The decisive defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which isferociously fighting probably its last battle in a small piece of land (about 20sq. kms) with little chance of winning it, is partly due to the follies ofPrabakaran, its chief, during the last four years and partly due to thedetermined and ruthless manner in which the Sri Lankan Armed forces have carriedout their operations.
Among his follies, one could mention his split with Karuna, the legendaryconventional fighter from the Eastern Province and his followers, his increasingreliance on terrorism after the desertion of the conventional fighters led byKaruna and his working for the defeat of Ranil Wickremasinghe, former PrimeMinister, in the Presidential election in November, 2005, which was won byMahinda Rajapaksa.
During its existence, the LTTE had developed a capability for conventionalwarfare as well as for spectacular acts of terrorism. Its best conventionalfighters came from the Eastern Province and many of its suicide terrorists fromthe Northern Province. Unhappiness among the conventional fighters that thesuicide bombers from the North were accorded greater importance and honours byPrabakaran led to their desertion under Karuna's leadership. Karuna helped theSri Lankan Army in its operations against the LTTE.
Deprived of the strong conventional capability, the LTTE increasingly relied onterrorism and intimidatory attacks by its small fleet of aircraft in its fightagainst the Armed Forces. Its reliance on terrorism at a time when theinternational community was developing a policy of zero tolerance for terrorismafter 9/11 deprived it of even the little public and political support which ithad enjoyed in the West. The European Union countries declared it a terroristorganization and took vigorous action to stop its gun running.
No Sri Lankan leader was more sympathetic to the aspirations of the Tamils thanformer President Chandrika Kumaratunge and Wickremasinghe. The latter wasprepared to concede in a large measure the political demands of the LTTE withina federal set-up. If Prabakaran had responded positively to the gestures fromWickremasinghe, the latter would have enabled the LTTE to retain control of theterritory which it had occupied and given it a measure of autonomy in return forthe LTTE giving up its demand for an independent Tamil Eelam.
Prabakaran, who had an inflated belief in his own prowess and in the perceivedinvincibility of the LTTE, spurned his gestures and worked for his defeat in thePresidential elections. His calculation that Rajapaksa would be a weak andindecisive President, whose Sinhalese extremism would further polarise relationsbetween the Sinhalese and the Tamils, proved terribly wrong.
Rajapaksa turned out to be one of the strongest and clear-headed Presidents SriLanka has had. He came to office determined to defeat the LTTE as an insurgentand terrorist organization first before addressing the aspirations of theTamils. He gave his armed forces the wherewithal in terms of money and equipmentto enable them defeat the LTTE. He also resisted international pressure to reacha political accommodation with the LTTE. He was determined that the politicalaccommodation will be with the Tamils after the defeat of the LTTE and not withthe LTTE.
The improved morale and capabilities of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces havedefinitely contributed to their remarkable success in relentlessly rolling backthe LTTE from the areas controlled by it, but this success was facilitated bythe ruthless use of air strikes against the LTTE.
Did Indian assistance also contribute to the success of the SL Armed Forces? Thegovernment of India denies having given any offensive equipment and training tothe SL Armed Forces, but Sri Lankan officers and leaders have themselves beensaying that the success of their Armed Forces was made possible by Indianassistance. The failure of the government of India to counter these claims hascreated growing suspicions not only among the Sri Lankan Tamils, but also amongsections of the people of Tamil Nadu that the government of Dr Manmohan Singhhas not been very straightforward and that it had given more assistance to SriLanka than it has admitted.
The LTTE's brutal assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 created arevulsion for it in Tamil Nadu. If it has since managed to rehabilitate itselfin the eyes of some sections of public opinion in Tamil Nadu, the Manmohan Singhgovernment and its senior functionaries cannot escape the responsibility for it.The failure of the government to condemn the air strikes and its seeminghelplessness in the face of the humanitarian disaster affecting over 200,000Tamils have cost it considerable public support in Tamil Nadu and made supportfor the Sri Lankan Tamils once again a popular cause. Rajiv Gandhi'sassassination by the LTTE has been forgotten.
People tend to compare what they perceive as Manmohan Singh's helplessattitude in the face of the repeated rejection by the Rajapaksa government ofthe requests for a humanitarian approach to Rajiv Gandhi's action in sendingthe Indian Air Force to drop humanitarian supplies to the Tamils despite strongcriticism of the Indian action not only by the SL authorities, but also by theinternational community.
What next after the defeat of the LTTE? Rajapaksa has been repeatedly promisingthat he would address the aspirations of the Tamils for greater political andeconomic rights. Will a bloated Army and the Sinhalese extremist elements allowhim to keep his word even if he wants to or will he, egged on by his army, tryto impose a dictated peace on the Tamils? One has to keep one's fingerscrossed.
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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
