Hope Is Not A Method

As Nepal moves towards a new order, its governing parliamentarians would dowell to heed that most fundamental of maxims: hope is not a method.

To date, events have gone reasonably smoothly, but there continue to beominous signs that a rougher road lies ahead. Not least of the elements forconcern is what has been at the heart of the matter all along: the motives ofthe Maoist insurgents.

Contrary to much ill-considered opinion, the Maoists have not opted for peacein our time. Instead, their forces remain intact, even as they encourage the governmentto dismantle the only surviving force that stands between the Communist Party ofNepal - Maoist (CPN-M), and its ability to work its will, the security forces.

Their grudging moves towards negotiations notwithstanding, the Maoists havebeen very consistent. In their verbiage, in their briefings to their cadres, andeven in their interviews given to members of the international media, they makeclear that they do not accept the present state of things and remain convincedthat they are riding the "will of history" that will see the complete ouster ofthe old order.

The Maoists view the present course of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) as anerror of major proportions and are fearful that 'the people' will be 'betrayed'.They certainly do not accept parliamentary democracy as the end-state, unless itemerges in a form of which they approve.

What stands behind their present tactical maneuvering is a willingness to gowith the flow so long as the river does not leap its banks. If the SPA will dothe work that armed rebellion could not accomplish - especially, dismantle thesecurity forces and do away with even a figurehead monarchy - that isagreeable. But one cannot expect them, if things do not go their way, simply toshrug and say they had their moment.

There is a veritable cottage industry of historical falsification abounding,in Nepal and abroad, producing the fiction that the Maoists turned to insurgencyonly because they were not allowed to participate in 1991 parliamentaryelections (as Masal). That is false. The machinations that led to onewing of Masal being allowed to run using party identification were anintra-Masal squabble, not something the system engineered.

Likewise, the outrageous claim that the monarchy is somehow responsible forthe violence of the Maoists is as astonishing as it is absurd. The Maoists firstsystematically laid waste to Nepal and its weak democracy, then systematicallycarried out a campaign to claim the reigning monarch had killed his brother andengineered what they, the Maoists, had in fact done - destroy Nepal. Havingturned to armed insurgency, CPN-M methodically destroyed the structure of thestate, in the process eliminating all who opposed the local presence of theMaoists.

Having gained control of widespread areas, which they will continue tocontrol during any proposed 'elections', they are not about to allow theirrivals to freely contest within 'liberated space'.

This is classic "machine politics", as the Maoists claim the Nepal Congress(NC) and Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML, orsimply UML) have been playing all these years. Since UML buys into this logic,at least partially, it is willing to front for the Maoists. The extremist wingof the UML does more than front - it works with the Maoists.

Ironically, anti-communist India has ended up letting its own Marxists havetheir moment by unduly influencing New Delhi's Nepal policy. This should notsurprise, given the realities of coalition politics. With its dependency on theLeft Front, particularly the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPI-M) inParliament, compounded by divisions within its own ranks as to the proper policytowards Nepal, the Congress-led government has acceded to the CPI-M demands. Asa consequence, CPI-M figures such as Sitaram Yechury have become regularvisitors to Kathmandu as they conduct the Indian Left's 'foreign policy within aforeign policy'.

The issue of Indian policy or intervention is not one that need detain anyanalysis at this moment. It will ultimately be decided, one way or another, asit was in Sri Lanka, by nationalism in the target state. Nepali nationalism, tobe sure, is something which has rarely reared its head in anything saveplatitudes about "never having been a colony". In fact, Nepal is as thorough acolony as ever there was (of India and of the international community throughits utter dependence upon external aid).

Still, to be clear: first, India has no desire to become bogged down in theNepalese quicksand, so having 'democratic allies' in power is the proper routeto realization of its geo-strategic designs; second, there is a strong wing ofIndian politics that sees the present policy towards Nepal as misguided,counterproductive, and downright dangerous, given India's own Maoist threat. Theclaim that there are no connections between the Nepali and Indian Maoists isfalsified by a wealth of evidence, not least the pronouncements and actions ofthe Nepali Maoists before they became more media savvy.

The threat to Nepali sovereignty, then, is not from India per se but from thepresent situation that India has 'enabled'. Its view is that it can 'handle' thesituation. This remains to be seen - just as India proved quite incapable of 'handling'the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka.

The most pressing danger, at this juncture, is that SPA, dominated by NC andUML, will revert to form (on full display during the dozen or so years of fulldemocracy) and lead Nepal into a 'Kerensky moment' for the Maoists, as occurredwith the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917-18. The Leninists were not the strongestparty in post-Czarist Russia, only the party with a preponderance of force atthe decisive point(s). This allowed them to gain control of the state and thento do what was necessary to consolidate their hold. This is also how Hitlerconsolidated his hold on Germany, despite having only one-third of theParliament (Reichstag). It is what the Sandinistas did in post-SomozaNicaragua. One already sees the Maoist thugs threatening even UML politicians(who, in any case, have always been on the cutting-edge as victims of theMaoists).

What all the preceding cases share is that the security forces had fallenapart. This is not yet the case in Nepal. The key, therefore, is to make thenew-order understand that the security forces have every intention and desire toserve democracy - and that they will not stand by and see restored democracyand Nepali sovereignty compromised.

The Maoists, however, have stated repeatedly that they have other goals:trials for those central to the old-order, especially for the monarch and theRoyal Nepalese Army (RNA) officer corps (the Maoist leadership has asserted bothof these goals in its less guarded moments). This is also what they have beensaying to their cadres.

They have rejected integration into the RNA by any name and demanded a newNational Army, which they will dominate by default. This is just how thescenario played itself out in Nicaragua, the result being the Sandinistadictatorship, which rapidly produced its own counterrevolutionary insurgency byabusing the people. (Contrary to the hoary left-wing myth, the CIA could noteven arm all the contras, so abundant was the influx of peasant manpowerdemanding the right to resist the Managua Marxist-Leninist dictatorship).

In this situation, what is both puzzling and counterproductive is how littlerealistic consideration has emerged concerning the future of the securityforces, of which the RNA is the dominant element. This is puzzling, because thesecurity forces are quite intact and - contrary to yet another theme pushed byboth activist elements of the new regime and their international activistbackers - exercised remarkable restraint during the recent mass agitation. Lathicharges and rubber bullets are not semiautomatic volleys, and the latter did notoccur.

There are at least 150,000 armed government security forces in completelyintact units. It is naïve to assume that they are going to march off tooblivion, surrender, or slaughter. The last two options are what the Maoistsenvisage, and what they expect to extract from the ruling SPA as their price for'nonviolent participation' in the state. To judge that this inevitably will leadto confrontation requires no analytical acumen - simply looking at the Nepalisecurity forces with clear eyes.

What is now on the field is a force quite different from that which enteredthe conflict in November 2001, when the RNA was attacked by the Maoists. This isespecially so in the key middle grades and extending even to the youngerbrigadiers. It is also true in the Armed Police Force (APF), perhaps to a lesserextent in the Nepal Police (NP). The RNA's 'field elements' now acceptparliamentary supremacy and seek a more professional, '21st Century military'.Officers know there are numerous friendly states with extensive experience inimplementing and consolidating the proper mechanisms. Many of these younger RNAofficers have even considered the passing of the monarchy, but they are worldlyenough to see that this leaves open the question of what institution or figurewould serve the referee's position. Hence, they believe it is preferable that aconstitutional monarchy remain.

What they do not accept is the position demanded by the Maoists and theirleft wing allies: 'replacing' one force by another, or of 'purging' one forceonly to install the cadres of another. Reconciliation, to their mind, demandsamalgamation, even if this is accompanied by reduction in overall numbers. Underno circumstances will any force accept being disbanded in favor of Maoistreplacements. To do so would guarantee left-wing dictatorship.

For their part, APF and NP are critical to the normal law and order of thestate. Ironically, whatever the precise manner in which events unfold, thesitting government is bound to find, in the months ahead, normal policing andsecurity duties will assume heightened importance. A clear understanding must beworked out by the government as to what is expected to arrest a dangeroussocietal drift that has set in. Armed thugs, often claiming to be representing 'thepeople' but invariably cadres of Maoist front organizations, roam all majorpopulation centers in Nepal and must be brought within the normal rule of law.

This is a job particularly for the Police, supported by the APF, but it isinevitable that RNA will be involved. The present situation, including thewidespread intimidation of individuals and institutions, cannot go unchecked.

Politically, RNA is confronted with a Faustian bargain: It must serve thestate even with the knowledge that the unity of SPAM (Seven Party Alliance + theMaoists) depends upon the SPA placating the Maoists. The Maoists see the victoryas theirs and see themselves as dictating the terms of surrender - andenvisage only trials for those who have resisted them. Hence, the securityforces must keep order even as they are plotted against (in certain circles) andheld up as a bargaining chip (in others).

