A Tactical Retreat

Inaugurating a three-day 'Global meet on resurgent Bihar' onJanuary 19, 2007, in Patna, President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam observed that Bihar'sdevelopment was crucial for the development of India. And in an attempt toencourage investment, Bihar Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar, stated that ‘goodgovernance’ was possible with firm efforts being made to establish the rule oflaw and make the state "an investor-friendly destination." The persistent problem of the Maoist insurgency in Bihar, however, remains a crucial element in defining the trajectory of thestate’s future.

The union ministry oh Home affairs, in its 2006 report oninternal security, stated that, except in the state of Chhattisgarh, whereincidents and casualties registered a steep increase, Left Wingextremist-related violence in the other affected states was contained duringyear 2006. According to data compiled by the Institute for ConflictManagement, Bihar accounted for 40 fatalities in year 2006 – 16 civilians,five security force (SF) personnel and 19 Maoists (also known as Naxalites) –as compared to 106 fatalities in 2005, including 25 civilians, 29 SF personneland 52 Maoists.

The decline witnessed in the Maoist activity in Bihar can beattributed to, among others, two primary reasons: first, there has been atactical retreat on the part of the Maoists, as the success story of SFs,particularly in Andhra Pradesh, has forced a revaluation of strategies andtactics not only in Bihar, but in all theatres across the country; and the SFshave also, to a certain extent, been able to counter Maoist subversion with thearrests and killing of some of the top leaders in the state. The SFs have alsomade significant seizures of arms, ammunition and explosives through year 2006.

Some of the significant Maoist-related incidents anddevelopments in Bihar in year 2006 included:

December 19, 2006: A Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) ‘central committee’ member, Arun Paswan alias Gautam, carrying a reward of INR 100,000 on his head, was arrested from the Chandauti Police Station area of Gaya district.
November 11, 2006: A weapons cache meant for the Maoists, including 585 INSAS rifle cartridges and Ordnance Factory products exclusively used by the Army, were seized from arms smugglers at Hamzapur. Three persons were arrested in this connection.
November 5, 2006: Ten CPI-Maoist cadres were arrested from an unidentified location under Lakshmipur Police Station in the Jamui district. Police sources said that the arrested included some Maoists involved in the killing of Munger district Superintendent of Police, K. C. Surendra Babu, in January 2005.
October 12, 2006: Four CPI-Maoist cadres, including an 'area commander' identified as Sahu, were arrested from an unspecified village under the Nasriganj Block in the Rohtas district.
August 18, 2006: Ten suspected CPI-Maoist cadres, including an ‘area commander’, were arrested from a village under the Mufassil Police Station of Gaya district.
May 5, 2006: In a joint operation, the Special Task Force, Bihar Military Police and Jamui Police shot dead five CPI-Maoist cadres in Lenin Nagar under the Sikandara Police Station of Jamui district.
April 24, 2006: Madanpur block Janata Dal (United) president Ashok Singh and six of his supporters were killed by CPI-Maoist cadres near Devjada village in the Aurangabad district.
April 3, 2006: A Deputy Superintendent of Police, Akhileshwar Prasad, was killed during an encounter with cadres of the CPI-Maoist in the Rohtas district.
March 14, 2006: A 'zonal commander' of the CPI-Maoist, Satyendra Yadav, who was wanted in connection with the Jehanabad prison attack, and his associate, Kesar Yadav, were arrested from Murgiachak village under Bhagwanganj Police Station in the Jehanabad district.
March 5, 2006: Three cadres of the CPI-Maoist were killed and two SF personnel injured as police foiled an attempt by the former to loot firearms from the Umaria Police Station in Gaya district.
January 15, 2006 : Seven CPI-Maoist cadres, including an ‘area commander’, all suspected to be involved in the Jehanabad district Jail attack, were arrested from separate places in the Patna district.
January 3, 2006: CPI-Maoist cadres shot dead a former Member of the Legislative Assembly, Hari Prasad, in the Chainpur area of Bhabua district.

Despite reverses and a decline in violence and fatalities,the Maoists are evidently in a process of making a qualitative penetrationacross the 38 districts of Bihar. Reports relating to the Maoists’ politburodocument suggest that they have launched a "socio-economicinvestigation" in places, both where their movement is strong and also intargeted areas, to identify new issues faced by the people. The "socialinvestigation" is aimed at redefining the strategies and field-leveltactics during the Special Congress – a major brainstorming session for theParty. It is significant, within this context, that "the study anddocumentation of local issues, grievances, and social and political powerdistribution" is a necessary prelude, within Maoist theory, to politicalmass mobilization around these grievances, the organization of protests andactivities, which lead up to the creation of ‘revolutionary solidarity’ andeventually, to the training and deployment of cadres in the protracted‘people’s war’.

The Maoist threat, consequently, is "not limited to theareas of immediate violence, nor does this threat vanish if violence is notmanifested at a particular location for a specific period of time. It is in thecomplex processes of political activity, mass mobilisation, arms training andmilitary consolidation that the Maoist potential has to be estimated. Whileincidents of violence and fatalities would be crucial in any threat assessment,they cannot exhaust its entire content." These broad considerations suggestthat the Maoists are focusing on a process of political mobilization andconsolidation, which will translate into violence in the foreseeable future.

It is also important to note that it is not long since Biharwas witness to the Jehanabad incursion. In what is arguably the most daringattack in the history of the Naxalite movement in India, approximately 150 to200 armed cadres of the CPI-Maoist along with an estimated 800‘sympathizers’ attacked the Jehanabad district Jail on November 13, 2005,and freed 341 prisoners, abducted more than 20 activists of the Ranvir Sena (amilitia of upper caste landlords), and looted a large quantity of arms andammunition. During the siege, seven persons (three Maoists, two Ranvir Senacadres and two police personnel) were killed. Subsequently, the Maoists executednine of the abducted Ranvir Sena cadres. The Maoists, who had virtually takencontrol of all entry and exit points of the town, also carried out synchronizedattacks on the district Court, Police Lines, district Armoury, the residence ofthe district Judge, and the S. S. College, where a Paramilitary Forces’ (PMF)camp had been set up. The Jehanabad incident is not an isolated one, andessentially marks a ‘higher stage of militarization’ of the movement.

Crucially, the lower levels of violence do not mean that the statehas reclaimed territory from the rebels or secured any dramatic victories overthe rebels. Indeed, the number of districts affected by Maoist activity in Biharhas, according to sources, remained more or less the same. There are variationsin the levels and patterns of Maoist activity but the larger picture remainsunchanged.

While 11 districts (West Champaran, East Champaran, Kaimur,Rohtas, Aurangabad, Gaya, Nawada, Jamui, Patna (south), Jehanabad, Arwal) arecategorized as highly affected, another 16 districts (Sheohar, Sitamari,Begusarai, Lakhisarai, Munger, Muzaffarpur, Nalanda, Khagaria, Darbhanga, Buxar,Siwan, Vaishali, Saharsha, Banka, Purnia, Katihar) are categorized as moderatelyaffected, while three districts (Madhubani, Sapaul, Araria) fall into thecategory of ‘targeted’, bringing the total number of districts in the stateaffected by Maoist activity to 29 (of a total of 38 districts). The lastcategory of ‘targeted’ areas, however, remains a misnomer in the strategicsense since the CPI-Maoist has clearly expressed its intent to capture poweracross the length and breadth of the country, and has established Regional, Stateand Special Zonal Committees to oversee this grand enterprise that leave only ahandful of areas presently outside its scope.

However, as far as their operational areas are concerned, theCPI-Maoist continues to maintain a presence in all parts of Bihar, with theirprimary support base located in the lower castes and poor peasantry. IncreasedMaoist mobilization has been recorded in south central Bihar with a gradualspread towards the northeastern part of the state. This upsurge has also beenmade possible by the Ranvir Sena’s decline in the Magadh region (Gaya, Nawada,Aurangabad and Jehanabad districts), which this armed group dominated earlier.

Effective counter-insurgency operations against the Maoistshave been inhibited by a lack of inter-state co-ordination, a perennial problemwhich the Centre is presently attempting to address in earnest. Recent reportsindicate that West Bengal, Bihar and Jharkhand were unable to reach anunderstanding to launch a joint offensive against the extremists, at theBhubaneswar meeting convened by the union home ministry in December 2006, toevolve a coordinated response to the Maoist problem. The Director General of theJharkhand Police, J. Mahapatra, claimed that Bihar officials argued that theywere not ‘dependent’ on Jharkhand to contain the Naxalite menace. Assertingthat they were self-sufficient, the Bihar representatives stated their forceshad been able to ‘successfully fight’ the Naxalites, according to Mahapatra.

The spread of left wing extremism in Bihar has beenenormously facilitated by the sheer and endemic lack of human development, acrumbling state administrative machinery, and decaying infrastructure. Maoistshave taken advantage of this widespread 'retreat of governance', not only inestablishing a network of extortion, imposing 'levies' and 'revolutionarytaxes', but also initiating 'developmental works' in some areas.

Maoist subversion in Bihar overlays a much wider breakdown ofthe criminal justice system, and the state has persistently neglected issues ofpolicing and the need to develop adequate capacities of response to variouschallenges of internal security. The Crime in India – 2005 report, publishedby the National Crime Records Bureau, indicates that Bihar has policemen perlakh population ratio of 57, the worst in the country. By comparison, nationalaverage is 122, and some states boast a ratio of 854 (Mizoram) and 609 (Sikkim).Even the other Maoist afflicted states are significantly better off: AndhraPradesh has a ratio of 98; Chhattisgarh, 103, Jharkhand (which was formerly partof Bihar), 85; and Orissa, 90. Substantial sections of the Bihar Police continueto use the antiquated World War I vintage bolt-action .303 rifles and otherobsolete equipment, as compared to the more sophisticated weaponry with theMaoists, and the condition of rural Police Stations in the state is abysmal.Organisations representing Police personnel in the state have repeatedlyprotested against the lack of adequate protection to the Police and theirfamilies, and the Force is hardly in a position to protect the public. Despitethe rhetoric of ‘resurgent Bihar’, unless these parameters undergo dramatictransformation, little can be expected in any other sphere of development. Inthe absence of improved security, the expectation of any noticeable surge ininvestment and economic activities will prove entirely illusory.

Ajit Kumar Singh is Research Assistant, Institute forConflict Management. Courtesy. the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal