Countering The Spin

In its anxiety to further improve relations with China and to wean Beijing away from Islamabad, has theGovernment of India taken the first step towards writing off the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans and abandoningany role by India in helping to preserve the unique Tibetan culture and Tibetan school of Buddhism?

This question first arose in the minds of Tibet-watchers after the recent incident in which, perhaps forthe first time, the Government of Nepal complied with a Chinese demand to detain and hand over to them 19Tibetan refugees fleeing perceived persecution in their traditional homeland, which is recognised by India andthe rest of the world as a part  of China. Many, including this writer, suspected  that Kathamandumight not have taken a serious and troubling step like this without  a nod from New Delhi.

The US reportedly expressed its concern and unhappiness over this action of the Nepal Government. Despitethis, there are reports that similar action against another group of refugees is under way.

This question would become  even more troubling after the six-day high-profile visit of Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister,  to China from June 22.  The visit, which took place a yearbefore the parliamentary elections in India, was marked by much hype apparently with an eye on the elections. "Historic", "path-breaking", " a new beginning" "never before have suchproductive discussions been held" were some of the expressions used by the spin-masters of the Governmentand dutifully played up by the embedded journalists who had accompanied the Prime Minister.

To find  more objective and critical accounts, one has to search for the reports of journalists whowere not accorded this privilege and honour and hence travelled independently or those who stayed behind inIndia and viewed the visit from here.  The fact that some of this kind felt troubled too by the way theirfraternity went overboard in helping the Government to project the visit as "something like this hasnever happened before" would be evident from the comments of Mr. Inder Malhotra, a highly-respectedsenior journalist, who had covered the Sino-Indian relations right from the first decade of India'sindependence.

He wrote in The Hindu, a prestigious national newspaper, on June 26:

"As has happened all too often in the past and is most certain to be repeated in the future, the mediacontingent accompanying him went into a tizzy of exaggeration and hyperbole."

Shorn of the hype, the outcome of the visit is partly disconcerting, partly questionable and partlygratifying. The disconcerting aspect relates to Sikkim and Tibet. Till the middle 1970s, Sikkim used to be aprotectorate of India, which had over-all responsibility for its defence and foreign relations.  Barringthis, the territory enjoyed some autonomy under a ruler called the Chogyal. He got married to an Americanstudent called Hope Cook, who had come to Sikkim ostensibly  for research.  The Indian intelligenceand Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, viewed her as a mole of the USA's Central Intelligence Agency(CIA), allegedly planted on him to steer him in the direction of independence for his territory.

One could  never prove whether she was a CIA mole or not, but it was a fact that he came under herfascinating spell and started moving in the direction of independence. He and his wife, for reasonsunconnected with India, became unpopular and a movement against them resulted in their overthrow and theterritory becoming a State of India, like any other State, thereby ending its special status.

The Chinese intelligence too was as much concerned as its Indian counterpart over her presence andactivities from Sikkim, which is on China's border.  Despite this, Beijing strongly condemned what it described as the Indian annexation of Sikkim. It viewed it as one more instance of Indian "hegemonism"in action.

China had never claimed Sikkim as its territory and never disputed its pre-1975 status as an Indianprotectorate. Thus, Sikkim is a non-issue in the long pending border dispute between the two countries. Itsapparent objection was to India's ending its special status and making it an integral part of India. Tilltoday---even after Vajpayee's visit-- it has not recognised it as an integral part of India, but Vajpayee hasclaimed that the first steps towards such Chinese recognition has been taken with an agreement calledmemorandum concluded during the visit for the resumption of border trade through Sikkim.

The first step towards the resumption of trans-border trade was taken by the two countries through amemorandum signed in December 1991, which designated certain points for the trade and through a protocol forregulating it signed in July 1992.  The points identified under that memorandum for border trade did notinclude the Sikkim sector.

It is said that in 1997, China took the initiative in suggesting the resumption of the traditional tradethrough Sikkim too. The matter was under negotiation between the two countries since then.  There are twopossible routes for the border trade through Sikkim--via the Nathu La pass and vis Jalep La in south-easternSikkim.  Before the Sino-Indian war of 1962, most of the  border trade used to take place throughJalep La. From Jalep La, the Chinese/Tibetan traders used to enter Kalimpong in West Bengal where China hadbeen allowed by the Jawaharlal Nehru Government to set up a trade post, which was supervised by a ChineseConsulate in Kolkatta (Calcutta).

Following the deterioration of relations between the two countries, which led to the war of 1962, theGovernment of India ordered the Chinese trade post at Kalimpong and the Consulate at Kolkatta to close down.The Indian intelligence suspected them of indulging in espionage and subversion.  Till today, noGovernment in New Delhi has agreed to their being re-opened despite the improvement of bilateral relations,reportedly because of continued misgivings over the wisdom of such action.

It is said that the original Chinese proposal was for the resumption of the border trade through thepre-1962 Jalep La/Kalimpong route or through both the Nathu La and Jalep La routes.  Apparently, theGovernment of India agreed only to the Nathu La route, which would not require the re-opening of the Chinesetrade post at Kalimpong.

In the build-up, which preceded the visit of the Prime Minister to China, this impending memorandum on theresumption of border trade through Sikkim was projected as a major break-through of great politicalsignificance, since it amounted to a Chinese recognition of Sikkim as an integral part of India. In my earlierarticle titled "Understanding China", written before the Prime Minister's visit, I had expressed mydoubts about the validity of this projection.

