A Compact Of Fire

"We do not believe that the suffering masses can be liberated through negotiations. Our ultimate goal is to capture power through armed revolution."

Ramakrishna, 
'Secretary', People's War Group

The merger of two dangerous left wing extremist outfits, the erstwhile Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People's War (CPI-ML PW, also known as the People's War Group or PWG) poses a threat that goes beyond internal security, and imperils India's Parliamentary Democracy itself. 

The two Left Wing extremist groups merged to form a new "unified" entity, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) on September 21 somewhere in the projected Naxalite 'liberated zone', either in Jharkhand or Bihar. The merger of these two groups, long-feared by the state's intelligence agencies who had taken up the obstruction of such a fusion as a priority, contains the potential to change the course of the 'revolutionary movement' not only in India, but also across the South Asianneighbourhood.

The merger now makes the CPI-Maoist a pan-Indian revolutionary group, and bringsthe Maoists closer to their objective of 'liberating' their proposed CompactRevolutionary Zone (CRZ), which extends from Nepal through Bihar in the North toDandakaranya region (forest areas of Central India) and Andhra Pradesh in theSouth. 

The intention is to have a continuous stretch of territory under theirinfluence and control, with the ultimate goal of eventually"liberating" the entire zone. Large parts of this territory havealready been brought under the extremist influence with only some link-ups nownecessary in the remaining pockets to make the CRZ a reality. Once achieved, theCRZ will virtually drive a wedge through the vital areas of the country, andwould help crystallize linkages with other Maoist groups operating in SouthAsia, including the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) and the CommunistParty of Bhutan-Maoist (CPB-M).

The merger is the consequences of initiatives that date back five years, whenthe PWG approached the MCC with a proposal of merger. In fact, since itsinception on April 22, 1980, the PWG had been trying to bring all the Left Wingextremist groups in India (numbering around 40) under its umbrella with theobjective of overthrowing 'the bureaucrat comprador bourgeois and big landlordsclasses who control state power in collusion with imperialism' and 'to establishin its place the New Democratic State under the leadership of the proletariat'with the ultimate aim of establishing socialism and communism. 

The MCC had been its first target and talks had been on since the early1980's. However, the discussions failed to progress initially as a result ofturf wars and differences at the leadership level. Despite ideologicalcommonalities and shared objectives, the pathways to the merger have been fullof obstacles, with territorial and leadership clashes giving rise to aninternecine conflict that lasted through much of the 1990s, as the two groupsstruggled for supremacy in different parts of then undivided Bihar, resulting inthe death of hundreds of cadres and sympathisers. 

However, continuous interaction resulted in declining hostility between thetwo groups over time, and gradually increased operational cooperation andconsolidation. The creation of Jharkhand in November 2000 and anti-Maoistoperations launched by the administration pushed the MCC and PWG into closercooperation, and a truce was announced between them three years ago.Significantly, the PWG had earlier merged with the CPI-ML (Party Unity) of Biharin August 11, 1998.

According to the CPI-Maoist press release issued by Muppala Lakshman Rao aliasGanapathi, the 'General Secretary' of the Party, the unity was aimed atfurthering the cause of "revolution" in India. The new party alsopledged to work in close collaboration with the Communist Party of Nepal(Maoist). As part of its strategy, the CPI-Maoist would fiercely oppose theCentral Government run by the Congress and its mainstream communist allies, theCommunist Party of India (CPI) and the CPI-Marxist. Ganapathi also announced theformation of a 'People's Liberation Guerrilla Army' and extended support to"revolutionary struggles" in Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, Turkey and"other places".

The MCC's current areas of influence extended over Bihar and Jharkhand, withsome sway in Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal, Uttaranchal and afew pockets of Madhya Pradesh. The PWG's areas of dominance included AndhraPradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. Bothorganizations shared their belief in the 'annihilation of class enemies' and inextreme violence as a means to secure organizational goals. However, significantideological divisions did exist in the past, with the PWG adhering to aMarxist-Leninist 'line', while the MCC embraced Maoism. 

These differences have now been ironed over, with Maoism prevailing, in thewords of PWG Andhra Pradesh State 'Secretary', as "the higher stage of theM-L (Marxist-Leninist) philosophy. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism will be theideological basis guiding its (CPI-Maoist's) thinking in all spheres of itsactivities." The new entity has reaffirmed its commitment to the classicalMaoist strategy of 'protracted armed struggle' which defines its objectives notin terms of the seizure of lands, crops, or other immediate goals, but theseizure of power. Within this perspective, participation in elections andengagement with the prevailing 'bourgeois democracy' are rejected, and allefforts and attention is firmly focused on 'revolutionary activities' toundermine the state and seize power.

