Fresh Fears in Kashmir

If it wasn't his toothpaste-advertisement smile, the face peering out from behind the prison bars would look disconcertingly similar to that of Osama bin-Laden.

Amongst the ranks of jihadi groups in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Ghulam Hassan Gujjaris probably better known than his doppelganger. Operating under the improbable nom de guerre'Santra Chacha,' or Orange-uncle, Gujjar helped thousands of terrorists from Pakistan cross the Line of Control (LoC) after 1988, evading Indian ambushes and minefields. In 2003, when Pakistan diluted support for cross-border terrorism and a ceasefire went into place along the LoC, he retired to the two homes--and two families--he had built in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). 

But early this spring, Gujjar was called out of retirement to help facilitate a renewed infiltration surge."I brought twenty-six Mujahideen across in just one trip," he recalls, "along with eighteen porters for their weapons andammunition." During questioning, Gujjar provided Jammu and Kashmir Police interrogators a graphic account of just how adept infiltrators had become at evadingIndia's LoC fencing--and the new tactics they were using to defeat electronic surveillance equipment.

When an Expert Committee set up by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Srinagar at the end of June 2007 to discuss the prospect of demilitarising Jammu and Kashmir,Gujjar's story formed the centrepiece of its briefings. Although the Committee is charged only with exploring the"reconfiguration and redeployment of Security Forces (SFs)," rather than actual troop cuts, officials argued that thissummer's grim infiltration figures make even this impossible. 

Given that the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the junior partner in the Congress-led alliance that rules J&K, has threatened to bring down thegovernment unless movement begins towards demilitarisation, this summer's renewed infiltration offensive could have consequences far greater than the purely military.

Just what are security experts so disturbed by? Ever since June 2002, when an Indian war threat and intense Unitedstates-led diplomat pressure forced Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to promise to end cross-border terrorism, infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir has been in decline. 

But that trend began to reverse last summer--and the upswing has continued this time around, too. Between January and May 2007, official estimates show, some 160 terrorists succeeded in penetrating the LoC. Similar figures were seen during these months in 2006, too--a sharp increase from 2005, when just 100-odd jihadis crossed over.

No full account has become available for just why infiltration has resumed. Some believe GeneralMusharraf's is indeed working to terminate infiltration, but that his efforts are being sabotaged by hardliners in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Advocates of this theory note that Pakistani forward posts are no longer used as launch-pads for infiltration attempts--and that some action has been taken to deter terrorists from crossing the LoC. In March 2007, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)'launching commander' Imtiaz Alam was detained by the Pakistan Army's Military Intelligence Directorate after he sent a twelve-man unit to reinforce his'northern division commander', Mohammad Shafi Dar. Soon, though, Alam was released on ISI orders.

Others argue that Pakistan has decided not to allow the jihad to wither away until a political agreement on Jammu and Kashmir is put in place. During the spring and summer, snow-melt and rainfall makes it near-impossible to ford the Neelam river. As such, infiltrating terrorists and their supply porters must use bridges to cross the river--bridges which are guarded by the Pakistan Army, and whose use needs its institutional consent.

Whatever the truth, the escalated infiltration is yet to manifest itself in increased violence. Kashmir province saw just 290 terrorism-related incidents of violence between January and May 2007, down from 475 in the first five months of 2006. Ninety-five terrorists, 45 civilians and 39 SF personnel were killed during this period. By contrast, 124 terrorists, 98 civilians and 42 SF personnel lost their lives between January and May last year.

But, experts note, the jihadi cadre now crossing the LoC are better trained and equipped than in the past. Between January and May, 2005, SFs operating in J&K killed an average of 4.4 terrorists for each fatality they suffered. In 2006, though, the kill ratio for these months fell to 2.92:1. In the first five months of this year, the figure has fallen further, to 2.4:1. A decade ago, the kill ratio often exceeded 7.0:1. Notably, infiltration during the summer of 2006 and 2007 has exceeded terrorist attrition for the first time since 2001-2002--suggesting the jihad is not about to wind down.

Much of the new jihadi build-up is taking place in northKashmir's high mountains. Villagers have reported concentrations of up to 40 terrorists from Lolab, Gurez, Rajwar and Bandipora--remote areas where the Indian Army has historically been reluctant to commit forces, fearing that it would thin out the protection available for more densely-populated towns and villages in the plains. By some accounts, both the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) have built fortified hideouts in the Bandipora and Rajwar forests. 

Clearing these high-altitude hideouts would mean a large-scale offensive in the mountains: an enterprise involving more troops than the Srinagar-based XV Corps and Nagrota-based XVI have readily available. Although critics ofIndia's counter-terrorism posture in J&K often represent the state as a garrison, the reality is somewhat less dramatic. Of the 337,000 Indian troops in J&K, almost half are committed to counter-infiltration and defensive tasks along thestate's frontiers with Pakistan and China. Another 100,000 are tied up by administrative duties and the enormous logistical chain which links the Himalayas with the plains, leaving only 80,000 troops free for counter-terrorist operations--a force roughly the same size as the J&K Police. 

Does the heightened infiltration mean that an escalation of violence is around the corner? Not quite. There is no sign, yet, that terror groups or their sponsors in the Pakistani establishment wish to reverse the diminution of violence seen since 2001. However, the future is still fraught.

First, mired as it is in multiple internal crisis, Pakistan seems unwilling--or unable--to risk the full-blown confrontation with Islamists that a termination of the jihad in J&K would invariably involve. General Musharraf knows well that his dialogue with New Delhi is unlikely to yield much beyond the status-quo in J&K, a poor prize for running the risk of alienating the Islamists who still support him.

Second, jihadi groups are themselves divided on just what dividends peace might yield. Although powerful elements in the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) wish to turn from terror to politics, most understand that they will at best find bit-roles in democratic politics. While some elements in the HM may be willing to see their cause subjected to a quiet euthanasia, the more ideologically-rigorous cadre of groups like the LeT or Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) remain profoundly committed.

Third, the secessionist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is hopelessly divided on the terms and content of its future engagement with New Delhi. While doves like Abdul Gani Butt are clear that the time has come to acknowledge the essential legitimacy of the status quo and participate in elections, few of his colleagues are willing to stake their future on a representational test. Indeed, APHC chairperson Mirwaiz Umar Farooq has distanced himself from the debate, and spent much of the summer travelling inwest Asia and Europe. With neither an agreed road-map for progress, nor a shared vision of the future, the engagement between New Delhi and the APHC appears to have reached impasse.

For all these reasons, no decisive breakthrough in the peace process appears likely in the near term. When J&K heads towards elections next year, jihadi groups would like to be in a position to both advertise their power, and demonstrate on-ground influence. Hence, their need to reinforce their diminished ranks--even if no spectacular acts of violence are executed

Not surprisingly, demilitarisation has found its most vocal advocates among the PDP, which stands to benefit the most from a strong jihadi presence in the countryside. In the 2002 J&K Assembly elections, jihadi groups helped sabotage the election campaign of thePDP's main rival, the National Conference. This time around, the diminished influence of jihadi groups would help the National Conference--an outcome the PDP, for obvious reasons, has no interest in bringing about. At once, the Congress would like to ensure that its alliance partner does not grow into a position from where it can dictate terms. Hence, theparty's own implacable opposition to troop cuts.

Given the potential of the demilitarisation debate to tear apart the Congress-PDP alliancegovernment in J&K, the Expert Committee is unlikely to make a public recommendation in the near-term. Highly-placed sources disclose that forward movement on troop relocation was unlikely until September or October, after snowfall would make infiltration across the LoC more difficult. By then, however, the need to secure thestate in the run-up to next year's elections would make troop reductions unlikely.

Both Indian troops and the soldiers of the jihad, then, will hold their ground--and their guard--this summer. Whether the PDP makes its peace with this fact, or chooses instead to bring down thegovernment to force its case on demilitarisation, remains to be seen.

Praveen Swami is Deputy Editor and Chief of Bureau, Frontline, New Delhi.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.