Ending speculation on the future of peace in Nagaland, interlocutors of the union government and the topleadership of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) conducted negotiations overthree days on June 25-27, 2004, in Amsterdam.
A high measure of ambiguity is considered vital for the continuation of the negotiating process, and verylittle concrete could be expected to emerge out of a single round of dialogue, given the complexity of theissues involved. The round of talks, nevertheless, constitutes a significant step in maintaining peace inNagaland.
The immediate objective of the negotiations in Amsterdam was to extend the ceasefire with the rebel groupbeyond July 31, 2004. That, however, is a mere formality compared to several other complicated issues, whichcontinue to badger process. The most complicated of these is the demand for the integration of the Nagainhabited areas in the Northeast, a process that effectively means a redrawing of the State boundaries ofAssam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. Over the years, the NSCN-IM and its various protagonists have remainedobdurate in this demand, making it intrinsic to any peaceful resolution of the "Indo-Naga conflict".
The previous National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government's apparently accommodating attitude on such anoption had been checkmated by virulent mass protests in the streets of Manipur in June 2001. However, the newUnited Progressive Alliance (UPA) government's commitment to maintaining status quo on Stateboundaries, enshrined in its Common Minimum Programme (CMP), makes progress in the current peace processdifficult, unless either or both sides are willing to make partial or significant departures from theirprojected positions.
The current round of talks are the first contact between the new UPA government at New Delhi and the rebelgroup. The NSCN-IM had acquired a measure of confidence after nearly five years of negotiating with theprevious NDA government, but an element of uncertainty has now entered the process of negotiations,articulated in the NSCN-IM General Secretary's May 26 statement, "We do hope they are for peace andhonourable solution". Such symptoms of fretfulness had been overcome under the last regime, not only bythe sheer frequency of the meetings held, but also in the way the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) went aboutplacating the NSCN-IM. The largesse doled out was not only visible in the Prime Minister's package of Rupees10.5 billion to the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) government in Nagaland - considered close to theNSCN-IM leadership - in October 2003, a gesture usually reserved for friendly State governments, but also inthe coup orchestrated in Arunachal Pradesh in August 2003, where 39 Members of the Legislative Assembly, witha number of proclaimed NSCN-IM sympathisers, changed their political affiliations to herald in the first-everBJP-led government in that State. Soon after, the Arunachal government not only repealed the Arunachal PradeshControl of Organised Crime Act (APCOCA), 2002, which had been legislated to contain the activities of the NSCNin the State, but also began talking about providing autonomy to the Naga dominated districts of Tirap andChanglang, a known hunting ground of the outfit.
It is well known that the union government today is faced with a far stronger NSCN-IM than was faced by itspredecessor NDA. The group today enjoys a far greater clout, not only in Nagaland, but also in the hill areasof Manipur and in three districts of Arunachal Pradesh. The rebel organisation's widening sphere of influencehas been achieved not only through its appeal among the Naga population in these States, but was substantiallyfacilitated by the NDA government's efforts to install non-Congress governments in the not-so-Hindu Northeast. The growth of NSCN-IM has, in fact, been directly proportional to the growth of the NDA in the region. If theNSCN-IM was showing signs of nervousness regarding the installation of the new UPA government at Delhi,consequently, this has less to do with movement on the peace talks, and probably far more to do with theprobable halt on its sweep over the proposed 'Nagalim' areas in the absence of a central facilitator.
A recently submitted 'Confidential' dossier by the Congress leaders in different States of the Northeast,titled "Law & Order Scenario in Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh", accused theNSCN-IM of continuing its militant activities and pursuing a "grand design to subjugate the entirepopulation." It further requested the union government to implement the 'ceasefire ground rules strictly-in letter and spirit.'
Over the past years of facilitated consolidation, moreover, the IM group has cut into the strongholds of otherdissident and rebel groups as well, and this process is still to be contained. Just over the last couple ofmonths, the NSCN-IM has gained control over sizeable stretches of Phek district, mostly in the Chakhesangregion, the last remaining bastion of the significantly marginalized Naga National Council (NNC). An NNC pressstatement on June 19, 2004, asserted further, "In the latest situation in Chakhesang region, hundreds ofarmed NSCN-IM cadres freely roam every nook and corner of the region carrying out their mission of extortionand terrorism in every village openly in front of the so called law enforcing agencies." On June 12,speaking at the general session of the Chakhesang Public Organisation at Pfütsero, Finance Minister K. Therieaccused the group of not adhering to the ceasefire ground rules and asked its cadre to stop moving around inuniform in Phek district. Similar NSCN-IM activities in Tuensang and Mon district have also been reported.
Several cases of the violation of ceasefire norms have been noted, and the IM cadres have been involved inlarge-scale extortion. On June 22, State Home Minister Dr. T.H. Lotha admitted that some of the Statedepartments had received extortion notes from the militant groups. The government had given a standing orderto all departments to refer all such cases to the State Director General of Police (DGP). However, given theState government's much-professed policy of 'equi-closeness' to all the underground outfits, complaints ofthis nature are never filed. Earlier, two IM cadres were arrested on June 12 while looting money from a truckand some labourers in Kohima. In a move, which could be seen as a confirmation of the existing regime ofextortion, and the State government's inability to deal with it, the DAN government, in June 2004, proposedthat the union government provide financial grants to both the major underground groups, the NSCN-IM and itsrival, the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K), in order to prevent them from collecting illegal 'tax' from civilians.
Another mater of grave concern is the provision of arms training and camping facilities by the NSCN-IM toother insurgent groups. On May 11, 2004, 31 United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) cadres (anti-talksfaction), along with five NSCN-IM militants, were arrested from a bus on the Paren-Ghaspani Road on their wayto Dimapur. These cadres had undergone training at an NSCN-IM camp. There are similar reports of UnitedLiberation Front of Asom (ULFA) cadres, after being ousted from their camps in Bhutan, having been providedshelter at some of the NSCN-IM's designated camps. Recently, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi described thedevelopment as 'very disturbing'. The timely help provided by the NSCN-IM could be a significant factor behindthe ULFA's resurgence in the districts of Upper Assam.
The NSCN-IM's steady gains have forced many of its opponents to fall in line, and have also encouraged manytacit supporters to come out in the open. Recently, NSCN-K cadres of the Chang region defected to the NSCN-IM.Over a hundred cadres of the Khaplang group have changed their loyalty in past one year. Additionally,organisations like the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), Naga Students' Federation (NSF) andNaga Mothers' Association (NMA), which previously operated under a veil of neutrality, are now willing to comeout of the closet in support of the IM group. Thus, in response to a recent allegation by the NSCN-K,censuring these organisations for their biased stand, the NMA, NSF and NPMHR, in a press statement on June 20,claimed that they were, indeed, "proud to support the NSCN-IM." Reiterating their newfoundbluntness, these organisations, on June 26, cautioned the union government that the NSCN-IM would not extendthe ceasefire unless the UPA government modifies its CMP.
What stares the union government in the face, today, is a rebel group that has judiciously exploited theconditions of the ceasefire to significantly augment its authority over the region. The UPA government appearsto have vested its faith in continuing with the old set of negotiators. It is not clear whether these have thewill and capacity to guide the government out of the current logjam in Nagaland.
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Bibhu Prasad Routray is Acting Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati. Courtesy, theSouth Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
