Begging For UN Cover

The U.S. is eager for the UN to return to Iraq to provide political cover for itsoccupation. The quagmire on the ground in Iraq plus recognition that the rest of the world, and most Iraqisthemselves, reject Washington's claim of legitimacy is the basis for the Bush administration reversing itsearlier anti-UN positions to beg the international organization for help. Kofi Annan's decision to send atechnical investigative team to Iraq is partly in response to mounting pressure from the U.S., but also aresponse to shifting sentiments among Iraqis, particularly the call from Ayatollah al-Sistani for a UNassessment of political conditions. While Annan's announcement indicated he was responding to the request ofthe U.S. occupation authorities and its hand-picked "governing council" to determine whetherelections could be held by Washington's June 30th deadline, he left open the possibility of a broaderdefinition of "what alternative arrangement would be acceptable" if not.

Why Is The Bush Administration So Set On A June 30th "Handover Of Power ToIraqis"?

1) The deadline is driven far more by U.S. desperation - electoral and economic/corporate -than by any concern about "returning sovereignty" to Iraq. The Bush administration is lying aboutthe deadline, claiming that it will lead to a "transfer of sovereignty" and the "end of U.S.occupation" in Iraq. A real "end to occupation" requires the withdrawal of U.S. troops.Transferring nominal authority from one U.S.-selected Iraqi agency to another U.S.-vetted Iraqi organizationdoes not equal an end to occupation.

2) Bush needs to be able to claim "the occupation is over" and "troops arebeing withdrawn" as he enters summer campaigning for November. The reality will be the militaryoccupation continuing, with a U.S.-backed "sovereign" government "requesting" that U.S.troops remain. The U.S. will withdraw 20,000-25,000 troops with great fanfare, ignoring and hoping the voterswill forget about the 100,000 or so U.S. troops that will remain, and the likely continuation of significantcasualties among U.S. troops. (Just today Rumsfeld authorized 30,000 additional troops for the Army.)

3) U.S. plans for massive privatization in Iraq have faltered because of a lack ofpotential buyers. Profiteers are concerned that without something resembling an official government in Iraq,U.S. efforts to sell of Iraqi assets will be recognized as illegal under international law and could beoverturned when something closer to a truly legitimate and representative government takes over. So the U.S.has every interest in insuring that a transitional phase includes something that can be called a"sovereign Iraqi government," but which in fact remains under U.S. control, to insure that theprivatization plan goes ahead before a real end to the occupation.

Why Did The Bush Administration Change Their Line On The UN?

1) The utter and all-too-public failure of the U.S. occupation (especially the continuingdeaths of U.S. soldiers) in Iraq seems to have led to an internal power shift within the Bush administration,with the Pentagon ideologues tactically [and almost certainly temporarily] giving way to electorally-focusedconsiderations. In the battle between Rumsfeld/Cheney and Karl Rove, Rumsfeld/Cheney seem to have blinkedfirst.

2) There is no doubt that unilateralist, anti-UN sentiments continue to dominate the BushWhite House. But hypocrisy aside, changes are afoot. One piece of evidence is Dick Cheney's unexpectedEuropean foray. While arrogantly refusing to even hint at an apology for launching Washington's war in theface of UN and broad international opposition, the fact that he left his undisclosed location at all to travelto European capitals urging greater international support for the U.S. in Iraq, even calling (once - notrepeated) on the UN to respond to the request of the Iraqis, indicates a significant level of pressure onCheney's longstanding antagonism to multilateralism and the UN.

What Did Kofi Annan Agree To?

1) The secretary-general agreed to "send a technical mission to Iraq to establishwhether elections for a transitional national assembly can be held before the transfer of sovereignty on 30June, and if not, what alternative arrangement would be acceptable."

2) The language is significant, since "alternative arrangements" could refer to awide range of possible alternatives, essentially broadening the U.S.-defined mandate. Those alternatives couldinclude not only the nature of the elections but also a challenge to the validity of the U.S.-imposed deadlineitself. That is, the UN mission could conclude that elections are possible at a time beyond June 30th. Aninternal UN study in Iraq from last August determined that it would take six months to organize elections.

3) It is clear that Annan's decision was partly based on the call from Iraqis beyond theU.S.-appointed Governing Council. Specifically, it is clear that al-Sistani's call for the UN to determine thefeasibility of elections played a part in his decision.

Why Is Ayatollah Al-Sistani so Committed to Elections and Why Did He Ask for UN Help?

1) While al-Sistani represents a Shi'a current that does not call for complete clericalcontrol of government, he is eager to realize the likely political potential inherent in the 60% Shi'amajority in Iraq.

2) The U.S.-proposed selection system (a longstanding Bush preference over elections…)for choosing an Iraqi parliament would not only privilege the U.S.-selected Iraqi Governing Council who wouldchoose most of the assembly members, but would give a functional veto to the U.S. occupation officialsthemselves. (In each of the 18 regions the Coalition Provisional Authority - Bremer and company - wouldappoint five of the fifteen members. Since eleven votes would be needed to approve candidates, the CPA wouldbe able to veto anyone they didn't like.)

What is the Danger to the United Nations if it Refuses to Return to Iraq Under U.S.Terms? If it Agrees to U.S. Terms?

1) If the UN completely rejects the U.S. proposal that it return to Iraq under the auspicesof the U.S. occupation, it faces the possibility of escalating marginalization by the Bush administration,further threats to its independence, and the likelihood of being deemed "irrelevant" by the world'ssole super-power. Washington might make additional cuts in dues to the world organization and the humanitarianagencies, reduce its already insufficient political support, and increase its threats and punishments of UNmember states who stand defiant.

2) If the UN agrees to return to Iraq under terms set by the U.S. occupation, the dangersare even higher. The global organization risks a serious loss of international credibility, and the danger ofbeing deemed an agent or facilitator of occupation. Aside from the credibility factor itself, UN staff in Iraqwould again face the likely possibility of physical attack, based on the opposition's view that the UN wasacting as an agent of an illegitimate occupation. Passed under extreme U.S. pressure, Security Councilresolution 1483 arguably provides a kind of forced legality to the U.S. occupation of Iraq; it does notprovide any legitimacy.

So, What Do We Call For?

1) We call for an end to U.S. occupation, and withdrawal of American troops. Because theU.S. invasion destroyed the governing capacity in Baghdad and undermined security for civilians throughoutmuch of the country, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces should be followed by a temporary combined mandate forthe United Nations, Arab League, and OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) to provide direct supportfor Iraq's reclaiming of sovereignty. That would include election assistance, humanitarian and reconstructionaid (including control over all international funds, including those coming from the U.S. Congress, designatedfor Iraqi rebuilding), and peacekeeping/security deployment.

2) The UN investigation team should reject the artificial U.S.-imposed June 30th deadline,and broaden its mandate to examine what conditions would have to change before an election could be organized,assess what time frame would be required to accomplish those changes, and determine whether any electionconducted under foreign military occupation could be free and fair.

What About The Weapons Of Mass Destruction That Weren't?

We were right. They lied.
No gloating - too many people have died.
More later.

Phyllis Bennis is with the Institute for Policy Studies. Courtesy, Znet.