Making A Difference

Two-Track Soliloquies

The third round of secretary-level discussion ends in failure; now the scene shifts to New York

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Two-Track Soliloquies
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AS expected, the euphoria following the Male meeting between the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers, I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif, is over. And once again it's back to the two leaders to give the dialogue a renewed impetus when they meet in New York on September 23. If they fail to resolve the differences, it is unlikely that the officials from the two sides will succeed.

The third round of the bilateral Indo-Pak dialogue ended on September 18 inconclusively. Not so surprisingly, the two sides failed to agree on the kind of mechanism to be adopted for dealing with Jammu and Kashmir and peace and security, including confidence-building measures (CBMs), two of the eight issues identified in the June 23 joint statement issued at the end of the second round in Islamabad.

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Gujral and Sharif had announced with much fanfare in Male that they had agreed to the setting up of the working groups to tackle various bilateral issues, leaving the details to be worked out by the foreign secretaries, which the two officials proceeded to do in Islamabad in June. And that is where the dialogue has been stalled ever since.

Most observers have chosen to focus on the problem of working out a mechanism for solving the two thorny problems. But that is only part of the dilemma. Islamabad wants the structure of the talks to be such that Kashmir is reflected as the core issue, bestowing it with a certain exclusivity, high profile and focus. In such a scenario, it is easy to use the whole exercise for propaganda purposes. When Pakistan's foreign secretary, Shamshad Ahmad, arrived in New Delhi, there were indications that he would not insist on a working group and would agree to a subcommittee. From the Indian point of view, there is no difference in this except in the nomenclature. In fact, it will not come as much of a surprise if Pakistan suddenly drops the demand for a joint working group and seeks an alternative arrangement which provides exclusivity to the Kashmir issue.

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As things stand today, Pakistan has premised the entire bilateral dialogue on Kashmir. This was inevitable. The Pakistani obsession with Kashmir and the domestic compulsions of any Islamabad government are well known. That resumption of dialogue would be problematic and this Pakistani emphasis on Kashmir would have to be reckoned with were also things South Block had expected. But officials hoped that though a long-drawn-out process, discussions between the two sides could help accommodate their mutual concerns.

On its part, in the June 23 joint statement after the first round of talks, India agreed to list Kashmir along with other bilateral issues which needed to be thrashed out. This, to some extent, accommodated Pakistani concerns. The statement spoke about setting up "a mechanism, including working groups at appropriate levels, to address all these issues in an integrated manner". Islamabad interpreted this as an Indian agreement to set up a working group on Kashmir. New Delhi naturally demurred, pointing out that Kashmir and peace and security were issues which were to be tackled by the foreign secretaries. This did not satisfy Islamabad.

These differences were responsible for Islamabad holding back on its decision to carry on with the third round of talks in Delhi. Ahmad finally arrived, saying Pakistan had got some partial clarifications from New Delhi and further talks were required. But he does not seem to have got any clarifications, and returned without operationalising the mechanisms, which was the main objective of the third round.

AS soon as he landed in Lahore after the talks, Ahmad blamed India for backtracking on the June 23 statement. Said he: "If this round has remained inconclusive, it's because the other side has resiled from the agreement as set out in the Islamabad joint statement. On our part, we could not compromise on our principled position with regard to the Kashmir issue, which in our view lies at the heart of all problems." He referred to the "air of uncertainty" despite which he had gone to Delhi, saying it indicated Pakistan's sincerity. South Block was quick to deny it had 'resiled' from the Islama-bad joint statement.

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The outcome or the lack of it of the third round makes it easier for Pakistan to now raise the J&K issue with both Gujral and US President Bill Clinton when Sharif meets them in New York. Sharif can be expected to raise it in his speech at the UN General Assembly and make a plea for third party intervention, in this case the US.

Pakistani information minister Mushahid Hussain has already delivered a hard-hitting speech in Washington, asking for third party mediation. His anti-India stance is well known. Speaking at a recent conference on Kashmir in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, he compared India being seated in the UN Security Council to Hitler's presence at the Nuremburg trials. It is clear that neither India nor Pakistan have much space for manoeuvre. Their stances are completely irreconcilable. Foreign secretary-level talks in 1994 had ended because of similar problems. The main issue Pakistan wanted to discuss then was the modality for holding a plebiscite. India rejected the demand and a hiatus of three years followed before the two neigh-bours returned to the table.

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Indian officials are clear that they can't negotiate away the basic Indian position on Kashmir. "It is a political problem and we want it treated like that. Some subjects lend themselves to working groups, some don't. You can't put Kashmir into a straitjacket. The purpose should be to have substantive discussions, but not to be fixated on the procedures," says an Indian official. Hence, India told Islamabad that the "mechanism is a means to an end and not an end in itself". But Pakistan disagrees and sticks by its position. In a skilful propaganda exercise, Pakistan has often tried to project that it is easier to deal with Gujral, who it argues is reasonable, who can make concessions and whose famed doctrine lends itself to being flexible with India's neighbours (though Gujral has said it does not extend to Pakistan) than Indian officials and diplomats who create all the difficulties. Now that the initiative has moved to New York, Islamabad may try to use this tack to get some concessions from the prime minister.

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Indian officials say Islamabad is unlikely to succeed. "We realise attempts will be made to generate pressure on India, but how intense it will be is difficult to speculate," says an Indian official. Adding that such tactics can easily be handled, he asks, "why does everyone doubt the government's ability to deal with these with confidence?"

It is a positive indication that both foreign secretary K. Raghunath and Ahmad have spoken of carrying on with dialogue. There was speculation that Islamabad may break off the talks, blame India for its intransigence and take propaganda advantage through it in New York. It would also fall in with its campaign to prevent India getting into the UN Security Council, whenever it is expanded. But breaking off the difficult parleys with India would be worse than Indian intransigence and can't possibly fetch it much dividend. The two premiers have a tough exercise ahead. Given their respective compulsions, it is difficult to see what they can do, despite the measured reaction of US undersecretary of state for South Asia, Karl Inderfurth, to the outcome of the New Delhi talks.

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