EAST LANSING
The election of Abdullah Gül as president of Turkey--a foregone conclusion since the landslide victory of Prime Minister Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) in July--marks a turning point in the country’s history. If allowed to carry on the mandate with which the party won 46.5 percent of the vote in July elections, the AKP could further democratize the country, bringing about economic liberalization and international integration.
But if the AKP victory--and the entry of a First Lady wearing a headscarf--is interpreted by Europe and the US as marking the rise of an Islamist government, this could contribute to reactionary nationalism in Turkey.
The first multiparty general elections in Turkey were conducted in 1946 through an "open cast, secret tally" system, resulting in the victory of the Kemalist People’s Republican Party (CHP). Since the country’s first free and fair elections conducted in 1950, however, the CHP never returned to the status of absolute majority. Almost all elections in which it came in first place followed a military intervention.
Under normal democratic conditions, the Turkish public brings to power liberal-conservative parties that favor strong integration with the West: the Democratic Party in the 1950s, the Justice Party in the 1960s, the Motherland Party in the 1980s and finally, during the last four years, the AKP. Through liberal economic reforms, these governments allowed social and economic mobilization of their grassroots, thus undermining the classical, bureaucratic model of modernization.
On July 22, the overwhelming majority of Turkish people voted along this general trend. By renewing the mandate of the AKP, Turkish voters confirmed the party’s liberal-internationalist outlook and rejected isolationist tendencies. They rebuffed the authoritarian practice of secularism and continuing pressure of the military in politics designed to secure strict adherence to Kemalist goals.
Contributing to the election results was the futile attempt of the military and judicial bureaucracy to block election of Gül as president, allegedly because he failed to meet standards of secularism as defined by chief of staff General Yasar Büyükanıt as "secularism in essence not in discourse."
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called early elections in response to the Constitutional Court’s April decision to interrupt the presidential election process through a new constitutional interpretation--and the results signaled Gül’s massive popularity. In contrast to the outgoing president, Ahmet N. Sezer, a staunch defender of Kemalism, Gül has an internationalist outlook, demonstrated by his tenure as foreign minister under the first AKP government. He is also a practicing Muslim, whose wife wears a headscarf, the reason why some suggest that his election undermines Turkish secularism.
Since the 28 February process, the Kemalist bureaucratic establishment has intensified attempts to de-Islamify the public sphere by banning the headscarf in universities and government offices.
In a society where reportedly more than half of women don some head covering, such authoritarian secularism is out of touch. These and other limitations forced the newly rising religious middle and upper middle class to seek alternatives for social mobilization. The newly emerging religious middle class internalized globalization and the idea of EU membership in their attempt to escape an authoritarian state.
This phenomenon is most visible in economically-booming central Anatolian towns--notably Gül’s hometown Kayseri, Konya and Kahramanmaras where the AKP garnered nearly 70 percent of the vote. Despite the general rise in nationalism in the country--as indicated by the electoral success of the Nationalist Action Party--they experienced socioeconomic transformation, thanks to export-oriented economic development. Hence, by no coincidence, these cities supported an internationally-oriented, pro-market party.
In contrast, isolationist and nationalist parties increased their percentages in coastal cities where Turks and Kurdish immigrants endure chronic unemployment and related social problems.
Only once before in the history of Turkish democracy did the ruling party increase its number of votes in two consecutive elections. Inasmuch as the primary policy agenda of the first AKP government, 2002-07, was the implementation of EU membership, it would be fair to assert that Turkish voters reaffirmed the party’s pro-EU agenda. Despite bureaucratic hurdles, the government implemented the necessary reforms, as demanded by Brussels, which led to membership negotiations in 2005.
Since then, the membership process has slowed to a crawl, in the context of strong European public reactions to the idea of Turkish membership that may benefit right-wing political parties. This reduced Turkish optimism, paving the way for rising nationalism and ultra-nationalism.
Yet with the 47-percent share of votes that AKP received during the last elections, in contrast to 34 percent in 2002, Turkish voters send a clear message to Europe. A majority of Turkish people express desire for greater global integration and EU membership. Out of the three parties that crossed the electoral threshold of 10 percent, AKP most eagerly defended the country’s full integration with global and European institutions, despite being labeled as "Islamist" by the secularist political establishment and the media. The party rejects any agenda of Islamization of Turkish politics and also garnered support of non-Muslim minorities such as the Greek Orthodox community.
The primary reason the Kemalists label the party as such is individual lifestyle choices of party leaders rather than any specific policy. In practical terms, the headscarf issue has emerged as sufficient condition for being considered an Islamist in Turkish secularist discourse and represents an ideological fault line.
Maintenance of the AKP liberal and integrationist outlook depends upon a favorable response from Europe. Yet approaches of many major European governments, most particularly France and Germany, leave little room for optimism for successful completion of Turkey’s EU-membership process. French President Sarkozy as well as German Chancellor Merkel oppose Turkey’s full membership, instead offering Turkey a "privileged partnership," an arrangement in which Turks would wash the dishes after others finish eating their cake. Such conditional responses may compel the AKP government to fine-tune its stance on the membership drive to combat accusations from nationalists that the EU reforms are concessions to external pressures.
EU membership is critical of Turkey’s relationship with the US, and for this reason the US remains supportive. Ironically, the general anti-Western mood stirring in Turkey is a product of American foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly US occupation of Iraq. Recent Pew opinion-poll data report that more Turks dislike the US than Palestinians do. Only 9 percent of Turks hold a favorable view about their most significant NATO ally, cited as their most admired country in 2000.
The Turkish government must address the question of anti-Americanism, but this requires US cooperation. US refusal to cooperate with Turkey to address Kurdish rebel PKK camps in Northern Iraq contributes to the anti-Americanism. On the other hand, many Turks bitterly remember US acquiescence of numerous military interventions in the history of Turkish democracy and regard the Bush administration’s lukewarm approach on recent democratization issues as an indication of American unpredictability.
Europe and the US must recognize that only a democratic Turkey can contribute to needed stability in the region, that the nation can seek its rightful place both in Europe and the Middle East. They should recognize that reactionary nationalism and isolationist tendencies in Turkish politics are a direct outcome of its historically-rooted perception of being victimized by the West. This perception is widespread even among the most Western-looking Turkish elites deemed as secularists.
Turkey drifting away from the West is not to the West’s advantage and clearly not the desire of most Turks. With a liberal-internationalist government and presidency, Turkey’s demand for European and global integration will be strong.
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Hasan Kösebalaban is a visiting assistant professor at James Madison College, Michigan State University.Rights:
© 2007 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. YaleGlobalOnline
