and publics at large that the time is right tolessen tensions, seek settlements, and create a condition ofpeace between the two countries. The Indian and Pakistanibodies politic have responded positively, reminding us of theresponse Americans and the peoples of the Soviet Unionevinced during the Cold War, when, despite the deep dividein positions and outlook, our governments found their wayto summits and negotiated our differences.
India & Pakistan: the road ahead.
The steps taken by President Musharraf and PrimeMinister Vajpayee deserve the broadest possiblecommendation. This hearing provides the United States andour Congress another opportunity to speak out and signalour support for the course these two great nations have set.The route traveled thus far is impressive, marked as it is bycarefully considered steps, an absence of grandstanding andpublicity, and a willingness to steer clear of promises whichcannot at this stage be predicted with confidence, givenhistory and tough, present realities.
It is my impression that despite two attempts onMusharraf's life and the presence in Pakistan of strong,deeply rooted, radical political groups dedicated to violence,the great majority of Pakistani's accept the legitimacy ofMusharraf's efforts to pursue a new understanding withIndia. Like Indians, Pakistanis recognize the subcontinent'srivalry has vitiated both nation's strength and ability toaddress the pressing needs of their populations. Pakistan'sbusinessmen tell me they welcome the prospect of doingbusiness directly with India. They believe they can competeand will be able to take advantage of larger markets andcheaper sourcing.
The world at large, notably the United States, see thegreat advantages in Indo-Pakistani détente andunderstanding. We need stability in Pakistan and progress inits dialogue which India can contribute to that objective.Less distracted by their historic quarrel, India and Pakistancan play positive roles in their region and beyond. Lessenedtensions also diminish the awful threat of a nuclearexchange.
This said, it would be foolish to argue that the roadahead is either safe or easy. It is decidedly not, and givenhistory of past Indo-Pakistani negotiations, there will besetbacks, including dangerous ones. This venture will onlysucceed if there is an unmistakable and sustainedabatement in cross border violence and terror. Freshconfidence building measures and even the prospect ofsuccessful negotiations will be negatively effected by crossborder violence. I contend Americans understand andsupport India's insistence in the regard, but I argue equallythat terror and the groups that propagate it are a threat tothe Pakistani state and Pakistan's ability to restore nationalstrength and international standing.
Success will also depend on a broad recognition amongPakistanis and Indians that force will not alter realities,including the status of Kashmir. Neither side can advance ifthe other is humiliated. National pride and honor are ascompelling sentiments in South Asia a they are anywhereelse in the world. Finally, as regards Kashmir, no settlementis possible without the contribution and consent of Kashmir'speoples. For this reason, it is important that New Delhi'sdialogue with Kashmiris in opposition, or in dissidence, bepursued with vigor and that Kashmiri dissidents pick up aclear message from Islamabad that the time is right torestore peace and engage politically.
Successful, negotiations are possible if New Delhi andIslamabad seek "win-win" solutions. Those in authority inboth countries have firsthand experience with the trauma ofpartition and the bitter conflicts which followed it. They havean opportunity to spare future generations the pain theyhave suffered, provided they seek understandings which arebased on respect and are pursued quietly and confidently.For the first time in years, India's and Pakistan's politicalclocks are ticking on the same time; both have strongleaderships, backed by favorable public dispositions.This is precisely the spirit inherent in the joint Indian-Pakistani statement of January 6, 2004. I suggest it beincluded in the Congressional record. It contains the views ofboth governments in a balanced, respectful fashion. Thestatement calls for negotiations in February. We must allwish the negotiators well.
When negotiations are joined, they must be pursued withall the skill India's and Pakistani's leaders can muster -- skillwith which South Asia's leaders are amply endowed. We willknow progress is possible if the negotiators selected, includethose committed to peace, and if their work is superintendedclosely by both country's highest authorities. The channelsof exchange should also be carefully considered.
Negotiations can progress if they are pursued outside theglare of publicity and in a manner where ideas can be testedand compromises achieved. The record of restraint andcareful deliberation of recent months is instructive.Above all, we need to hope and argue that India andPakistan set the right objectives and negotiate in a mannerthat successes can be scored, momentum achieved andfurther gains registered. At heart the key objective is toreduce tensions and build confidence. Concrete negotiatingresults will be hard to achieve and slow in coming. If thethreat of conflict between the two nations can be contained,the world and India and Pakistan will profit.
It has been my strongly held view over a number ofyears, the conclusions of those I have worked with in theCouncil on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society, theopinion of many thoughtful observers in India and Pakistanthat the right way to proceed is to put all issues on thenegotiating agenda, including Kashmir in its severaldimensions; negotiate each with urgency and seriousness;but as a conclusion is reached, to permit it to take effect,while solutions to other differences are sought. In otherwords, agreement on many of the issues dividing India andPakistan should not be held hostage to agreement on allquestions, particularly Kashmir where the differences aregreatest and at this sage offer no ready prospect of earlycompromise.