Even as the Prime Minister was in Beijing, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman punctured the Indianeuphoria by clarifying that it was nothing of the sort. He described the Sikkim question as an "enduringlegacy" of the past and said that "it cannot be solved overnight". Despite this, New Delhi hasmaintained that the memorandum amounted to a de facto recognition of the Indian position by China, even thoughit might not amount to a de jure recognition. In support of this, it has been pointed out that the preamble ofthe memorandum talks of the two countries being " desirous of opening another pass on the India-Chinaborder" for border trade. If Sikkim's border with Tibet constitutes India's border with China, theinference is that Sikkim is a integral part of India.  So the argument goes, definitely with somevalidity.

China's renewed interest in a presence in Sikkim, which resumed trade would involve, and, ultimately inKalimpong, has economic as well as political motives. The economic motive is obvious and needs no explanation.The political motive arises from the fact that in addition to the route through Nepal, Tibetan politicalrefugees fleeing perceived persecution have preferred the Jalep La-Kalimpong route. The more sensitiverefugees, who had held offices of authority in Tibet, had avoided the Nepalese route  as they were notsure even in the past of how the Nepalese authorities would handle them.  When the Dalai Lama and hisentourage fled Tibet in the 1950s, they used the route through Kalimpong.

The Chinese administration in Lhasa had always been anxious to plug these routes of escape for thepolitical refugees. With the Nepalese route now apparently ruled out, the only safe route which remains forthem is through Sikkim. By signing this memorandum, has the Government of India consciously or unconsciouslyhelped the Chinese in their efforts to plug this too? Enhanced Chinese presence in this sector, whichresumption of trade would involve, could have a deterrent effect on refugees wanting to flee Tibet through theSikkim route.

The over-attention during the visit to Chinese sensitivities over the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) ofChina with little attention to Indian sensitivities either over Sikkim or over China's nuclear and missilesupply relationship with Pakistan is equally troubling.  According to the Prime minister, as quoted inthe media, he did not raise the Pakistan issue at all during the talks.

A joint declaration signed by the two Prime Ministers says: " The Indian side recognises that theTibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and reiterates that it doesnot allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side expresses itsappreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimedat splitting China and bringing about independence of Tibet.  The Indian side recalled that India wasamong the first countries to recognise that there is one China and its one China policy remainsunaltered."

The Chinese did not hesitate to emphasise that there is only one China, of which Tibet is a part, andinsist that this be included in the joint declaration.   Is it not the responsibility of any Government inNew Delhi to similarly emphasise  that there is only one India, of which Sikkim is a part, and insist onthis being included in the statement too.  Our Prime Minister's apparent acceptance of a Chinese oralassurance of a change in their Sikkim policy in the future without insisting on this being recorded inwriting, brings to mind Indira Gandhi's acceptance in 1972 of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto's oral assurance that hewould accept the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir as the international border after preparing publicopinion in Pakistan to accept it, without reducing his commitment to writing in the Shimla Agreement. Hesubsequently denied giving any such assurance. We never learn from our follies.

The India-China (Panchsheel) Agreement on Tibet signed on April 29, 1954, had referred to  Tibet asthe  "Tibet region of China. " Thereafter, when the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhivisited China, a Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique issued  on December 23, 1988, said that "Tibetis an autonomous region of China. " It said: "The Indian side reiterated the long-standing andconsistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-Chinapolitical activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil."

Strictly speaking, New Delhi is right in saying that substantively there has been no change in India'sposition on Tibet. What is new and troubling is the much stronger language used now and the Chinese insistenceon this stronger formulation.  In a media briefing, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman even wentfurther than this and claimed that the Indian Prime Minister had accepted that the TAR is an"inalienable" part of China, but this expression is not found in the joint declaration.

Amongst the troubling questions coming to mind are:
 

• The Tibetan exiles have always been alleging that the present TAR is smaller than the Tibetan region firstoccupied by China. According to them, part of the Tibetan territory was separated by the Chinese afteroccupation and merged with adjoining provinces. What was left was named the TAR. By accepting the newformulation, has India consciously or unconsciously legitimised the Chinese action in doing so?
  
  
• Will India's apparent yielding to Chinese pressure for a stronger formulation mark the beginning offurther Chinese pressure on India to stop the non-religious activities of the Dalai Lama's set-up inDharamsala in India?
  
  
• Will it cut the ground from under the feet of the Dalai Lama in his efforts to achieve genuine autonomyfor the homeland of the Tibetans  and protection of their culture and religion through talks withBeijing?

What spin, one wonders. A spin on the Chinese or Indian people?

While Dharamsala has not yet come out with any official reaction, a web site maintained by Tibetan exilesabroad has described Vajpayee's discussions with the Chinese on Tibet as "semantic diplomacy" andsaid:" While political scientists may be able to explain the implication of the difference between theseformulations, the statement contained in the joint declaration seems to be an attempt to meet Chinese desireto legitimize its control over Tibet.  However, the fact that there was hot discussion on the formulationseems to be clear from leaked reports released by Xinhua in which China talked about India recognizing Tibetas an "inalienable" part of China.  The joint declaration does not contain any suchreference."

The uncertain aspect of the outcome relates to the agreement to "each appoint a Special Representativeto explore from the  political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of aboundary settlement." Is this just another layer of cosmetics to conceal the lack of significant progressin  the ongoing negotiations at the official and experts' level to find a solution to the border disputeor does it mark an innovative mechanism to expedite the search for a solution in a time-bound manner?

The Prime Minister has been quoted as saying: "The kind of talks that I have had on the boundary issueduring this visit have perhaps never taken place before." Only time can say how far his optimism isjustified.

The gratifying part of the visit relates to the various measures agreed to for further promoting bilateraltrade and strengthening economic co-operation. This is the non-controversial part of the outcome and needs nocomments. 

(B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter)