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West Side's Story

The Indian mood is upbeat, but western scepticism will persist till Indo-Pak dialogue takes off

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West Side's Story
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It may not be a mandate for India but it certainly is a mandate for Indian democracy," gushed a government official who plays a key role in formulating New Delhi's Kashmir policy. As the election results came pouring in, and the Abdullah dynasty was banished from centrestage, the official ebulliently reeled off what the results meant for India: "It's a mandate for peace, it's a mandate against Pakistan and it's a big snub to the Hurriyat."

But in Delhi's spiffy diplomatic enclave, there are not many who share the official's perception and enthusiasm. As one of them said, "It would be wrong to assume the elections have solved everything. It is only the starting point." Sure the election was fair, sure the turnout was impressive in the face of a steady onslaught of violence, sure there was infiltration from Pakistan. But as another western diplomat warns, "It would be wrong of India to rest on these laurels." So, what will satisfy the West? De-escalation of tension in the subcontinent and Indo-Pak talks.

Therefore, these diplomats obviously don't think the successful conduct of elections has swept aside the alienation of the people in the Valley. For one, they are worried whether or not it was inclusive of all sections in the Valley. Certainly, India tried to reach out to the ideologically and politically intransigent—as represented by the likes of the Hurriyat and Shabir Shah—but foreign diplomats feel these efforts were at best modest. One verdict was even harsher: "All attempts to have the Hurriyat and the others participate in the elections were sabotaged."

Lest these diplomats are considered a quibbling group, a senior Indian official tacitly accepts the sabotage theory. He asks: "Isn't it remarkable that all initiatives by New Delhi to coopt the Hurriyat have not worked? Whether it was the (K.C.) Pant thing or the Arun Jaitley initiative or even (Ram) Jethmalani's. Yet, there are a whole lot of people in New Delhi who are patting themselves on the back and crowing about the elections. But actually the very people they contacted boycotted the election. We have to ask ourselves what this means."

Western diplomats questioning the inclusive nature of the Kashmir election point to some telling statistics: 22 of the Valley's 46 assembly constituencies registered a turnout below 30 per cent. In six of these, it was below 5 per cent; in four it was between 5 and 10 per cent; five others registered between 10 and 20 per cent; another five witnessed between 20 and 25 per cent of polling and two between 25 and 30 per cent.

Ultimately, they say, New Delhi has to ask whether a candidate who won, say, from Habbakadal, where only 1.84 per cent of 66,782 voters cast their ballot, can be considered truly representative. In such assembly segments people didn't turn out to vote, though what has to be determined is whether this was because of the Hurriyat's call for a poll boycott or because they were scared of retribution from militants.

But Indian officials say there's another side to this argument. Since low turnout wasn't universal, and some constituencies did witness tremendous enthusiasm, the limitation of the Hurriyat's "pumped-up reputation" is palpable. As one of them remarked acerbically, "These people had been given undue importance by western diplomats and now they (the Hurriyat) stand exposed as anything but representative of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir. Their influence is clearly localised."

Such perceptions could inspire Kashmir policy-makers to ignore the Hurriyat. But western diplomats' expectations are to the contrary. Apart from hoping that the new assembly would explore avenues of economic and political amelioration, they feel New Delhi must continue to reach out to the Hurriyat and others.As one diplomat put it: "Good elections tend to influence attitudes in positive ways. The political capital that New Delhi has reaped in this election should strengthen the government's resolve to continue dialogue with political forces in the Valley. It is very important to somehow get them in."

Some diplomats concede they don't expect the entire 23-party conglomerate to be mesmerised by New Delhi's dazzling political initiatives. But they feel that Mirwaiz Umer Farooq's Awami Action Committee and the late Abdul Ghani Lone's People's Conference (PC) are ripe for the picking. The PC fielded proxy candidates (estimates vary between seven and 15, depending on which government agency is asked for figures). Out of these, government sources admit, less than 30 per cent won. Out of the five candidates in Kupwara, only one won, and in Khansahib in Badgam, a PC-supported proxy candidate won. Government sources say this could be attributed to the fact that the PC leadership didn't campaign and party symbols and flags were not used. What lessons the Hurriyat draws from this remains to be seen.

These lessons will be made clear to Jethmalani, of the Kashmir Committee, who is scheduled to visit Srinagar on October 19 to meet the Hurriyat. Says a senior official: "The Jethmalani mission can either revive itself or get marginalised. It all depends on the Hurriyat." However, government sources make it clear that there are not going to be fresh initiatives other than those under way.

So, where exactly do the Kashmir elections leave New Delhi? US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill was candid: "We continue to note that elections in Kashmir alone won't solve Indo-Pak problems. We're hoping it will open up diplomatic dialogue."

Indian diplomatic sources say the situation will have to be assessed based on three emerging trends: the credibility of the j&k elections strengthening New Delhi's position; Pakistan not delivering on its promise to end cross-border terrorism; and the low turnout in the Pakistan elections further denting President Pervez Musharraf's credibility. In fact, his version of democracy saw the middle classes staying away from the polls, consequently enabling religious parties to improve their performance spectacularly. This means the new civilian government—or Musharraf—can't resile from the hardline Kashmir stance.

Western diplomats in New Delhi, though, look at the situation differently. Acknowledging that New Delhi has developed a distinct aversion to talking to the Pakistani military dictator, they feel that "one of the expectations inherent in the Pakistan polls is that New Delhi will have a new power centre to speak with". But that power centre dependent on fundamentalists could belie this hope.

What must be remembered is that the sustained international pressure on New Delhi isn't because of Kashmir directly; it is more because of the tension at the Indo-Pak border. Indian diplomats feel Indian strategy should aim at achieving some de-escalation that could satisfy the international objective of reducing risks of a conflict in the region. Once this is done, they say the pressure on India to talk to Pakistan would ease.

But the EU-India summit only testified to the hardening of stance: the international community expects Indo-Pak dialogue and New Delhi is against it. What India has to judge is whether its stubbornness would erode the goodwill the Kashmir election generated for it abroad.

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