A Political Blunder

Using her executive prerogative, on 4^th November, President Chandrika Kumaratunge sacked threeof the cabinet ministers holding important portfolios of Defence, Home and Information in Wickremasinghegovernment on the ground that they were acting against the security interests of the country - seriousallegations indeed. Information has just been received that the President has declared an emergency. This is likely to put the whole peace talks with the LTTE in jeopardy.

Constitutionally, Chandrika’s actions were correct but politically to say the least, it is a greatblunder. The timing was equally bad when  her Prime minister was away in USA and the LTTE had justsubmitted its proposals for an interim administration of Northeast. She has prorogued the Parliament for afortnight and when it opens she would need the help of JVP to realign the groups in her favour.  With thedeclaration of emergency, the Parliament may not be convened at all.

The JVP, it is well known, is totally opposed to any concessions to the Tamils and even the ongoing peaceprocess. Yet in her address to the nation she has assured the minorities that their interests will beprotected.

The three ministers sacked were very close to Prime minister Wickremasinghe. More significantly, they werethe most active supporters of the ceasefire talks with the LTTE. Sadly, the sacking would send a wrong signalto the LTTE.

The President’s party, the SLFP without waiting to make a serious study of the proposals had stronglycriticised it just two days ago and this combined with the present sacking of the ministers most supportive ofthe talks would only confirm the suspicion the LTTE had, that President Chandrika was not serious of the peaceprocess and that at some point or other she would scuttle the whole process.

What is forgotten is, that instead of vague generalities which have been the hall mark of LTTE as well asother Tamil militant groups since July 1983 after the state inspired riots- for the first time the LTTE hascome up with specific proposals for an interim administration for the North East. There could be criticismsthat the proposal is silent on the role GOSL ( Government of Sri Lanka), or that of the federal conceptconceded in the peace talks or on the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka now emphasised by the President - butit is  important to note that the LTTE has given the parameters of autonomy they want to hold in theirhome land for a discussion.

Soon after submitting the proposals for the interim administration (ISGA), it was the LTTE that took theinitiative for talks on the proposals and had requested the Norwegian interlocutor to convene the nowsuspended meeting soon. The last round (sixth) was held on 18^th February, 2003.

The first major mistake made by Prime minister Wickremasinghe was in not taking the President intoconfidence when the preliminary MOU relating to the cease fire was drafted and signed. In a cohabitationgovernment where the President has enormous executive powers it should have occurred to Wickremasinghe thatconsensus of the two arms of the government was absolutely necessary and more so, when the President is fromthe opposition party. This was not done. The President on the other hand in spite of making periodicstatements that she was not against the peace process went about openly criticising the Prime minister onevery action of his with no holds barred. The impression that one got was that if ever the peace process isgoing to be scuttled it may not due to the intransigence of the LTTE, but  due to the infighting betweenthe President and the Prime minister.

The first reaction of India as revealed by the spokesman of the External Affairs was that it was"surprised " by the developments in Sri Lanka. The surprise is that India is surprised, as it wasfully aware of the ongoing tussle between the President and the Prime minister. Both were close to the Indiangovernment and both have been informing the decision makers here directly and through emissaries the problemeach was facing from the other. Where India failed was that in spite of its assessment that the peace talkshad no chance of success without the two wings of the government (who represent the majority Sinhalacommunity) arriving at a consensus, nothing was done to get them together on this important issue which notonly affects the stability of Sri Lanka but of the entire region.

Now what next? How would the Norwegian interlocutors react? Norway has already incurred the ire of thePresident who had asked for the withdrawal of the Norwegian chief of the cease fire monitoring team who isalleged to have acted against the security interests of the host country! She made such serious allegationsdirectly to the Prime minister of Norway without even consulting her Prime minister! Those who have dealt withthe Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, know very well how difficult is the task for any third party tomediate. Yet the Norwegians showed extra ordinary patience and perseverance in continuing with the peaceprocess and never gave up.

More important would be the reaction of the LTTE. Officially the LTTE sources have said that they arewatching the developments. They are unlikely to respond to any peace overtures coming directly from thePresident. They have already prepared themselves fairly well for any renewal of the conflict. Unconfirmedreports indicate that the LTTE cadres outside the area of their control have been asked to return. If theceasefire breaks down ( hope it does not), it is not the President or the Prime minister who would suffer, butthe people on both sides of the ethnic divide. The question is: can this be avoided?

Dr S. Chandrasekharan is Director, South Asia Analysis Group.