Their logical advocates, the Indians, who have the most to lose from aMaoist-dominated Nepal, remain very much an unknown element, given the array ofactors waging mini-foreign policies. One factor has not changed as any perusalof large segments of the Indian press reveals: New Delhi has been ill-informedby a good fraction of its so-called 'Nepal experts', in just the manner it wasled astray, two decades ago, by its 'Sri Lanka experts'. It cannot be said thatIndian analysts have developed much actual knowledge of the workings of NepaliMaoism. The dominant position is that the CPN-M can be bought off or simplydirected - an astonishing position given what India seems to have realizedquite belatedly the Stalinist, anti-democratic essence of its own Maoists.

The CPI-M, in particular, has little comprehension of Nepali insurgent groundrealities. The Indian Left Wing political pilgrims to Nepal deal with theiropposite numbers in the UML. If they meet a 'Maoist', they deal withpersonalities of their 'own stratum', who can be as engaging and sophisticatedas any. They do not deal with what is in the hills, thus gaining nocomprehension that there is an organization of LTTE clones, every bit asdogmatic and ruthless.

For those who have dealt with the Tamil insurgents, one conclusion issalient: the orientation of manpower is never the issue in a situationsuch as this. It is leaders who are the lynchpin, who produce the endlesscycle of insurgent brutality in Sri Lanka, a struggle that has long since seenits original causes vanish. The situation in Nepal is similar. It is the Maoistleaders who are following an ideological play-book; their followers are thrownup by local grievances. Maoist manpower is just as eager for 'peace' as anyoneelse, but they expect to get something out of their campaign. They have beentold consistently that the new order will belong to them and will bring justiceand prosperity. There is no way to do that in the short term except by takingfrom the old and giving to the new.

That this is playing a losing hand has been made clear in study after study,most recently by the simple but telling calculations of Dr. Steve Gorzula. As henotes: divide the arable land of Nepal (22,627 km2) by the population (28million in July 2006 estimates), and the result is a society that has exceededthe carrying capacity of the land. Lip-serve is paid to the only realpossibility - development of hydropower - and the result is a vacuum inwhich Maoist coercive utopian solutions have no competitors.

Lenin would certainly be proud of his Maoist pupils. On the side ofdemocracy, however, there is little worthy of praise. The stormy course aheadwill require more steady seamanship than has hitherto been demonstrated in theshort history of Nepali democracy. More than 'hope (it all works out)' will berequired.

The role of the security forces will be paramount, for they are the onlyguarantee that Maoist violence will not be the trump card. Thus normalfunctioning of those security forces will have to be maintained at all costs, soas to avoid demoralization and possible desertion. Clear explanations of what ishappening are imperative, with the emphasis upon 'transition to parliamentarysupremacy'. Any impression of 'defeat' must be banished, despite the concertedefforts of the Left Wing to push this claim in the ongoing struggle for controlof the narrative describing recent events. Already, the Maoists claim theirrevolutionary forces were the key in the recent agitation (their cadresdid incite violence and cache explosives in urban areas).

'Reform', then, must be the order of the day, as has long been called for byall interested parties, but this word finds no place in the Maoist vocabulary.Consequently, forces of actual democracy (as opposed to 'people's democracy')will be called upon to face the inevitable backlash. It is for the politiciansto deal with this reality, and the security forces can be their shield.

It is possible that international mediation and even involvement may createnew possibilities. For the moment, however, the Maoists have no intention ofparticipating in a new version of the old-order. They are demanding andexpecting that a constitutional convention will deliver a people's republic inform if not in immediate practice. They are determined to exact vengeance.

They are not, in other words, seeking 'democracy' as we know the word. Thereis a strong thread of thought which claims the Maoists will choose the path trodby the 'other' insurgent groups in Sri Lanka (e.g., People's LiberationOrganisation of Tamil Eelam, Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation, Eelam People'sRevolutionary Liberation Front), groups that agreed, with certain misgivings, towork within the system. More likely, the Maoists will go the way of the LTTEthat, after each hopeful pause, resumed its revolutionary project.

It hardly needs highlighting that such a course of action by the Maoistswould put them squarely at odds with the desires of the Nepali masses - justas LTTE cannot today be said to represent much more than the aspirations of itsrump state. If the CPN-M is astute, it will realize this. Unfortunately, historydoes not provide grounds for optimism. There is no Maoist insurgency that hasdisplayed such foresight. Neither do operational realities provide any morehope: the Maoists are not in any way standing down.

The up side? If the Maoists move as driven by their hate-filled ideology andresume their struggle, they will find themselves just where LTTE is - on thewrong side of history and facing a reasonably united, democratic society, amplyassisted by friendly powers, including India.

Dr. Thomas A. Marks is a Honolulu-based political risk consultant andauthor of a number of benchmark works on Maoist insurgency. Courtesy, the SouthAsia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal