Assassination Aftermath

The assassination of Mrs Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, hasconsiderably embarrassed President Pervez Musharraf. This was because theIntelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, hadthe over-all responsibility for her security and it was headed by Brig (retd).IjazShah, a close associate of Musharraf, against whom she and her husband Mr.AsifZardari had been repeatedly complaining ever since the first attempt to kill herat Karachi on October 18, 2007. Musharraf's perceived failure to address herconcerns and to respond to her requests for better security have created awidespread perception of wilful negligence in protecting her.

There was definitely negligence in protecting her, but it is difficult to say at what level of the intelligence and security establishment. In the short term,Musharraf should be able to get over this embarrassment provided the streetreaction to the assassination does not become widespread and uncontrollable.There have been violent street protests--particularly in Sindh, as expected, andin pockets of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)-- resulting inthe deaths of over 30 persons and extensive damage to public and privateproperty. But, surprisingly, the street protests have thus far remainedcontrollable and have been no more serious in Karachi than those witnessedearlier this year over the suspension of former Chief Justice Iftikhar MohammadChaudhury of the Supreme Court.

One had expected the whole of Sindh to blow up and rise against Musharrafafter the assassination. Surprisingly, this has not happened so far--not evenafter the funeral of Benazir in her native village. The absence so far ofuncontrollable street anger probably indicates a certain disenchantment with herattempts to make a deal with the Army before she returned from exile on October18, 2007, and with her  pro-US policies. Her strongly pro-US statements didnot apparently go down well even in Sindh and this is reflected in the absenceof massive protests so far.

The support for Musharraf from the Army is unlikely to be weakened as aresult of the assassination unless the street protests become massive in thedays to come, thereby making his position increasingly untenable. If theprotests remain at the present  level and show signs of losing steam in thedays to come, he may be tempted to go ahead with the elections even in the faceof a boycott by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League(PML) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif. The long-suppressed differences inside the PPP betweenthe Zardari loyalists and the traditional loyalists are likely to sharpen.Sindhi leaders such as Makhdoom Amin Fahim have always had their own secretpersonal ambitions, though they remained loyal to her till the last. Now thatshe is no more, personal ambitions would increasingly play a more important rolethan party loyalty in influencing their behaviour and Musharraf should be ableto exploit this to draw them into a coalition with the Pakistan Muslim League (QaideAzam) engineered by him in 2002.

The removal of Benazir from the scene is unlikely to redound to the benefitof Nawaz Sharif in any substantial measure. Thus, the short-term politicalbeneficiary of the removal of Benazir from the scene would be Musharraf and thePML (QA). Musharraf would find it hard to resist the temptation to exploit thesituation to strengthen the political backing for him by going ahead with theelections.

The US is in a dilemma. It realises the folly of uncritical dependence onMusharraf. Had Benazir been there and done well in the elections, she would haveprovided it with another card. With her gone, the US is back to its pre-October18 position of having only the Musharraf card. It would not like to throw awaythis card for the present. The US has reasons to be alarmed by indications ofthe spread of Al Qaeda's tentacles to Rawalpindi. Countering Al Qaeda is moreimportant in its eyes than really nurturing democracy. Pro forma support for atransition to democracy and carrying along with Musharraf despite all that hashappened till an acceptable alternative is on the horizon will be its policy.For this purpose, it would want Musharraf to go ahead with the elections even iftheir credibility had been weakened.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.