Flirting With Fire

In the aftermath of the Assam Assembly elections where the Assam UnitedDemocratic Front (AUDF), a coalition of Muslim parties in the state that cameinto existence just months before the polls, captured 10 seats, there is now afocused effort, particularly among the more communal-minded Muslim leaders, toextend this experiment to other parts of India. Most proximately, this attemptto crystallise the 'Muslim vote' has found expression in the creation of theUttar Pradesh United Democratic Front, a Muslim communal formation that seeks toreplicate the Assam experience in UP in the elections of 2007.

There have, however, also been reports of efforts to raise new Muslimcommunal formations in other states as well, and this has caused some concernamong intelligence and security agencies, but provoked a greater panic in'secular' political formations that have long taken the Muslim vote-bank forgranted, and who now fear they may lose their stranglehold on this block ofvotes.

As is almost invariably the case with contemporary assessments by politicalparties in India, the conclusions being drawn are short-sighted, hasty andtragically flawed. The error of assessment is the most pronounced withinCongress circles, since the direct impact has been the greatest on the partyand, had it not been for the chunk of Bodo votes which offset the loss of whatthe AUDF gained, the regime at Guwahati would have been far more tenuous than itcurrently is. To the extent, however, that there is a risk that the sameexperience may be replicated in other states as well, all political parties,including the Hindu right, are troubled. It is significant that the BJP, afterover a decade of struggling in Assam, still managed just 10 seats in theelection - barely enough to match the upstart AUDF.

There is, of course, need to look into the AUDF phenomenon - and its copycatpotential - closely. The first questions that arise relate to theextraordinarily abrupt emergence of this force, and the need to assess whetherthis is essentially a local manifestation, or one that links up with largerpatterns in the wider neighbourhood. It is useful to note that Badruddin Ajmal,the founding leader of the AUDF, does not come from Assam's traditional Muslimleadership, but was a virtually unknown trader before he practically stormed thestate elections. How precisely does an obscure businessman acquire a politicalprofile of such prominence? Running a political party requires enormous support.Who is standing behind the scenes to provide this support? The Muslim clergyplayed a major role in the election campaign in Assam this time around - whathas provoked this sudden mobilisation?

It is, nevertheless, important to note that the transient success of communalformations in India has historically not been a consequence of factors integralto their own nature, profile or agenda, but rather, arises essentially from thefailures, miscalculations and rank and habitual folly of secular formations. Itis, in fact, the secular formations that have historically been most guilty ofcreating and cultivating communal and caste vote-banks -- which are eventuallytaken over by more radical or divisive parties and agendas. It is the Congressparty's desperate efforts to consolidate the Muslim vote-bank in Assam even, onat least some issues, at the clear expense of the national interest, whichprepared the 'Muslim vote' for easy picking by the AUDF. Indeed, there has beena wider campaign over the past year to exploit Muslim communal sentiments, as inthe case of the orchestrated protests on the Danish cartoon controversy andagainst the Bush visit, as well as the manipulation of the Shia sentiment onIran, in which secular formations, including the both the Congress and theCPI-M, flirted shamelessly with outright communal Muslim elements.

Other political miscalculations undermined the Congress campaign in Assam aswell, and at least some of these were connected to the factional tussles withinthe party, as a result of which some of the party's senior leaders, as well assome strong young secular leaders were deliberately undermined.

Despite all this, however, it is significant that the AUDF is not riding anyoverwhelming wave of Muslim support, but has benefited from high levels of voterfragmentation. Indeed, the AUDF, according to some estimates, won no more that40 per cent of the Muslim vote -- which is, of course, extraordinary for such ayoung party -- but the remaining 60 per cent remains substantially with thesecular formations, and principally with the Congress. It is useful to note,moreover, that the Muslim vote is of decisive significance in nearly 50 per centof Assembly constituencies, and a bulk of these have remained outside theinfluence of the AUDF, though the nascent party contested as many as 69 seats.The neglected lesson of the Assam elections is that the Congress stillrepresents the largest segment of virtually every community in the state,including the various religious, caste and tribal demographics, and it does sobecause it is still seen as principally secular and non-discriminatory in itsideology -- though possibly not, on frequent occasions, in its practices.

Secular democratic formations are increasing tempted to flirt with the 'soft'communal card and the 'soft' caste card, even as their governments fail toprovide the basics of an acceptable standard of administration and thenon-discriminatory practices that are the soundest guarantee of justice, andthat all communities -- including the minorities, who may be briefly seduced bypromises of privileged access to some benefits -- appreciate unfailingly at thehustings. All-India parties particularly cannot rely on sectarian and divisivepatterns of mobilisation if they are to survive, and this is demonstrated, atonce, by the continuous shrinking of the authority of the Congress party, whichis trying to compete with regional, sectarian and caste based parties on theirterms, as well as by the fate of communal parties such as the BJP, which may dowell in an occasional election, but have been swept aside because they failed tomeet popular expectations of broad-based and effective governance.

Ultimately the only lasting 'card' that can be played is the 'developmentcard', the 'prosperity card', the 'efficiency card'. Political adventurism basedon disruptive sectional agendas may secure short-term gains, but these quicklyvanish, as does the party's legitimacy and long-term capacities for politicalmobilisation, if the basics of administration, of non-partisan access todevelopmental services and public goods, the imperatives of law and order and ofjustice, are neglected.

K.P.S.Gill is former director-general of police, Punjab. He is alsoPublisher, SAIR and President, Institute for Conflict Management. This articlewas first published in The Pioneer.