United States diplomacy, India and Pakistan.
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The United States has important national interests atplay in South Asia. For the first time in our history we aredirectly involved in the region. Our soldiers are fighting inAfghanistan, where our most significant gain in the war onterror, the elimination of al Qaeda's base, was registered.We need Pakistan's full cooperation in eliminating al-Qaeda'snetworks and leadership and we need Pakistan's unstintingcooperation if the extremely difficlt situation along thePakistan-Afghanistan border is to be brought under control.We require, moreover, Pakistan's commitment to control itsnuclear and missile systems and technologies. Above all, weneed a stable, progressive Pakistan.
India is finally emerging as a major force on the world'sstage. Its economy is registering huge gains, especially infields important to our future -- information and biotechnologies. Our trade is robust and growing; Americans ofIndian decent are a vital force at home. India's growingstrength, rooted in democratic traditions, is key to Asia'speace and the balance of power.
While we have an important stake in peace betweenIndia and Pakistan, we are not mediators. Nor do we havesolutions, including for Kashmir, which are not outcomesborne of Indian and Pakistani imagination and pursued withtheir political will. We have strong ties to both governments,most recently with India, but our image in the region, whileon the whole positive, is open to contest, especially inPakistan where its Islamist minority regards Americaninfluence with deep suspicion, verging on hostility.We can facilitate a reduction of tensions in the regionand the pursuit of negotiations, but we cannot make or evenbroker peace between India and Pakistan.
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To be successfulas facilitators, it is incumbent upon the United States tobuild its influence in both countries. With regard to thepresent, promising developments in the region, our bestinterests are served by discretion, not claiming credit forgains registered, nor articulating outcomes the parties havenot accepted. We work best through quiet, diplomaticchannels with a vision of where we wish India and Pakistanto be, but eschewing the limelight. More now than atanytime in the recent past, discretion is important.Equally important is focus -- keeping a close watch onthe situation, engagement at highest levels, at carefullyconsidered moments and pursuing relations with both NewDelhi and Islamabad, but not linking the progress in ourrelationship with one party to the imperatives of our tieswith the other.
With these considerations in mind, I have the highestregard for the Administration's record in South Asia. ThePresident, the Secretary of State, his colleagues in cabinetand across government have worked steadily to buildAmerican influence in South Asia, giving substance andstability to our approach and intervening effectively,generally in the shadows, during the crisis that beset Indiaand Pakistan in December, 2001. American diplomacyhelped diffuse that crisis, not once, but on several occasions.The Administration has made clear its commitment todétente in the region and its support of negotiatedsettlements.
It has built bridges to Pakistan, drawing red lines whennecessary, but acting with understanding and providingsupport. With India, the Administration has set out tobroaden and deepen political, security and economic ties. Ata time when the United States is heavily taxed on manyfronts, the Administration has given India and Pakistan theattention and importance they deserve.
Our engagement in South Asia requires more of thesame; it also needs the full support of the Congress. Thishearing is a timely example of the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee's attention to our policies in South Asia. As wemove ahead, it is deeply important to provide Pakistan withthe $3 billion which the Administration has requested and tomy view to commit the lion's share to areas which willcontribute to Pakistan's stability, education being a majorexample. Textile imports from Pakistan call for sympatheticconsideration. Pakistan poses one of the more difficultforeign policy challenges the United States faces. Dealingwith terror and its supporters in Pakistan, containing nuclearand missile proliferation; and bringing order to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area must also be treated simultaneouslyand at the same time we pursue ways to support a lesseningof tensions and negotiations between India and Pakistan.Central to our approach to Pakistan is a willingness to befrank when key boundaries are crossed; our assistance can Iin part be linked as incentives to Pakistani accomplishmentof objectives which we jointly agree are important. Asuccessful policy with Pakistan requires stability and must befree of threats of sanctions and rhetorical attack.
The requirements of our engagement with India are ofsimilar importance. The Administration's recent decision todeal with high technology trade impediments deservesCongressional support. The imperatives of non proliferationare important to us; they are also significant to India andPakistan. We make a serious error if we leave a searchingreview of global non proliferation, especially nuclear, normsoff our foreign policy agenda. The global, non proliferationsystem, which the United States supported over the pastfour decades, does not include space for India and Pakistan,which are now nuclear powers. It is in no ones interest thatthey remain outside a system of international controls andno such system presently exists. Equally, I hope that nuclearthreat abatement measures will be part of the Indian-Pakistani dialogue.
Conclusion:
It is not my purpose today to list the many requirementsof our new engagement with India and Pakistan. Rather, Iwish to underscore the importance of our approaching theneeds of both relationships as a vital component of theinfluence we need to exert during the current phase ofIndia's and Pakistan's relationship. The particular cannot bepursued without equivalent attention to the whole.
