(Paper presented at aconference jointly organised by the State Islamic University (UIN) of Jakartaand the Institute for Defence Analyses (IDA) of Washington DC at Bali,Indonesia, from October 19 to 21, 2005 )
INTRODUCTION
The Internet enables every jihadi to feel part of a larger whole. Itenables every angry Muslim to give vent to his or her anger in myriad ways. Itenables every Muslim to become a participant in the jihad in his or her own way,with or without a leader. It has strengthened Islamic solidarity. Cyber spacehas become the spawning ground of jihadi warriors. The use of the Internetby the jihadi terrorists illustrates the folly of dismissing them as irrationalsor as persons with a medieval mind. An irrational person or one with amedieval mind cannot use the Internet as effectively as the jihadi terroristshave been doing. In this paper, the increasing use of the Internet byinternational jihadi terrorist organisations would be discussed under six heads:Propagation; Communication; data-mining; cyber warfare; other aspects; andNet-centric counter-terrorism.
PROPAGATION
2.All political dissident and other minority groups who in the past lacked access to the conventional media---print or electronic--- have found inthe Internet an easily available means of propagating their cause,creating an awareness of their ideology, winning adherents and promoting afeeling of solidarity and unity of action for achieving their objective. Webactivism is not a recent phenomenon and not confined to Islamicgroups---moderate or extremist.
3. Terrorist organisations of different hues ---ethnic, ideological orreligious--- too have found in the Internet an ideal tool for facilitating thepursuit of their objectives. The international jihadi terroristorganisations were not the first to turn to the Internet. Ethnic terroristorganisations like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ideologicalterrorist organisations such as the Maoist groups of India and Nepal andreligious terrorist organisations such as those of the Punjab in India and theIrish Republican Army (IRA) in the UK were amongst the earliest to have realisedthe utility of the Internet as an operational tool in their attempts toachieve their objective.
4. Amongst the indigenous jihadi terrorist organisations, those of thePalestinians and pro-Palestinian groups, the Chechens and the Kashmiriswere the first to start using the Internet for propagating their cause. Thesewere followed by organisations in Indonesia. Jihadi terrorist organisations with pan-Islamic objectives and trans-national networking started using the Internetin a big way only in 2000 and, since then, have replaced the indigenous jihaditerrorist organisations as the most extensive and innovative users of theInternet.
5. The initial use of the Internet--whether by the indigenous jihadiorganisations or by the pan-Islamic ones--was confined to the creation and theuse of web sites for propagating their cause, for enrolling members andcollecting funds. The web sites were also used for a psychological warfare (PSYWAR)against their State adversaries through the dissemination of details of theiralleged suppression of the Muslims.
6. Well-known and well-identified jihadi organisations restricted their use ofthe web sites for purposes, which would not bring them into conflict with thelaw. They refrained from using their web sites for purposes such as givinginstructions on how to wage a jihad through means such as the fabrication of animprovised explosive device (IED), publicising their claims relating to thesuccessful commission of acts of terrorism etc.
7. Amongst the ostensibly legitimate purposes for which they used their websites were proclaiming their objectives and policies, disseminating statementsof their leaders, carrying articles on different aspects of Islam, and makingappeals for volunteers and funds. The web sites took care not to let themselvesbe seen as indulging in and justifying acts of terrorism.
8. However, this cautious policy did not prevent them from indirect facilitationof acts of terrorism through means such as dissemination of articles carried bythe professional journals and web sites of governmental institutions like theArmed Forces and the police on matters such as the low-intensity conflict, whichindicated the various ways in which terrorist and insurgent organisationsfunctioned. Their purpose in carrying such articles was to facilitate copy catterrorism, without falling foul of the law. In their perception----which wasvalid---since they were mostly reproducing articles on the modus operandi ofother terrorist organisations written by governmental experts, they were notcommitting any breach of the law.
9. The period before 2000 also saw the emergence of a number of web sitescreated by either Muslim individuals or by organisations not identified withindigenous or pan-Islamic terrorist organisations. They sought to encouragefeelings of Islamic solidarity and made Muslims aware of the writings andteachings of well-known jihadi leaders associated with organisations such as theMuslim Brotherhood. An important example is the writings and statements of thelate Abdullah Azzam, considered one of the mentors of Osama bin Laden, whichstarted appearing in these web sites. The purpose of these web sites was toprovide a religious and ethical justification for jihad.
POST-1998 MUSHROOMING
10. Statements condemning the US and Israel and projecting them as theenemies of Islam and the Muslims started appearing with increasing frequency inall the web sites of the pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist organisations after theformation of the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against theCrusaders and the Jewish People by Osama bin Laden from his hide-out in Kandaharin February, 1998. The IIF sought to bring together in a trans-national network bin Laden's Al Qaeda, an exclusively Arab terrorist organisation, and a numberof non-Arab jihadi terrorist organisations operating from countries such asPakistan, the Central Asian Republics, Egypt, the Philippines, Bangladesh etc.The frequency and virulence of the anti-US statements carried by theseorganisations increased after the US Cruise missile attacks on alleged trainingcamps of the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Sudan in August, 1998.
11. The projection of the US as the principal enemy of Islam became the definingcharacteristic of all pan-Islamic jihadi extremist or terrorist organisationsafter the Cruise missile attack. However, the indigenous jihadi terroristorganisations such as those of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)in India and Chechnya in Russia refrained from adopting any anti-US propagandaline in their web sites.
12. In February, 2000, a search of the World Wide Web (WWW) by this writer,even if not very exhaustive, led to about 1,500 sites of Islamic organisations.Most of them had the benign objective of helping in a better understanding ofIslam among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. They contained interpretations of theholy Koran, explanations of Islamic religious traditions and practices andarticles on the contribution of Islam to science and fine arts etc. They alsoprovided a useful database of the Muslim scientists, thinkers and womenengineers of the world, the Muslim media and so on.
13. The following conclusions emerged from their study undertaken by this writerat that time:
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A large majority of them was Sunni and Wahabi sites, with very few Shia or Iran-based ones. Some were anti-Ahmadiya.
The preponderance of sites run by members of the Muslim community of the US. The next in number were those of Western Europe, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan.
There was a large network of Muslim Students' Associations in US universities. All of them had their sites.
The US also had some sites meant for Muslim members of the US armed forces. There was one site, called Muslim Military Members (MMM), which enrolled adherents from the Muslims serving in the armed forces of different countries all over the world. It describeed its aim as follows: " The MMM is an information source for brothers and sisters serving in the armed forces. We are a gathering point. A place where information is disseminated. A means to keep people informed. Through MMM, you will stay informed of different events, resources and news items to help you survive as a Muslim in the armed forces. The MMM is not an official organisation, but rather a loose association of military personnel and those in the service of military personnel. The cost of the web site is provided freely as a service by the Islamic Information Office, paid by Muntadanet.Inc."
The comparatively fewer sites from West Asia and North Africa, which was explained by the restrictions there on non-government organisations (NGOs) and also possibly by local curbs on access to the Internet.
Surprisingly, while there were about 50 sites focussing on the problems and history of the Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir, one noticed only three sites relating to the Muslims in the rest of India-- those of the Aligarh Muslim University Alumni, the Indian Muslim Relief Committee and the "Islamic Voice", a journal published from Bangalore. It was possible there were many more sites, but these were not picked up by the search engines.
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While there were many sites todiscuss the relations of Islam with Christianity and Judaism, one did not comeacross any on relations with Hinduism.
14. Of the 1,500 sites studied by this writer, only about 150 containedextremist material relating to the so-called jihad. The rest of them appeared tobe benign in their objectives. The majority of the jihadi sites was run byMuslim extremist organisations in different parts of the world which had takento violence to achieve their political and/ or religious objectives. Some werealso kept by individual Muslims with assumed names such as Abu Mansoor, AbuMujahid, Abu Jindal etc.
15. Some of these jihadi sites performed the following services:
Dissemination of information regarding the jihad in different countries.
Instructions on how to become a Mujahideen, how to manufacture explosives etc.
Database on the availability of arms and ammunition for purchase, including the prices. The sites providing this information were apparently run by Muslims in the US, because the arms sellers recommended by them were all based in the US.
A bibliography of articles on urban warfare and low-intensity conflicts, which had appeared in the military and strategic journals of the US. A list of 266 such articles was available. Many of them had been collated from the US Marine Corps Doctrine Publications, the Marine Corps Warfighting Publications, the Marine Corps Reference Publications and the US Army Field Manuals. One can directly access many of these articles at the Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library sites, by just clicking on the relevant titles.
Examples of articles collated by these jihadi sites: Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict; Physical Security; Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; Intelligence Officers' Handbook; Military Operations in Built-up Areas; Urban Warfare Communications; Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts; Bomb Protection Handbook; Chemical/Biological/Radiological Incident Handbook, purported to have been prepared by the CIA; Chemical Warfare Handbook of the Marine Corps Institute; Chemical Warfare Agents; Military Intelligence--Using Organic Assets; Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare, purported to have been prepared by the CIA's Psywar Division for use in Nicaragua; Dealing With Vehicle Hijacking Situations; Emergency Response to Terrorism; Media Facilitation; Public Affairs Operations; Media Relations; Building a Newspaper--Tactics, Techniques and Procedures; Combat Neurosis etc
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16. While most of thesearticles and papers made available by the jihadi web sites were apparentlyprocured from open sources, the origin of some such as the documents purportedlyof the CIA was not clear. Were the pro-jihadi Muslim members of the USArmed Forces and security agencies providing some of this material to the jihadiweb sites? One had a strong suspicion, which could be neither proved nordisproved.
17. Nearly one-third of the 150 jihadi websites related to Kashmir. These wererun by indigenous Kashmiri organisations such as the Jammu & KashmirLiberation Front (JKLF), Pakistan-based terrorist organisations such as theMarkaz Dawa Al Irshad and its militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), theHarkat-ul-Mujahideen etc, Western-based Kashmiri organisations such as theKashmir American Council, the Kashmir Canadian Council etc, Kashmiri activistsbased abroad such as Ajaz Siraj, moderator of the Kashnet, Dr.Ayub Thakur of theWorld Kashmir Freedom Movement, Azmat A.Khan, Secretary-General, JKLF,UK/Europe,Bashir Siraj of the Kashmir Forum etc Some Western personalities taking interestin the Kashmir issue such as Lord Avebury of the UK and Ms. Karen Parker of theUS had their own sites. Some of the Kashmiri sites seemed to have beenconstructed and run by a Colorado-based Internet Service Provider with thetypical Hindu name of Indra's Net.
18. Amongst other jihadi organisations active in the WWW were those of Chechnya,which maintained their sites in eight different languages, with video/audiocoverage of the fighting, scenes from the training camps, interviews with theMujahideen etc, Kosovo, Indonesia and the Xinjiang province of China. One didnot come across any sites of the jihadi organisations of the Central AsianRepublics. Interestingly, the Uighur jihadi organisations of Xinjiang seemed tooperate as lone wolves, with no links to other jihadi groups. No satisfactoryexplanation for this was available.
19. The Taliban government of Afghanistan used to have its own site maintainedapparently from Islamabad. After the enforcement of the UN sanctions against theTaliban in November 1999, this disappeared. The site carried a message thatdue to difficulties in loading and maintaining the site directly fromAfghanistan, it had been discontinued. The visitors were advised to read the"Dharb-e-M'umin", an online electronic monthly, for news aboutAfghanistan, Kashmir and Chechnya.
20. Amongst organisations of West Asia and North Africa having their own siteswere the Hamas, the Hizbollah, the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria etc.
21. Some of the jihadi sites were in the Malaysian language. Surprisingly, onecame across very few references to Osama bin Laden in the150 jihadiwebsites. There were far more references to the late Abdullah Azzam, aPalestinian who, along with bin Laden, was quite active during the Afghan warand who was mysteriously killed in an explosion in Peshawar in the late1980s.The complete text of a book on jihad by Azzam was available on the webeven in 2000.
22. In a note prepared by me giving my assessment of the sites on February23, 2000, I had stated as follows: "It would be difficult to estimate theimpact of these jihadi web sites on the ground situation in terrorism-affectedareas. In regions such as Chechnya, where the Russians don't allow foreignjournalists, the web sites definitely become reference points for outside peoplewanting to have a version different from that of the Russians. One does not knowin how many instances, the terrorists were established to have learnt theirtradecraft from the web sites. However, it is important for the securityagencies to closely monitor the jihadi sites."
23. The period between 9/11 and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq inMarch-April, 2003, saw a mushrooming of jihadi web sites, with organisationssuspected or identified as facades for the Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda individualsstarting a plethora of them. Since the organisations and individuals behindthese web sites had no reasons to take care not to come into conflict withthe law, they made no secret of their desire to use their web presence not onlyto propagate their cause and carry on a campaign against the US and othercountries perceived as supporting the US, but also to spread the jihadacross national borders by paying homage to suicide terrorists, and byconverting the Internet into a virtual madrasa and jihadi training centre. Thenumber has further grown up after the US-led occupation of Iraq. The number ofjihadi web sites is estimated to have increased from about 150 in February,2000, to about 4,000 today.
24. The military operations by the US-led coalition in Afghanistan after 9/11not only deprived the Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations associatedwith it of their training infrastructure, but it also damaged the ability oftheir leadership to personally interact with their cadres and motivate them. Thescattered remnants of the Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations foundthemselves forced to split into small groups and take shelter in differentplaces in Pakistan as well as in other countries such as Iran, Bangladesh, Yemenetc. The post-9/11 security measures made travel to other countriesdifficult, thereby drastically reducing the possibility of personal meetings.This period also saw the emergence of the phenomenon of free-lance jihadis--individualMuslims angered by the actions of the US and other Western countries inAfghanistan and Iraq waging an individual jihad, either alone or inassociation with like-minded co-religionists, without necessarily belonging tothe Al Qaeda and other members-organisations of the IIF. The free-lance jihadisalso made their presence felt in the WWW.
25. As these scattered small groups, at their initiative without necessarily anydirections or guidance from a central leadership, planned and executed jihaditerrorist strikes in different parts of the world, they started depending on theInternet more and more for keeping up the motivation of their cadres and forsharing their knowledge and expertise in matters such as fabricating explosivesfrom commonly available materials, assembling an IED, use of modern innovationsin science and technology for the commission of acts of terrorism etc.
26.
