Dubai Doesn't Deliver, Yet Again

In the second such incident since December last, on February 3, 2003, Dubai arrested and subsequentlyreleased a number of high profile organised criminals linked with international terrorism, despite Interpolred corner notices against many of these, and despite the fact that India had again handed over a listcontaining the details of some of these criminals to the United Arab Emirate (UAE) authorities as recently ason January 28, 2003.

Initial reports suggested that 26 members of the notorious Dawood Ibrahim gang, widely known as the'D-Company', including two of the gangleader's brothers - Noora (Noorul Haque) and Mustaqim - had been takeninto custody in Dubai. Both Noora and Mustaqim - along with Mohammed Dossa, another of the arrested gangsters- are accused in the 1993 Bombay Blasts case involving a series of explosions in commercial centres thatkilled 257 persons, and injured another 713, and are believed by Indian authorities to be part of the networkthat provides operational support to terrorists in close coordination with Pakistan's Inter ServicesIntelligence (ISI) agency.

Both Noora and Mustaqim are permanent residents of Dubai, with substantial business interests in this CityState. Subsequent reports indicated that the number of gangsters arrested by Dubai authorities was as high as110. Despite the arrests and the clear documentation on this count, Indian authorities had little expectationthat the culprits would be extradited to face Indian justice. For one thing, the Indian Ambassador to Dubaiwas stonewalled by authorities in his efforts to secure official confirmation and details of the arrests; foranother, the same drama had been played out with another of Dawood Ibarhim's brothers, Anees Kaksar Ibrahim,in early December 2002 [OutIn The Open]

In the latest incident, reports indicated that all the persons arrested were subsequently released withinstructions to 'leave the country immediately'. On the surface, it was unclear why Dubai chose to take suddenaction against these gang-lords and their cadres who have had settled operations in the country for well overa decade. Sources indicate that the motive was primarily to prevent a bloodbath on Dubai soil, rather than anylarger concern regarding the criminal and terrorist activities engaged in by these groups in other countries.

Earlier, on January 19, 2003, one of Dawood Ibrahim's lieutenants, Sharad Shetty, was killed at the India Clubin the city in what is believed to have been a revenge killing ordered by Dawood's former associate and -since the Bombay Blasts - current underworld rival, Chotta Rajan, for an unsuccessful attempt on Rajan's lifein Bangkok in September 2000. The killing may also have been a bid to take over the lucrative betting cartel,which Shetty ran on Dawood's behalf, ahead of the Cricket World Cup Series. Shetty had been settled in Dubaisince 1986, and had spawned a huge financial empire in the city despite a range of criminal charges pending inIndia, and a red corner Interpol notice relating to the murder of a Mumbai hotelier in June 1995.

The present spate of arrests is believed to have been initiated when a large number of 'D-Company' menconverged on Dubai in what was thought to be a prelude to a gang war to eliminate Chotta Rajan's network inthe city. Dubai authorities, concerned with keeping their own turf clean - particularly on the eve of theannual 'Dubai shopping festival' - simply bundled up all the suspects, gave them a warning against suchviolence within their jurisdiction, and asked them to leave the country - probably for their safe havens inPakistan - for a 'cooling off' period.

Indian authorities have failed to get any official version on these events - including identities, points oforigin and eventual destinations - of the criminals arrested and released by Dubai, despite requests forinformation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and diplomatic channels.

Dubai's conduct in this and other cases raises critical questions about the role of this tiny City State inthe evolving international network of organised criminals and Islamist extremist terrorists. One of thelargest and most unregulated financial centres in the world, with huge turnovers in undocumented movements ofgemstones - including those originating in the world's worst conflict areas -, gold and cash, and located atthe strategic crossroads of the Gulf, South Asia and Africa, Dubai has long been a financial hub for organisedcriminal and Islamist extremist groups, as well as a primary transit point for the shipping of contraband.

The Dawood Ibrahim gang controls much of this contraband movement from and to South Asia, as well as,crucially, a large chunk of the illegal hawala transactions in the region. It is this latter element thatconstitutes the gravest threat within the context of contemporary international terrorism: hawala is thefuture of terrorist financing, as various systems of transfer through 'regular' banking and conventional moneylaundering channels all leave behind paper trails that are vulnerable to eventual discovery. A paperlesstransaction, the traditional South Asian hawala system leaves behind no evidence once the monies are deliveredto the recipient.

There is significant evidence of massive flows of terrorist finance from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and intoDubai after the US campaign against the Al Qaeda - Taliban combine commenced in October 2001. It is certainlythe case that much of the money, both before and after 9/11, that financed terrorism in different parts of theworld moved through ventures located in Dubai. The reality of this superficially modernised City State is thatit runs a highly efficient operation that uses contemporary technologies and commercial systems that supportsthe world of disorder, lawlessness and terror, and Dubai is, indeed, a direct beneficiary of, and heavilydependent on, its linkages with this underworld.

Dubai claims that it is 'cooperating' with US authorities to shut down terrorist financing through financialnetworks based on its soil - but the nature of the underground system is such that it cannot be shut downselectively, disallowing transactions by one group of users, while facilitating others. Authorities in thisport city have long demonstrated strong sympathies and direct commercial linkages with a terrorism-linkedinternational criminal underground operating from its soil.

There is, at this point, little evidence that these sympathies and linkages have, in any measure, beendiluted by the world's anger at the catastrophic terrorist attacks in the US, and by international anxietiesregarding the rising tide of extremist Islamist terrorism. It may, however, have become temporarily necessaryfor ambivalent states like Dubai to try to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.

Ajay Sahni is Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management and Editor, South Asia IntelligenceReview of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal, courtesy which this piece appears here.