The merger will have serious implications in all States facing the Maoistthreat, and will increase the 'firepower' the 'battle ability' and levels ofmodernization of the two groups. The PWG is estimated to have 3500 armed cadresand around 3000 firearms, including a large number of rifles of AK variety, LMGs,SLRs, carbines, .303s, grenades, revolvers, pistols, and landmines technologies.The PWG also has a technical squad, which manufactures 12-bore guns and itsammunitions, repairs all kinds of weapons and assembles grenades. The MCC isestimated to have cadre strength of between 3000-3500, and around 2500 firearmsof similar varieties.

The two guerrilla 'armies' of the PWG and the MCC - the People's Guerrilla Army(PGA) and the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) - havealso merged under the September agreement. The new armed force will operateunder the name 'People's Liberation Guerrilla Army' (PLGA) after December 2,2004. The CPI-Maoist would carry on the new "democratic revolution, whichwould remain directed against imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucraticcapitalism." The new party believes that the merger would cause "fearamong the ruling classes" and would fulfil "the aspirations of themasses" for a strong revolutionary party that would usher in a "newdemocratic society" by advancing towards socialism and communism.

Financially, the CPI-Maoist will be the richest and largest revolutionary groupin India, with a presence in at least 125 districts in 12 States, with another24 districts targeted in its current phase of expansion.

The merger could also be seen as a strategic move to escape the ban in Bihar and Tamil Nadu, and the national ban under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which was recently amended by an Ordinance to incorporate elements of the repealed Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002, as the new party, technically speaking, is not banned. The Governments in these States will have to issue separate orders banning the new entity, giving the CPI-Maoist some time to expand its bases.

The merger assumes more threatening proportions in view of the CPN-M's rampageacross Nepal. The CPN-M has long maintained that unless the Maoists of the SouthAsia region work together to counter India's 'pernicious role', 'final victory'would elude them. Intelligence sources indicate that, if the Maoist insurgentsachieve their objective in Nepal, a sudden spurt of cross-border terrorism alongthe 1,751 kilometre Indo-Nepal border would be a certainty, as the Maoist groupsfocus on the consolidation of their Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ).

The results of the merger are already visible in operations in West Bengal andJharkhand.

• On October 15, cadres of the CPI-M blew up a Public Works Department (PWD) guesthouse at Kundari under Lesliganj block in Palamau district of Jharkhand.
  
  
• On October 14, a landmine blew up at least six Eastern Frontier Rifles personnel inside a forest in the West Midnapore district of West Bengal.
  
  
• On October 13, the CPI-Maoist cadres damaged a block office in the West Midnapore district of West Bengal, though there were no reports of any casualties in the incident.

In the meantime, the state response to 'Naxalism' remains incoherent anddirectionless. As the extremists work to consolidate and expand their power,repeatedly declaring their commitment to 'armed struggle' and their rejection ofIndia's 'bourgeois democracy', the Andhra Pradesh Government - the State hasbeen the location of some of the most serious and ideologically coherentmovement for decades now - has put its entire faith in 'negotiations', backed bythe Centre, with the Union Ministry of Home Affairs encouraging other Naxalite-affectedStates to follow the Andhra Pradesh example.

Initial reports on the talks between representatives of the PWG / CPI-Maoistand the Andhra Government, however, are far from encouraging. The Naxalites haverejected two basic ground rules that the State Government had put forward: theywill not surrender their arms; and will not accept any restriction on bearingarms in the areas of their operation, and the Government has tamely submitted.The Government, incidentally, has already called off all counter-insurgencyoperations in the State, giving the armed Naxalite cadres a completely free run.

Reports suggest frenetic activity to regroup, recruit and train new cadres inAndhra Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar and Chhattisgarh, as well assignificant activity to enter hitherto virgin territories. While theCPI-Maoist's intentions are abundantly clear, neither the Union nor the StateGovernments appear to have any coherent strategy - other than the delusionaryoptimism of a directionless process of 'negotiations' - to contain or counterthe extremist gameplan.

In the interim, intelligence agencies appear to be pinning their hopes on thepossibilities of exploiting or provoking internal dissension within theCPI-Maoist, insisting that the money in the joint kitty is 'too big to share',and that conflict over the division of spoils would eventually undermine themerger and joint operations.

Having failed to prevent the merger, it appears that the surviving gamble isto take advantage of residual ideological differences, personality clashes andconflicts of vested interests to undermine effective cooperation within theCPI-Maoist. Given the track record of continuous consolidation within the LeftWing extremist ranks and the continuous and abysmal failure of the state tocontain their activities, however, the chances of winning on this throw of thedice are far from optimistic.

Nihar Nayak is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia TerrorismPortal