Hu's China - VII

Economic and military strength go together. Without economic prosperity,there can be no military strength and without military  strength, there canbe no economic prosperity.

That was, in short, the theme of the observations of President  Mr HuJintao on China's defence policy in the report presented by him, in his capacityas the Party Secretary,  to the recently-concluded 17th National Congressof the Communist Party of China (CPC). He described the responsibility of thearmed forces as to obey the party and serve the people. He called for nationaldefence with Chinese characteristics and the continued implementation  ofthe concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinesecharacteristics. However, he did not explain what those Chinese characteristicsare or should be.

He called for an integrated attempt to make the Armed Forces morerevolutionary, modernised and standardised. He also called for the accelerationof the mechanisation and computerisation of the Armed Forces and said theyshould be made  capable of winning IT-based warfare.

Mr  Hu said : " We are determined to safeguard China's sovereignty,security and territorial integrity and help maintain world peace." No onecan object to this formulation provided  the term territorial integritymeans the integrity of the territory which constitutes China today. The problemwhich India faces in its relations with China arises from the fact that theChinese speak of territorial integrity in the historical and not contemporarysense.  Their concept of defence of territorial integrity includes not onlythe territory which is part of China today, but also which was, according tothem, part of China historically and had been taken away from China by colonialpowers. Under this category come India's Arunachal Pradesh and certain otherterritory in the Western sector of the Indian border.

While there was no reference to the not-forward-moving Sino-Indian bordertalks during and in the margins of the Party Congress, Indian media reportedjust before the Congress, recurring instances of innumerable border intrusionsby the Chinese troops. Two of these incidents are of worrisome significance. Thefirst was an intrusion into Bhutan and the second was about the Chinese raisinga pro forma objection to the Indian construction of two military bunkers insideIndian territory in Sikkim.

Apparently in its ill-advised  anxiety to avoid any public airing ofconcerns before the visit of Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the President of the Congress(I), to China and the expected visit of the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh,to China later this year, the Government of India has sought to play down theimplications of these intrusions and to project them as unintended consequencesof the differing perceptions about the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

One lesson which India learnt from its experience of dealing with Chinabefore the Sino-Indian war of 1962 was the folly of treating Chinesetransgressions as unintended. There has always been a method in China'stransgressions, which are meant to assert periodically its territorial claimsand exercise pressure on India to make territorial concessions.

Despite the positive spins put out by the Govt. of India from time to timeabout the progress supposedly being made in the border talks between the twocountries, it is clear that the Chinese are determined to get satisfaction ontheir claims to what they project as southern Tibetan territory in ArunachalPradesh. In fact, they look upon the entire Arunachal Pradesh as southern Tibet.

Their troops objecting to our Army constructing two bunkers in our territoryin Sikkim cannot be dismissed as a minor incident of no consequence. The Chinesehave de facto conceded Sikkim as a part of India by saying in 2005 that "Sikkimno longer constitutes a problem between the two countries". A de jureformalisation of this position will come only when the border talks lead to asettlement. Their renewed activism -- even if verbal-- on the border in theSikkim area is an indicator that they might reverse their de facto concession onthe status of Sikkim, if India does not transfer at least the Tawang Tract inArunachal Pradesh to them. The Government of India will be repeating thepre-1962 follies if it relapses into the pre-1962 practice of playing downChinese transgressions and volunteering to provide to the Chineserationalisations of their transgressions.

In my previous articles, I had referred to the projected good behaviour ofthe Chinese in the months running up to the Olympics, but this has not preventedthem from maintaining their campaign against the Dalai Lama and continuing withtheir policy of calculated border incursions to assert their claims. Thisunderlines the need for our pressing ahead with our policy of militarymodernisation, improving our infrastructure in the border areas and revampingour intelligence apparatus so that it recovers the China-dedicated capabilitiesimparted to it after 1962,  which have been allowed to rust since 2000.

One does not wish for a military confrontation with China. It will not be inthe interest of either country. However, if a confrontation comes about, it willbe on the land and in the air across the land border and not in the seas. In oureagerness to give a power projection capability to our Navy in the seas to theEast of India, the Government should not be remiss in the exercise of itsresponsibility for giving the Army, the Air Force and the intelligence agenciesthe required capability for the protection of our territorial integrity.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.