December 13 And After

Even while lauding the remarkable reflexes and bravery of the securitypersonnel who prevented the terrorists from gaining access to the sanctumsanctorum of the Parliament House on  December 13, one has to note that theincident  highlighted once again the unsatisfactory  manner in whichwe continue to deal with terrorism sponsored from Pakistan, despite beingvictims of the  Pakistan-sponsored terrorists for decades.

General intelligence that the Parliament House could be a target of theterrorists  of the Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden was available, according toofficial indications from  New Delhi as well as  Mumbai, but specificintelligence on how and when the terrorists would strike was not.

The assassins of Rajiv Gandhi had taken up position in Chennai weeks beforethe assassination, recruited local accomplices and conducted dry runs withoutthe intelligence agencies detecting their presence and activities.

The terrorists responsible for the Mumbai blasts of March, 1993, hadsimilarly been planning for the blasts for weeks before the event without beingdetected.  So too was the case with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM)hijackers of December, 1999, who seemed to have done all their planning inMumbai before moving to Kathmandu.

It is obvious that there was a similar lack of specific intelligence aboutthe presence in New Delhi of the terrorists who attacked the Parliament Houseand their preparations.

The Purulia Arms Drop case of December, 1995, showed  as to how evenwhen specific advance intelligence was available from the British about theplanned air drop, we were remiss in the follow-up action to trap those for whomthe arms were meant.

Ever since the first use of a car bomb against the US Marines in Beirut in1983, strict control of vehicular movements in the vicinity of sensitiveestablishments is part of the standard security drill in all countries affectedby terrorism.  Such control is generally in the form of construction oframps and other physical obstructions to vehicular  movements, tallying thenumber of the vehicle approaching a building with the numbers in a list of thoseallowed access to the building in a vehicle and physical checks for concealedarms and explosives.

From the TV visuals, it was apparent that no such security drill existeddespite the available intelligence about the Parliament House being a likelytarget.

Whenever there is a spectacular terrorist incident, we tend to project it asan act of desperation of the terrorists, instead of seeing it in the correctperspective as a disturbing indicator of the terrorists' unweakened motivationand determination and countering them with an appropriate response.

Another stock response  in India is to contend that there is noeffective counter to suicide terrorist acts.  By doing so, we play into thehands of the terrorists, who, through their acts, want to convince the publicthat the Government cannot protect them.

The responsibility for the December 13 strike is yet to be established. The present  likelihood is that it must have been by one of the threePakistani components of bin Laden's International Islamic Front For JehadAgainst the US and Israel, namely, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) or theHarkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) or the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) carried out partly inpursuit of their over-all objective of merger of Jammu & Kashmir withPakistan and the "liberation" of the Muslims in other parts of Indiaand partly as a reprisal for India's links with Afghanistan's Northern Alliance,which they blame for the humiliation inflicted on Pakistanis belonging to theseorganisations in Afghanistan.[This piece was written before the disclosures byPolice Commissioner, New Delhi, and the home minister L.K.Advani, that the saidattack was a combined operation of Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad-- ed.]

All these organisations have been godfathered by Pakistan's Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI).  Despite the USA's declaration of the HUM as a foreignterrorist organisation in October 1997 and its post-September 11 freezing of theaccounts of all these organisations because of their association with Al Qaeda,the Musharraf regime has avoided banning them in Pakistan.

It continues to use them in its proxy war against India and is hoping thatthe US "war" against international terrorism would not be extended tocover them.  In the absence of an appropriate response from India,Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment shows no signs of relenting inits proxy war which it has been waging at little cost to itself and is unlikelyto do so unless and until we make the cost prohibitive to Pakistan.

Counter-terrorism against a State-sponsor involves effective passive andaggressive active defence.  Passive defence is about making physicalsecurity in our own territory impregnable.  The repeated success of thesuicide squads of the LET and others in penetrating sensitive establishments inJ & K and now New Delhi by following the same modus operandi of wearinguniform and using a vehicle resembling a government one shows how weak  ourphysical security is despite the deployment of huge manpower.

Active defence is about taking the proxy war to the state-sponsor'sterritory.  To emulate the direct responses in the form of air strikes, hotpursuits, cross-border raids etc of the US and Israel would be unwise andcounter-productive.  Neither the US nor Israel has a nuclear-power as theirterrorist-sponsoring adversary.  We have one across our border.

The Pakistani junta thinks that the nuclear factor has insured it against anIndian retaliation.  We have to prove it wrong.

However, our response has to be indirect in the form of a counter proxy war--undeclared, covert, deniable, determined, consistent and hurting Pakistanpolitically, economically and para-militarily till it relents.

None of the Governments in New Delhi, of whichever political persuasion, havehad the will and the stomach for such a counter proxy war.  Unless ourresponses become more hard-hitting and yet deniable, we will never be able todeal effectively with this hydra-headed monster let loose against us byPakistan.

Bravado in rhetoric we have in plenty, but action is woefully lacking.

Counter-terrorism also demands a strong intelligence and legalinfrastructure.  The fact  that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)of the US was equally helpless against suicide terrorists on September 11 is noargument for explaining our inadequacies.

The  controversy over the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) showshow politicised the counter-terrorism debate  has become to the detrimentof national interests.  The Congress (I) and other opposition parties havebeen short-sighted in their opposition to it, but the Government cannot escapeits share of responsibility for failing to adequately consult the oppositionbefore the promulgation and to sensitise it to the need for it.

The plethora of the post-September 11 counter-terrorism legislation in the USwas preceded by a classified briefing of select Congressmen by the intelligencechiefs on their threat perceptions and wide-ranging bi-partisan consultations. In India, such courtesies and sensitisation of the opposition leaders are yet tobecome part of our political culture.

Counter-terrorism and counter proxy war require a determined nationalresponse. Partisan political calculations come in the way of such a response inIndia to the benefit of the terrorists.  Unless the political partiesrealise the folly of their behaviour and work towards a national response, moreDecember 13 like incidents are likely.  History will judge them harshly.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai)