Making A Difference

Keeping America's Peace

An infantry division has been identified to be sent to Iraq. But would helping America help India's cause at home? <a href=pti_coverage.asp?gid=25>Updates</a>

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Keeping America's Peace
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It's a dilemma New Delhi will have to resolve soon: should it send troops to Iraq to undertake perilous policing activities? This question has deeply engrossed the establishment in New Delhi, divided as it is over the sagacity of a move which is bound to generate tremendous sound and fury. As New Delhi mulls over the issue, and attempts to reconcile differences in the establishment, sources say an infantry division has already been identified to leave for Iraq on short notice.

The debate was sparked off from the time Washington sought to ascertain from New Delhi whether or not it was inclined to participate robustly in the long-term reconstruction of Iraq including sending troops to maintain internal stability in the war-ravaged nation. In a series of conversations between Indian and American leaders, New Delhi signalled it wasn't averse to playing such a role. The Indian leaders, though, did add a caveat: India needed a sufficient UN cover for its prospective activities in Iraq. The most recent of these conversations included meetings between US secretary of state Colin Powell and foreign minister Yashwant Sinha in Moscow, between national security advisor Brajesh Mishra and US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage in London, and during Mishra's informal meet with US president George Bush.

The question of sending troops to Iraq is sensitive because Parliament had in April passed a resolution expressing consternation at Washington's decision to invade Iraq without a clear UN mandate. The resolution then went on to call for a quick withdrawal of coalition forces.

Obviously, Washington has its own reasons for seeking troop contribution in Iraq from other nations. This could, for one, facilitate the US to withdraw a couple of divisions of its own troops and hand over the increasingly messy business of internal policing and related activities to reliable partners.

Once India signalled it wasn't opposed play to a role in Iraq, New Delhi and Washington gingerly picked their way through a minefield of issues that could clear the ground for taking this political decision. India wants an adequate distinction to be made between occupying powers in Iraq and those countries that could engage it over the long haul. Much of this is about nomenclature, a crucial factor in any parliamentary debate.

Consequently, New Delhi argued it would be helpful if the (ruling) authority in Iraq was civilian in nature and had, in some ways, the sanctity of the UN. It also wanted the UN to make a direct appeal for troop contributions to stabilise and secure Iraq. There was also the tricky question of command and control—an Indian troop commander, New Delhi argued, could not be seen to be reporting directly to US military authority.

These conditions have been met in some measure by UN Resolution 1483, which removed sanctions on Iraq, and through certain steps the US has taken. The contentious command and control issue, for instance, has been resolved through a parcelling of Iraq into sectors, each under a division. Thus, an Indian divisional commander would be his own boss in the sector assigned to him.

Obviously, each sector's commander would need to report to the civilian authority in Baghdad. And though the existing authority is not Iraqi by any stretch of imagination, it has been sanctified because UN Resolution 1483 now recognises it. It also in its preamble distinguishes between the occupying powers and those countries that are working now or may work in the future under the authority. The first paragraph also appeals to UN members to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq, a reference, sources say, that was included at India's behest. Implicitly, the resolution recognises that the existing authority in Iraq can't on its own usher in stability there. These are aspects the government can cite to bolster its argument for sending Indian troops to Iraq, should it ultimately decide upon it.

Yet, there are many who wonder whether the UN resolution provides a good enough cover—and justification—for India to move into Iraq, which hasn't yet showed signs of emerging from the chaos it was plunged into. There is also some disquiet in the political establishment that should the situation in Iraq take an ugly turn, it could prove disastrous in the general election that is only a year away in India.

Again, though policing in Iraq is UN-recognised, it won't be UN-authorised. This means Indian troops in Iraq won't operate under the UN flag, something which India hasn't done in its dozen peacekeeping activities overseas. It also raises another question: who'd defray the expenses Indian troops would incur? Since the UN won't be paying, either the US finds ways of reimbursing expenses or India itself funds this operation. The last has the potential of kicking up a storm.

It is not immediately evident whether there is any compelling quid pro quo that would make it easy for the government to justify its decision to send troops to Iraq. Diplomatic sources, though, feel that assistance in stabilising Iraq would enhance India's chances of bagging contracts there. They say the cost of sending one of India's 34 divisions is not "going to break the bank" anyway. And though the defence ministry is reportedly enthusiastic about the Iraq project, even some here warn, "It doesn't make sense to clean up the Americans' mess at our expense, especially if there is a possibility of us losing our men." The fact that an infantry division has been readied suggests all that is awaited is a formal request for such troop requirement, and a political decision to go ahead when the request comes in.

This has riled those opposed to the idea. A senior government source is aghast: "It is a case of chasing a desert mirage. Do you have to sell your soul to get there? If the Americans gain a lot from this and we don't gain anything concrete in terms of national interest, it's far more desirable to be principled rather than pragmatic."

Diplomats who have served in the region have no hesitation in saying that "activism for the sake of activism is foolish". They say India's experience shows that it is incapable, because of a variety of factors, of executing any major project in the region as a primary contractor. "The 30-40 projects we handled in Iraq—relating to water supply, sewerage, bridges, grain silos, fly-overs—were all middle-level projects. For these we are in any case competitive, if there is a fair tender system. Otherwise what seems to be going on amounts to blackmail." In other words, India is mulling over the idea of sending troops to Iraq because it fears the US might otherwise muscle it out from reconstruction in Iraq, or what one Indian politician described as, "the feast of vultures".

Another imponderable is the situation in Iraq. What will be the consequence if Iraq doesn't stabilise, or the interim authority comprising Iraqis—the exercise to build one has been now postponed from May to July—isn't accepted by the people? Will India be considered an occupying force, never mind the UN resolution, if the existing anti-US sentiment spirals out of control? The government apparently hopes that the possible negatives arising from such a decision would be outweighed through vastly improved ties with the US.

This too, at the moment, is subject to debate. What's clear is a decision to go into Iraq would mean India joining America's 'coalition of the willing', however unwilling it might be to accept it.

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